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Introduction

The United States remains one of several NATO-member countries that bans gays and lesbians who acknowledge their sexual orientation from serving in the military. In 1993, when President Bill Clinton attempted to compel the Pentagon to lift its gay ban, military and Congressional leaders responded that unit cohesion would suffer if the armed forces allowed gay and lesbian personnel to acknowledge their sexuality. They reasoned that if gays were allowed to serve openly, military units would no longer be able to function effectively in combat. According to their arguments, heterosexual service personnel would not willingly trust gay peers with their lives, and such discomfort and distrust would undermine unit cohesion.[1] The subsequent compromise between the White House, the military and Congress is known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” a policy which was designed to allow gays and lesbians to serve in the armed forces as long as they refrained from self-identifying as homosexuals.

Despite the importance of the unit cohesion rationale as the official justification for the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, there has been no direct test of its plausibility.[2] Several scholarly studies have addressed the theoretical foundation of the unit cohesion rationale, and others have analyzed the experiences of foreign militaries that have lifted their gay bans.[3] Despite these studies, however, the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy itself has made it impossible to study the plausibility of the unit cohesion rationale directly, in the context of heterosexual American military personnel who serve alongside gay and lesbian peers. Because American gay and lesbian service members cannot reveal their sexual orientation to peers or to scholars, such an analysis is not possible.

One empirical context that allows a more direct examination of the plausibility of the unit cohesion rationale, however, is multinational military units that include openly gay personnel from foreign armed forces who serve alongside Americans. As multinational military operations have become more common, it has become possible to ask whether and how U.S. personnel might be affected by the presence of acknowledged homosexual service members from other countries. An examination of multinational military units may be the most direct option for assessing the plausibility of the unit cohesion rationale.

This study begins by describing various settings in which U.S. personnel serve with non-U.S. personnel in multinational units. Then, it explores the official and unofficial policies and administrative mechanisms that organizations such as NATO and the United Nations have put into place to monitor differences in personnel policies among member nations. The study then presents five case studies of gay non-American service members who served with Americans in multinational military units or operations. Finally, a conclusion summarizes key findings.

The study’s primary conclusion is that the presence of acknowledged gay service members does not compromise unit cohesion or operational effectiveness in multinational military units. American personnel are able to interact with and work successfully with acknowledged gay personnel from foreign militaries. When occasional conflicts do arise, they tend to be minor and to be resolved successfully in an informal manner. On an institutional level, the study also finds that neither NATO nor the United Nations has addressed the coordination of divergent policies concerning sexual orientation in an official manner, largely because these organizations are preoccupied with more pressing concerns, and because homosexual personnel are not seen as sources of tension, even for U.S. personnel.

Methodology

The first phase of the study involved collecting all relevant information on multinational military operations, which was systemically gathered from publicly available primary and secondary sources. All prior research materials relevant to multinational forces and sexual orientation by governmental, academic, and policy-focused organizations was identified, retrieved and analyzed (n=53).[4] Lexis/Nexis search retrievals for all news articles and wire service dispatches relating to homosexuality and multinational forces were analyzed (n=9). Major academic, non-governmental and military officials familiar with gay military issues and multinational operations (n=16) were identified through snowball sampling and interviewed.

The second phase of this study involved identifying and interviewing openly gay, non-U.S. service members who served in some capacity with U.S. personnel. Interviewees were identified through an extensive outreach effort, which involved using well-established networks of military scholars, government officials, and nongovernmental organizations to recruit openly gay non-U.S. personnel to be interviewed (n=5). Once these individuals were identified, they were interviewed carefully to maximize breadth of evidence and minimize bias. The study authors provided multiple opportunities for personnel to remain anonymous or go “off record” to encourage full disclosure; interviews were conducted privately over the telephone with all but one subject, avoiding social pressures common in focus groups; the value of accurate and comprehensive responses was emphasized; subjects were encouraged to have colleagues with differing views or experiences contact the study authors on conditions of anonymity if preferred; and interviews were solicited with informed observers to corroborate findings and advise the study authors of potential sources of bias.

After these initial interviews were conducted, substantial efforts were made to locate and identify all U.S. personnel who worked with interviewees (n=7). Unfortunately, no U.S. personnel were interviewed for this study. Five were unable to be located, due to security restrictions imposed by the war on terror. The two who were located declined to be interviewed. Other difficulties were faced in identifying potential U.S. personnel to be interviewed. For example, one gay service member could not release his colleagues’ names because of the classified nature of his work.

This study relies on a multi-method approach to compare and synthesize evidence from a number of different sources to draw conclusions. Whenever possible, independent observations from multiple sources are compared to draw out common findings that are consistent among observers in different sectors. During the interview process, the study authors also sought to ensure the broadest number of sources by repeatedly asking experts from different sectors for recommendations of additional sources of information.

