To the Editor:

Major Craft frames my research as propaganda and implies that anyone who agrees with me is being manipulated by the gay lobby. Even if this were true, Craft does not show that lifting the gay ban would undermine readiness. And, when one realizes that Craft's accusations about my scholarship are, at best, without merit, his failure to engage in honest debate becomes even more apparent. To save space, the editors asked me not to use footnotes, but I have posted documentation for this reply at www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu. [Web editor's note: you are reading the fully footnoted version now.]

Craft asserts that "lifting the ban on homosexuality would significantly detract from combat readiness." But why, if allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly undermines readiness, hasn't anyone been able to identify a single military whose effectiveness deteriorated after the elimination of a ban? [1] To the contrary, U.S. officials praise the performance of Britain and other coalition partners. Scholars at RAND and PERSEREC have concluded that eliminating the ban would not undermine readiness. [2] Admiral John Hutson, former Navy JAG, says that the ban is a failed policy that undermines the military, and General Wesley Clark says the ban does not work. [3] During the first Gulf War, the ban was suspended via stop-loss order without any apparent impact on readiness. [4] Military leaders know that gays don't undermine readiness, or they would never suspend the ban during war.

Craft claims that because gay service members are likely to contract HIV and other STDs, lifting the ban would "overwhelm the military's limited health care system." But many thousands of gays already serve without overwhelming the system, and lifting the ban will not increase their numbers significantly. [5] Currently, approximately 1,000 service members are HIV-positive (.07% of the force) and all personnel are screened for HIV prior to accession and frequently thereafter. [6] There is no evidence that the health care systems of any of the 24 foreign militaries that lifted their bans have been overwhelmed or that rates of HIV or other STDs increased as a result of integration. [7]

According to Craft, gays live "unhealthy, high-risk" lifestyles. But DoD reports that 41.8% of service members engage in binge drinking, 17.9% do not wear motorcycle helmets, and 57.9% of those who are unmarried and sexually active did not use condoms during their last sexual encounter, a troubling finding given our history in places like Olongapo. [8] Sound public policy would address risky behavior as a service-wide problem rather than singling out gays.

While Craft invents imagined costs he asserts would result from lifting the ban, even though no organizations that lifted bans experienced such problems, he ignores actual costs the Pentagon must pay to sustain DADT. These include wasted money and talent and embarrassing media coverage that sometimes puzzles the American public, 79% of which believes that gays should be allowed to serve openly according to a December, 2003 Gallup poll. [9]

As to Craft's charges that my methodology and evidence are flawed, respected, mainstream social scientists see things differently; my work on gays in the military appears in highly-regarded, peer-review journals such as International Security and Armed Forces and Society which are neither liberal nor pro-gay, and which do not publish research based on flimsy methodology or data. [10]

Craft questions a passage that says, "A 1995 internal report from the Canadian government on the lifting of the ban concluded, 'Despite all the anxiety that existed through the late 80s into the early 90s about the change in policy, here's what the indicators show ‚ no effect.'" The supporting footnote cites a "Personal communication with Karol Wenek, Directorate of Policy Analysis and Development, Canadian Forces, 20 January, 2000." I cited Wenek rather than the document ("Briefing Note for Director of Public Policy," Ottawa, Canadian Forces, 25 August 1995), because the Parameters quote was Wenek's description of the report's conclusion. I am glad to share the report or connect interested scholars with Wenek.

My research for the Parameters article consisted of extensive literature reviews and interviews of officers and enlisted personnel, ministry representatives, academics, veterans, politicians, and nongovernmental observers (the latter group included activists). Craft questions my decision to interview activists, but consider how vigilantly women's groups monitor the U.S. military for trouble. [11] My colleagues and I included activists among our interviewees because they are among the most likely to know whether integration caused problems in their countries.

Craft finds it "surprising [that] apparently none of the experts, including the anti-gay ones, had an opinion in support of the gay ban worthy to be included in [my] findings." But none reported that readiness suffered as a result of integration. Consider, for example, Professor Christopher Dandeker, former Chair of War Studies at Kings College London and perhaps the most distinguished scholar of the British military. In 1999, Dandeker wrote that if Britain lifted its ban, readiness would deteriorate. After British policy changed, Dandeker concluded that his prediction had been incorrect. [12] I am glad to help Craft or others contact our interviewees to verify our findings.

Craft claims I did not interview all possible experts, and says my article "fails to identify any... documents and offers no specific data." But Parameters does not allow authors to publish complete bibliographies. I invite anyone interested in my source lists to consult the extensive reference sections of studies listed in footnote 6 of the article. [13] As those studies explain in detail, my colleagues and I used standard social scientific practices to ensure that our search for documents and experts was thorough.

Finally, Craft mischaracterizes my position on anecdotes and statistics. Anecdotes are useful when they illustrate trends. But even a large number of anecdotes featuring red-haired soldiers who undermine readiness would not demonstrate that red-haired soldiers undermine readiness on average. The dishonesty of the 1993 Congressional hearings was not the inclusion of anecdotes about gay service members who undermined readiness, but the failure to determine whether those anecdotes represented overall trends. [14] By contrast, when the totality of experts on a particular military testifies that there is no indication that lifting a ban undermined readiness, that is not anecdotal evidence.

I would welcome the opportunity to analyze the unit cohesion rationale statistically, and I requested permission to conduct such a study. The Pentagon declined to cooperate, and its refusal, which I'll share with interested readers, is fascinating. My complaint about surveys used to justify DADT is not that they are statistical, but that heterosexual dislike of gays is not evidence that lifting the ban would undermine readiness. For example, 66% of male British service members said they would not serve with gays if the ban was lifted, but ultimately the policy transition proved unproblematic. [15]

What about personal and political bias? Perhaps the most important distinction between honest scholarship and propaganda turns on a commitment to report embarrassing findings, to avoid reaching conclusions prior to examining the evidence, and to change one's mind when data contradict original expectations. My institute's staff and I always report findings that do not confirm our expectations or beliefs (see, for example, the third case of "Multinational Military Units"at www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu), which is why Charles Moskos, architect of DADT, wrote in an email that my scholarship is "reflective of integrity and honesty." When I asked Moskos for permission to use the quote in this essay, he responded, "Aaron, absolutely. Moreover, I have mentioned to many others that your reporting facts not supportive of your position is more remarkable and rare". [16]

While my passion for research derives in part from a desire to hold experts who fail to tell the truth accountable, my research conclusions follow from evidence, not from personal beliefs. Here's proof. If Craft or others can identify foreign militaries whose effectiveness deteriorated or whose health care systems were overwhelmed as a result of eliminating a ban, I will modify my views accordingly. (My institute will entertain fellowship applications for this research, as always, in good faith). [17]

The difference between Craft and me is not that one of us is political while the other is devoted to fact, but that I examine all available data to determine whether the costs of the ban outweigh its benefits, and remain open to changing my views if the evidence warrants, while Craft actively seeks data, sometimes from dubious sources, and ignores other evidence, to justify his predetermined position. [18] As I argued in my Parameters article, the gay ban is based on prejudice, not concerns about readiness, and prejudice tends to defy reasoned deliberation.