Multinational military units: a brief survey

Since the end of the Cold War, multinational force deployment has become an increasingly common and important strategy for international military and peacekeeping interventions.[5] Historically, multinational or multiethnic forces have existed in varying configurations for thousands of years. Whether in the form of mercenaries, forces in multi-racial states, colonial forces, or military alliances, “[h]eterogeneous armies appear in fact to have been the rule rather than the exception.”[6] International military operations in the twentieth century only confirm this observation. The current context for multinationality in the world’s militaries has resulted largely from the political alliances that developed after World War II, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN) giving rise to increasing military and political cooperation between member states and laying the foundation for many of the world’s current multinational military and peacekeeping operations. Yet multinational military actions during the Cold War can hardly compare in number or impact of those since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since the Persian Gulf War, the past fourteen years have seen a dramatic rise in the use of multinational forces, and events in the early twenty-first century suggest that multinational military operations will become more common.[7]

The end of the Cold War marked an important shift in how militaries conceptualized the use of multinational forces and considered participating in them. Much attention has been paid to the effects of military downsizing in the early 1990s, and this trend has clearly impacted many countries’ willingness to participate in multinational forces, which are seen as a means for maintaining viable militaries on leaner budgets.[8] The early 1990s also saw the U.S. successfully lead a multinational coalition against Iraq. The Persian Gulf War marked a watershed moment in multinational military coalitions. Many military officials, politicians, and scholars have heralded this military action as an example of what effective multinational deployments look like. Nations as disparate as Egypt, Pakistan, France, and Britain, as well as U.S. and its allies, took six weeks to carry out a military campaign with minimal losses.[9]

Prior to the Persian Gulf War and the end of the Cold War, such large-scale multinational deployments were much less common. After World War II, the Korean War was the first international conflict that drew upon multinational forces in which the U.S. participated. During this time, the UN also incorporated multinational strategies into its evolving peacekeeping operations. Yet prior to 1990, the UN sponsored only thirteen peacekeeping operations, as compared to the forty-one it has conducted since that time. As of 2002 there were fifteen operations underway. The U.S. has participated in eight of these operations. [10]

Since the Persian Gulf War and up through mid-1999, Western militaries were involved in fifty-four military actions, including NATO mandated actions, UN peacekeeping operations, and a variety of domestic security and humanitarian activities. The roles they played range from the mobilization of U.S. Army reservists to fight fires in Washington State in July 1994 to the U.S., British, and French air strikes against Serbs in Croatia, the largest NATO military action during this period, in November of the same year. The United States participated in forty of these actions, and nineteen of them involved U.S. forces deploying in some fashion with military personnel from other nations.[11]

In fact, multinationality is one of the key elements that characterize the postmodern military, a term that has been applied to Western militaries in the post-Cold War environment and that denotes a number of changes that these militaries are undergoing. They include fewer distinctions between the civilian and military realms, increasingly similarities within the military and between branches, a shift from national defense to peace-keeping missions, an increase in how often national militaries deploy in the service of international organizations, and the increasing internationalization of military forces themselves.[12] The missions of many Western militaries are in transition, and participating in multinational forces allows individual nations and their militaries to better accomplish their defense and security goals in this new era. Postmodern militaries are also characterized by the “erosion of marital values,” especially those associated with traditional understandings of sexuality, sexual orientation, and masculinity.[13] Generally speaking, these changes have resulted in a growing willingness to allow gays and lesbians to serve in many Western militaries. Britain, Germany, Canada, Australia, and Israel, for example, are among twenty-four foreign armed forces that have lifted their gay bans since the Dutch became the first military to do so in 1974.[14]

Multinational forces and U.S. personnel

Since World War II, the U.S. has engaged in a number of military actions and peacekeeping operations that can be considered multinational in force composition. In traditional military terms, the U.S. has contributed forces to NATO and participated in military actions under NATO mandates, as well as leading its own multinational coalitions, such the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and the recently-concluded invasion of Iraq. It has actively supported UN peacekeeping operations, contributing hundreds of personnel over the past forty-eight years. As well, the U.S. has led or sponsored its own peacekeeping missions, such as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai and the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. Other sites in which U.S. personnel serve or work with service members from other countries include NATO headquarters, war colleges in the U.S. and abroad, and NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command.

In the United States and abroad, officers of various nationalities interact quite closely in war colleges and multinational headquarters. In a study of international military cooperation, Charles C. Moskos interviewed international officers at American war, command and staff colleges, as well as interviewing officers at the Joint Service Command Staff College in the United Kingdom and at SHAPE, NATO headquarters, in Belgium. According to Moskos, “In 2001, close to 9,000 foreign military officers coming from over 100 countries received some sort of professional training in American military programs.”[15] As a result of these exchange opportunities, officers are exposed to numerous, distinct national cultures at the National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Army War College, Air War College, Marine Corps University, Army Command General Staff College, and Navy Staff College. The most significant exchange program is the International Military Education and Training (IMET). Approximately 400 international officers take part in this program every year, providing U.S. military personnel with important cultural training as they prepare for increasing interaction with multinational forces.[16] U.S. personnel also serve with non-American personnel at NATO headquarters or Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Approximately 800 officers serve in NATO headquarters, which includes not only officers from NATO members, but also those from members of Partnership for Peace countries, including Eastern European countries and former republics from the Soviet Union.[17]

Although U.S. personnel often interact quite closely with personnel from other NATO member states in NATO multinational headquarters, mostly at the command level, the degree of multinational integration varies greatly in NATO’s standing multinational land forces. For example, the I German/Netherlands Corps is one of most deeply integrated NATO multinational land forces. It is not merely multinational in name, but in function, as well. Defense ministers of both countries have pledged to change national laws where necessary to facilitate this merger, and the “two governments have the stated aim of providing the Corps Commander, irrespective of nationality, the ability of exercising the equivalent of Full Command over the corps headquarters and subordinate units.”[18] In stark contrast, the two corps in which U.S. personnel serve are multinational in name only and are clearly non-integrated. As Young writes, “The two corps headquarters remain national and cooperation is effected through the presence of a small number of exchange staff officers.”[19] Even though U.S. and German personnel are able to interact in theory, it is only possible at the command level through such staff exchanges.

In general, even though the alliance structure of NATO affords personnel from member countries limited exposure to each other, traditionally in most combat situations, service personnel from different nations typically do not fight alongside each other. Typically, multinational interoperability takes place at or above the battalion, ship, or aircraft level, which means that while commanders or upper-level personnel may interact with each other, personal contact between service members below these levels occurs infrequently.[20] The exceptions include small Special Forces operations, ACE Rapid Reactions Forces, and aircrew in NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C) Force. As well, personnel may be assigned as liaison staff or they may serve in exchange posts.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. personnel have served in a wide variety of peacekeeping missions, some controlled by the UN, others merely authorized by the international body.[21] As of July 31, 2002, 691 U.S. personnel were involved in UN-controlled peace operations around the world. Most of these personnel are civilian police (659), and the remaining are military personnel, 31 of whom serve as military observers with just one in a military role. UN-controlled peacekeeping operations tend to be fairly integrated, and as Colonel Michael Dooley writes, “In general, U.S. personnel assigned to UN-controlled peace operations (as contrasted with UN-authorized peace operations) work closely with personnel from other nations.”[22] The U.S. contributes many more troops to other types of peace operations. More than 8,450 U.S. military personnel serve in operations such as the Multi-national Force and Observers (MFO) sponsored by the U.S. or in Bosnia under NATO mandates.[23] In these types of operations, there is much less interaction between national contingents: “In general, the U.S. provides individual staff members to multi-national headquarters and … units to perform specific tasks/missions.”[24] This arrangement allows national contingents to maintain direct command over their military personnel.

NORAD is a binational organization created by the United States and Canada to monitor and control North American aerospace. NORAD headquarters are located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, along with a command and control center at Cheyenne Mountain Air Station. Three subordinate headquarters are located in Alaska, Manitoba, and Florida. Both Canadian and U.S. military personnel staff these headquarters. Approximately 120 Canadians are stationed at NORAD headquarters in Colorado, with an additional 180 Canadian personnel serving in Alaska and Florida. Approximately 70 U.S. personnel serve in Canada. Overall, the ratio of American to Canadian personnel assigned to NORAD is 3 to 1.[25]

Multinational forces and personnel policies

NATO

Generally speaking, NATO does not set policies of any sort for its member states, but encourages standardization to promote effective military cooperation among members. As an “intergovernmental organization in which member countries retain their sovereignty and independence,” NATO respects the personnel policies of its member states and has no power to change them.[26] Yet since its inception NATO has been concerned about standardization, and to this end, the NATO Standardization Group was formed. As the “central Alliance body for remedying existing deficiencies,” it works to mitigate the most extreme differences between member countries and facilitates the “dual aims of standardization: enhancing NATO’s military posture, and making more efficient use of available resources.”[27] NATO standardization agreements, (STANAGS) are divided into three areas: operational, material, and administrative. Operational standards apply to concepts, doctrines, tactics, logistics, and training, while material standards refer to “production codes of practices and material specifications,”[28] including weapons and communications systems, ammunition, fuel, and supplies. Administrative standards set common terminology for NATO personnel to use in the previous two areas.

NATO and its member countries view standardization as a flexible concept that is used when necessary. It is not the goal of the Alliance to create an absolute unified system. Standardization among NATO members is voluntary and a “means of achieving the desired end, but is not an end in itself.”[29] As Joseph I. Coffey notes, “Every nation … has insisted on maintaining its own armed forces, which are organized, trained and equipped to serve national ends as well as those of the Atlantic alliance.”[30] Even though NATO cannot require standardization without threatening each nation’s sovereignty, NATO leaders encourage standardization when they deem that doing so would promote efficiency.

Yet in relation to military personnel, NATO has even less authority to dictate policy. There has never been a STANAG that specifies the kinds of personnel each member state can contribute to NATO forces or deployments. Each NATO member retains to the right to select personnel they contribute to NATO and is “responsible individually … to equip the forces which they have earmarked for or assigned to NATO.”[31] Thus, NATO encourages members to view standardization as means to create enough commonality between militaries—primarily in areas such as equipment interoperability and military doctrine—to facilitate effective cooperation without impeding on their sovereignty over their own militaries. Attaining standardization has not been simple, and the more pressing difficulties of synchronizing sometimes disparate militaries in terms of basic doctrine and equipment interoperability have meant that little if any attention has been given to questions of cultural interoperability.[32]

The question of women’s roles in multinational units is an imperfect corollary to the question of homosexual personnel in similar situations, but it does provide a useful analogy that has received slightly more attention in both organizational and academic publications.[33] No STANAGS address the issue of women or homosexual personnel with regard to NATO force composition or management. Within the last decade, however, NATO has started to address issues concerning women in the military, creating the International Office on Women in the NATO Forces in 1997. As Admiral Guido Venturoni, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, noted during the fiftieth anniversary of NATO, “women continue to prove they can serve with distinction in the military services and their numbers have grown significantly.”[34] NATO members continue to allow more military opportunities for women, and women’s presence in multinational operations has increased: “This contribution is most visible in the NATO-led SFOR multinational force in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, and now KFOR, where military women serve side-by-side with their male counterparts bringing stability and security to this troubled region.”[35]

NATO has no policy for managing conflicts between countries that maintain different policies about women’s roles in the military, and the lack of administrative policy leaves little guidance about how to deal with problems that may arise. Officially, the alliance’s respect for national sovereignty means that member countries must respect all others’ policies on women as well as gay and lesbian personnel. Yet recent discussion at NATO headquarters and with the International Military Staff about creating clear guidelines concerning sexual harassment suggests a need for policies that would apply to all member nations that send personnel to staff NATO headquarters. Such policies would not contradict national personnel policies that stipulate conditions on who can or cannot serve in the military, but would require some countries to work with women in contexts they may not officially condone in their national settings.[36]

According to scholars who study NATO, the Alliance faces many more pressing issues than setting administrative guidelines for women in NATO forces, much less homosexual personnel. Thomas-Durrel Young observes, “[T]here are so many other issues in trying to make multinationality work that something like this [dealing with homosexual personnel] just pales.”[37] According to many of his publications, as well as other scholars’ work on U.S. participation in multinational NATO forces, problems related to command and control are the key impediments to the effectiveness and viability of NATO multinational forces and the greatest threat to national sovereignty.[38] Because each nation is responsible for raising, training, and equipping personnel that it deploys to NATO multinational land forces, the NATO multinational force commander retains a very limited and narrow type of control over personnel assigned to the mission. Emphasizing the difficulties this presents for accomplishing military objectives, Young asks, “[H]ow can Allied commanders plan to employ such formations in crisis and war, given the legal, political and financial restrictions placed upon them by sovereign contributors?”[39]

The degree to which NATO commanders can assume full command over their forces remains limited: “no multinational force commander … has the same command authority over subordinated foreign units as he would have in an equivalent national command.”[40] Dieter Fleck concurs with Young’s analysis: “No NATO commander has full command over the forces assigned to him. Instead, nations … delegate only operational command or operational control.”[41] To insure that personnel working under the auspices of NATO follow national laws and policies, each nation appoints a national commander who exercises full command. It is through such national contingent commanders that the “nation retains full responsibility for administration, personnel management and discipline, in addition to logistic support.”[42] Hence, NATO’s respect for national sovereignty requires a de facto support for gays and lesbians who serve in integrated NATO missions. As long as NATO member countries allow them to serve, the alliance itself must respect and support their presence. [43]

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

In terms of command and control issues and personnel management, NORAD functions similarly to NATO. As a binational organization, it is not considered integrated, as personnel retain membership in their national forces and remain subject to all national and military laws and policies. The NORAD command structure itself reflects this binational character: the commander in chief of NORAD is a U.S. four-star general; the deputy commander in chief is a Canadian three-star general. The regional headquarters are set up in a similar fashion. At the Canadian Forces Base in Winnipeg, Manitoba, a Canadian general is in command, while a U.S. general serves as deputy. In this way, a national commander is present at every NORAD installation, thus allowing national commanders to exercise full authority over personnel from their countries. All disciplinary action remains a national concern, and personnel are not subject to the personnel policies of the other country.[44]

Unite Nations

While NATO and NORAD have created no policies that address the issue of gay and lesbian personnel, the United Nations does have a few institutional mechanisms in place that deal with issues relating to sexual orientation. The official position of the UN regarding discrimination of any kind is reflected in its upholding of the principle of universal human rights, which ostensibly includes sexual orientation. Juan Carlos Brandt, Associate Spokesman for the Secretary General mentioned at a daily press briefing in 1997 that the “United Nations does not discriminate on the basis of nationality, gender, religion, or sexual orientation.”[45] Yet such statements have not always translated into concrete policies. As Jan Koller, President of the United Nations Gay Lesbian or Bisexual Employees (UNGLOBE), writes, “Internally, in spite of claims of non-discrimination, the UN does not extend any benefits such as visas, insurance, etc., … to same sex partners, nor does it have any policies specifically dealing with discrimination based on sexual orientation.”[46] In spite of the lack of a clear policy, Koller suggests that the UN is beginning to look more closely at the issue of sexual orientation under the broader considerations of human rights: “The High Commission for Human Rights has started to include sexual orientation issues in her reports, and agencies … have begun to press for benefits for GLB staff. The working environment has also changed dramatically.”[47] The formation of UNGLOBE in April, 1996 is perhaps the most visible indicator that the UN is slowly taking steps to insure greater equality for gay, lesbian, and bisexual staff.[48]

Even though the UN is taking small steps to address sexual orientation issues that concern its administrative staff, it currently has no policy with regard to sexual orientation for personnel who participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN have no knowledge of any policy in this regard and “could not think of any instance in a mission when this [sexual orientation] became an issue, whether in regard to differences in policy among the various TCCs [troop contributing countries], command and control, integration, or personnel/admin conflicts.”[49] As DPKO acknowledges, an issue in any of these areas would have to be of serious magnitude to warrant attention, and it is quite possible that low-level conflicts have occurred. Most likely, contingent commanders would have dealt with such problems locally. Interestingly, DPKO notes that “no departing Force Commander and Chief Military Observer has ever mentioned the issue in an end-assignment report, where more general observations and recommendations to DPKO are shared.”[50] From the institution’s point of view, there may be no pressing need to address the issue, as it has not caused any problems for the UN in its administration of peacekeeping operations.[51]

One possible reason why the DPKO has heard of no problems with regard to sexual orientation and peacekeeping missions may pertain to the authority that national militaries retain over their personnel in the field. Similar to NATO and NORAD, service personnel working under a UN banner are subject to the rules and regulations of their own national governments. In addition, they are subject to UN policies and must respect laws of the host country in which they are deployed. As a Joint Chiefs of Staff publication on peacekeeping operations makes clear:

Normally, military and civilian personnel of a PKO [peacekeeping operation] remain under the criminal jurisdiction of their own nations … [Members of a PKO] must respect the laws, regulations, religions, and mores of the host nation and other parties, and refrain from all political activity and other activity inconsistent with the requirement of strict neutrality. Members of the PKO remain subject to their national contingent’s code of military law.[52]

Similar to NATO and NORAD, national contingent commanders comprise part of the force that a nation deploys to a UN peacekeeping operation. They are “responsible for disciplinary action within their own contingents in accordance with their national codes of military law.”[53] The authority for these national contingent commanders to carry out this role typically is included in the status of forces agreements (SOFA) that establish the legality of the peacekeeping operation.[54]

The clarity, though, of national sovereignty in the formation of peacekeeping operations has become a source of confusion in the field. Similar to the evaluations of NATO that have taken place in the past ten years, experts on UN peacekeeping operations see command and control issues as central to the challenges facing the UN as it continues its peacekeeping endeavors. Exploring problems that the military component of UN peacekeeping operations face, Stuart Gordon cites “institutional confusion, a lack of unity of direction, inappropriate mandates and insufficient resources” as major hurdles. He notes that these obstacles have “impinged heavily on the adequacy of command and control arrangements in UN operations such as those found within Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia in the early 1990s.”[55] Gordon is highly critical of the UN, for in contrast to NATO, he sees the UN as less prepared to martial troops under a military operation.[56] Ultimately, many scholars conclude that greater command authority must be given to commanders of multinational forces. Otherwise the ability to accomplish their missions successfully will be thwarted, risking the lives of service members under their command. If these evaluations are realized and put into place, it is unclear how such transfers of authority might influence policies concerning sexual orientation.

Multinational units and homosexual personnel: five case studies

Colonel René Holtel, Royal Netherlands Army

At the age of fifty-four, Colonel René Holtel recently retired from the Royal Netherlands Army, but throughout his career he worked with and commanded U.S. military personnel in both NATO exercises and UN peacekeeping operations. In 1978, he served as Company Commander of Army Corps Ammunition Supply Company, and during exercise “Saxon Drive” in Germany, he was ordered to replace the actual company commander who had been dismissed. One of the units under his care during the exercise was a U.S. tank battalion. In the early 1990s, in another exercise, while serving as the company commander of the 12^th Mechanical Brigade Supply Company, a U.S. platoon served under him. From early January 2001, through the end of September 2001, Holtel served with U.S. personnel at the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). During his tenure at UNMEE, he served in a variety of capacities: as Chief of Staff (COS) of the Military Observer Group, Chief Military Observer (CMO), and Chief Liaison Officer (CLSO) between UNMEE Headquarters and the respective parties’ governments in Asmara and Addis Ababa.

In July 2000, the UN Security Council established UNMEE as a means to monitor the ceasefire that had been agreed upon by Ethiopia and Eritrea. The main role of UNMEE was to “establish and maintain liaison with the parties” and “establish and put into operation the mechanism for verifying the cessation of hostilities.”[57] Its area of operations runs the length of the former colonial boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as stipulated by the Algiers Peace Agreement of December 2000. This demilitarized temporary security zone has been divided into three sections: Center, West, and East. During Holtel’s service, three separate national battalions acted as the peacekeeping military forces: Jordan operated in Section West, the Netherlands in Section Center, and Kenya in Section East (India now operates in Section Center).[58]

Officers from countries contributing personnel to the actual peacekeeping forces make up the staff of UNMEE’s military headquarters, which was located in Eritrea. Both the battalions and the headquarter staff officers are under the operational command of the UN through the Force Commander, Major General Patrick C. Cammaert, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, who is considered a UN staff member for the duration of his appointment. Operational command ostensibly gives the force commander enough authority to accomplish the strictly defined goals of the UN Mission. All other command and control issues including discipline, tour of duty, rotation, payment, legal positions, and logistics are the responsibility of the contributing countries, which a senior national officer represents at the mission. This arrangement for UNMEE is typical of UN missions, and coordination can be challenging. As Holtel wryly observed, “Like one diplomat once said, the problem of the UN is that the force commander is not in command.”

While the military force of the mission was comprised of only three nations, the Observer Group consisted of members from forty-eight different nationalities, including personnel from Western and Eastern Europe, North and South America, Australia, New Zealand, Southwest Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. During Holtel’s nine months with UNMEE, six U.S. military personnel served with him as Military Observers, ranking lieutenant colonel, major, captain—both career and reserve—from the US Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

As Chief of Staff and Chief Military Observer, Holtel organized observer teams and managed the mission’s daily operations. This vantage point allowed him to interact extensively with all the military observers. Of the U.S. personnel who worked for him, he said, “In general, the Americans performed as most members of NATO armies do; not better, not worse. They took initiatives; they knew their place, although sometimes grinding their teeth when their team leaders proved to be less than competent or active; they had their likes and dislikes; in short: they were just people, but competent ones.” Holtel did note that U.S. personnel were often better qualified than many of their colleagues with regard to military terminology, but that because English is the official language of UNMEE, this was not surprising. As in many multinational peacekeeping operations, occasional frustrations and low level conflicts emerged among US personnel and service members from other countries, but overall, Holtel observed that service members from the U.S. worked effectively and professionally with peers from other military forces.

The smooth working relationships that Holtel developed with U.S. personnel, as well as observers from other nations, was not disrupted or damaged by his disclosure of his sexual orientation. During a staff meeting at which two U.S. service members were present, Holtel’s staff discussed challenges they would face when female military observers joined them. In the course of the conversation, as staff members were speculating on the difficulties of maintaining privacy while living together in small teams in close proximity, Holtel responded by suggestively pointing out that even in all male teams, problems could arise.

And they said, “Yes, but don’t expect them to be homosexuals.” [I said,] “You’re saying that as a kind of accusation.” Then the American Major said, “Well I think it is quite abnormal.” And I told him, “Please hold your tongue, because I’m gay.” And that caused a deafening silence … He was stupefied. He didn’t know what to say. So I didn’t ask him to comment on it. I just went on with the meeting.

Although Holtel could not confirm that every U.S. service member knew of his sexual orientation after this point, his experience with such disclosures led him to believe that the news spread quite rapidly: “There’s no such thing as proof, but stories like these tend to spread like bushfire since they are generally too juicy not to be told.” Even so, Holtel refrained from encouraging such gossip, even as he disclosed his orientation.

Interestingly, no one, including the American Major, approached Holtel after this meeting to discuss his homosexuality, in spite of the surprise it stirred in those members present. Speculating as to why this might have been the case, especially for the Americans, Holtel suggested that responding to his disclosure directly might have caused others to think that a service member might have been gay, which would have caused unnecessary difficulties, especially for U.S. personnel. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Holtel recognized that his status as a full colonel and as their commanding officer might have effectively stopped any second-guessing on their part and made it difficult for U.S. personnel to ask personal questions of a taboo nature of their foreign commander.

Accordingly, Holtel was also aware of the positive results revealing explicitly what may have been suspected: “If one’s commanding officer comes out for being gay, you see then with regard to that issue … some relaxation in the unit.” His experience taught him that coming out often comforts others and allows them to focus on their jobs, rather than having to surmise and gossip about their leader’s sexuality. Coming out, he said, “causes relaxation among the straight people as well, because they are not having questions anymore about who or what their commander is.” By coming out of the closet, he said, “you make a statement. You pose a clear guideline and that is don’t f--- around with gays, because I’m not going to accept that. You don’t have to say that. You make it clear by stating that you’re gay.”

Holtel also recalled disclosing his sexual orientation to a Canadian Lieutenant Colonel who worked as his chief of operations and a Kenyan Brigadier General who replaced him as Chief Military Observer. When the Canadian learned of Holtel’s homosexuality, Holtel said, “He was quite flabbergasted. He was quite astonished hearing me say that I’m gay.” As Holtel was preparing to leave the mission, he met with his replacement:

I told him I was gay in the week that I left the mission, and he was astonished, as well. He came up with the classical reaction, “That is impossible.” So I said, “Well, that is stupid.” Well we didn’t have to deal with each other anymore because I was leaving the mission, but I’m sure it wouldn’t have made a difference for him.

When pressed to explain why he thought so, Holtel said, “Because they’re forced to cooperate with you, which means that the only way out is, well to deal with you. And then they find out that you’re fit for the job. And after that all the other considerations become minor details.”

Reflecting back on his entire career, Holtel remembered that right after the Netherlands lifted its ban on homosexual personnel, gay service members had to work harder than their heterosexual colleagues to prove that they could succeed at their jobs. Now, he said, “You can be an average officer and the fact that you’re gay is not an issue.” This appears to be no less true in an international context like a UN operation. Even though Holtel attributes his own success with UNMEE to his excellent service record, he wonders if all homosexual personnel would have to do as well to be accepted as gay. In contrast to national militaries, “There’s quite a difference because, it’s in an international environment. The United Nations doesn’t decide on careers and promotions … So that means that even if they wouldn’t like it, members of other national communities … have to deal with it, whether they like it or not.” The only recourse for someone extremely uncomfortable with a homosexual officer would be to “tell the United Nations organization that you’re completely unfit for the job.” But as Holtel points out, the political ramifications of telling contributing countries that they are sending unfit personnel make this an unlikely scenario.

Ultimately, Holtel believed his disclosure, “never affected my relations with US and other personnel in a negative way.” Describing himself, he cited his leadership style as the most important reason why he did not experience difficulties: “Oh, even if it sounds old-fashioned, I think there’s still a lot of truth in what Napoleon once said, ‘It’s the commander who makes the regiment.’ You’re the commander. You decide, and you said this is the way it’s going to be. That’s it.” This traditional view of authority characterized not only the way in which he dealt with coming out as gay to the service members who served under him, but also for many potentially contentious issues. Confronting the issue of women joining his teams of observers, he presented the issue directly to his staff as one of practical necessity. As he said to them,

“[Women] are a part of quite a lot of military organizations all over the world, and if we ask them to deliver people to the Eritrea mission, it means they could deliver men and women. And we have to deal with that. Or tell them in advance that we don’t want women. Well if you feel like doing that, then feel free.” I waited for the comments. So they decided not to do that, so we got a few women.

Overall, Holtel’s experience at UNMEE confirmed his sense that there are many more important issues facing UN peacekeeping operations than homosexuality. Ranking sexuality low on this of problems, he said that “skin color is number one on the list of priorities; the second is NATO and non-NATO; the third is male or female. And being gay or not, well it depends on how you deal with it.”

Upon leaving UNMEE Holtel received excellent evaluations and also received commendations both from his Force Commander, Brigadier General Peter Augustine Blaye, the Head of the Mission of the Organization of African Unity, and Joseph Legwaila, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for UNMEE. Legwaila’s commendation noted that:

[T]he energetic sincerity of your commitment to the Mission’s success has made you indispensable … You have been a leader in word and deed for the military observers, and a staunch defender of the Mission in your daily contacts with the parties. You leave behind a high standard of professionalism as a soldier, a peacekeeper, and a peacebuilder.

Even though Holtel somewhat modestly dismissed the importance of the praise those officials offered, he recognized that “the fact that I’m gay, because they both know, they both were aware, has nothing to do with the job you do.”

Major Philip Edwards, Technical Liaison Officer, Canadian Air Force

Major Philip Edwards has served in the Canadian Armed Forces for nineteen years. For four years, he served on the liaison staff of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and worked directly with two Pentagon agencies. In his role as Technical Liaison Officer, he came into contact with approximately 75 U.S. personnel, twenty percent of whom were military personnel, while the rest were civilians. Of the military personnel he worked with, most were mid-grade officers, including captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and occasionally full colonels.

He worked closely with another Canadian in his office, but his remaining peers were exclusively U.S. personnel. He described the tenor of this office as a “very close collegial atmosphere” and very “cordial.”[59] Relations between him and his fellow Canadian and the U.S. civilian and military staff were quite good, with the occasional healthy competition between them. Edwards described the cultural differences as apparent but minimal:

[I]t’s the, “What’s the difference between an American and Canadian?” that always comes up in issues. I would say it’s a healthy tension—either the fifty-first state of the eleventh province, depending on your perspective. But in the areas that I work in, these are very close and special relationships. Everyone involved is … governed by security regulations … but … as a foreigner, even, it’s very rare that you’ll encounter any tension.

According to Edwards, the nature of his service with the U.S. personnel allowed him to develop very close working relationships with his colleagues, and differences in national identity did little to threaten them.

The friendly work atmosphere laid a foundation for Edwards to come out and serve in his role as an openly gay officer with no detriment to the smooth workings of his office. Edwards characterized his approach to disclosing his sexual orientation as a slow gradual process. “In most cases,” he said, “people have known me quite well before they come into that part of my life.” Many of his colleagues learned of his sexual orientation through observing Edwards’ actions, rather than through explicit conversations. When appropriate, he brought his partner to social events organized through work. Edwards could not think of any negative repercussions after appearing with his partner in such situations: “I’ve not detected any change in people’s attitudes or relationship with me.” Even when the director of one of the agencies that he worked for invited him to his Christmas party, Edwards said, “‘I’m bringing my partner with me,’ and certainly no one gave me any negative repercussions or suggested that that not occur.” His coming out was a very quiet, yet very visible, statement that he considered carefully, a tactic that may have helped promote greater acceptance.

Yet Edwards was not unaware of the potential problems that could have emerged, for he did join the Canadian military long before it lifted its ban on homosexual personnel. When he considered his role as a foreign officer serving in the U.S., he recognized the need to exercise caution and restraint, not only for his own well-being, but for the way in which he represented Canada, as well. He said, “[B]ecause I understand U.S. military systems … I’ve been very deliberate in my actions … as a liaison officer, you’re a guest in the organization, so you don’t want to do anything to raise anyone’s profile in a negative way.” Yet his restraint should not be mistaken for timidity or shame in himself, for he firmly believed his sexuality posed no embarrassment for his country, nor gave Americans reason to feel uncomfortable around him or judge the value of his work. Coming out—even in a non-combat setting—required patience and the correct timing: “[I]t’s not something that I’ve been ashamed of or … scared of doing. It’s just that [it needs to happen] at the right time or the right moment.”

Yet the U.S. personnel with whom Edwards worked showed him more than just grudging acceptance. Not only did Edwards bring his partner to social functions, but also during work itself, colleagues included him in their conversations and asked about his partner. In addition, Edwards worked so well with some of his heterosexual military colleagues that they developed friendships outside of the office. When asked if he experienced any conflicts specifically with the U.S. military personnel with whom he worked, Edwards replied, “Not really, actually. A couple of them … who are straight have turned into some very good drinking buddies. I guess if you can do that outside of work hours, then I would I think that hasn’t had much effect.” Edwards concluded that “My experience has been that it [his sexual orientation] has really been a non-issue.”

Edwards’s extended service as a liaison officer in the U.S. earned him excellent evaluations from both U.S. and Canadian military officials. A retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant-General who worked with Edwards issued him a Certificate of Appreciation, which recognized his “valuable and outstanding contributions” and “ceaseless efforts to promote and enhance the close collaboration” with Canada.[60] His annual evaluation also praised him: “Major Edwards has experienced outstanding success as an LO [Liaison Officer] during his tour … He has developed into a consummate diplomat, a skilled networker. He is an explemary worker, a self-starter, who sets a high bar in personal conduct.”[61] Being open about his sexual orientation while serving with U.S. personnel did nothing to impede his successful performance, nor did it affect the recommendation of his promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel.

First Lieutenant Joop Neijenhuijzen, Royal Marechaussee, Dutch Department of Defense

From August 1992, to February 1993, First Lieutenant Joop Neijenhuijzen served as Deputy Provost Marshall in the Military Force Police in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. He was stationed in the South Camp, and most of the personnel in his barracks were from the United States. He commanded a small Dutch contingent of military police, which unlike the military police in the U.S. armed forces is distinct from the regular Dutch military.

In 1981 Egypt, Israel, and the United States created the MFO to ensure that the Camp David Accords, the peace agreements that signaled the end of the Yom Kippur War, would be upheld. The precursor to the MFO was under a UN mandate, but political differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union prompted the U.S.S.R to block the extension of UNEF II, which in turn prompted the U.S. to develop the MFO, a peacekeeping operation independent of the UN. Based in Rome, it has its own civilian director general and forces comprised initially of infantry battalions from the United States, Fiji, and Colombia. Since its inception, the U.S. has continued its involvement, and the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kindgom, and Uruguay also have contributed forces. Primarily an observer mission, the MFO acts as an impartial authority and diplomatic arbitrator.[62]

For the most part, personnel from different national contingents do not work closely together at MFO.[63] But throughout his service in the Sinai, Neijenhuijzen did interact with U.S. personnel and faced ongoing difficulties in working with them. Describing the conflict in terms of the U.S. service members’ unwillingness to comply with international standards, he emphasized how he attempted to cooperate with them, and how they failed to reciprocate:

I tried to work together, because [the] military police [should have been] seventeen people … and I had only five, and I want[ed] to make a mix of the teams. But they have to work on the standard operation procedure. And that was the problem. They won’t cooperate, but the only one who’s cooperating was me, but not the Americans.[64]

From his vantage point, Neijenhuijzen thought that the U.S. military police did not understand their proper role in the MFO, nor how to meet the goals of the mission according to standards set by the headquarters staff. Neijenhuijzen also attributes American resistance to U.S. service members’ impression that the Dutch force commander was biased against them. Neijenhuijzen observed,

Although [the US military police] thought, “Oh, because he’s Dutch, these are the rules that you made.” And I never could explain … really who made this kind of rules, because it was Israel, Egypt, America, and some other countries … Also America make this rule, I say. It’s not Holland … and all the time they [U.S. personnel] try to make the rules to what they want to be …

As Neijenhuijzen admitted, “It was for me not a happy time,” and this conflict was never resolved adequately during his tour of duty.

During Neijenhuijzen’s service in Sinai, the U.S. Congress enacted the then-new Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell law. Prior to his deployment in the Sinai, Neijenhuijzen had served without incident as an openly gay police force member in the Netherlands. Among Dutch personnel in Sinai, he said, “I was really open. I could be clear about everything.” But Neijenhuijzen exercised greater discretion with U.S. personnel. He felt he should not reveal his sexual orientation “to the Americans, because they have the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell [policy], and we have to respect this.”

Yet Neijenhuijzen’s discretion did not keep his sexual orientation secret from the Americans. “There was an [American] investigator,” he said, “and we had some investigations. He came in my room in the barracks, and at that time I had my boyfriend’s picture on my desk. He came inside, he looked to it, and he didn’t ask.” Neijenhuijzen suspects that this incident explains how U.S. personnel discovered that he was gay. Subsequently, Neijenhuijzen felt pressure from U.S. personnel to admit that he was gay, but in the context of other problems he was facing with American service members, as well as his confusion as to what would happen if he did acknowledge his sexual orientation, Neijenhuijzen resisted doing so:

Yes, they must be aware about my sexual orientation, because they sometimes try to … they want [me] to say actually, “I’m gay,” but I don’t want to say “I’m gay,” because I want to respect the rules of America … But because the problems I had with the operational procedures, I had the really strong feeling [that] they want to put me out … My chief … didn’t like this at all. He say, “Joop, be quiet, because I don’t want to have problems with the Americans.” So [if] I choose to really say, “Hello, I’m gay,” then they have a reason to put me out and bring me to North Camp...

By the time of his interview for this study, Neijenhuijzen knew that the U.S. policy towards gays would not have resulted in his dismissal from a multinational force. But at the time of his deployment in the Sinai, he was not as confident. And given the conflict that already existed with Americans in the unit, he believed that their attitudes toward homosexuality could provide them with an additional reason to question his authority.

This case study illustrates that difficulties can emerge when openly gay service members from non-American countries work with U.S. personnel in a multinational peacekeeping operation. Some might interpret this case study as an illustration of how the mere presence of an openly gay service member can erode unit effectiveness. Neijenhuijzen, by contrast, believes that the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy facilitated U.S. service members’ ability to question his authority, especially given the prior conflict between the Dutch military force police and U.S. contingent. According to Neijenhuijzen, the primary difficulty between him and his American colleagues was not his sexual orientation or even what the U.S. personnel thought of it, but rather their insistence on deviating from standard operating procedures stipulated by the Multinational Force and Observers Headquarters in Rome.

Petty Officer Writer Stuart O’Brien, Royal Australian Navy

For four months in 1999, Petty Officer Writer Stuart O’Brien served aboard the HMAS Melbourne in the Persian Gulf alongside U.S. and British ships. Operating under a UN mandate, these ships boarded Iraqi vessels suspected of breaching UN sanctions. During the operation a small group of U.S. sailors remained on O’Brien’s ship to train Australian service members. As well, additional American personnel boarded O’Brien’s ship weekly and spent time with O’Brien and his Australian colleagues.

O’Brien characterized relations between U.S. and Australian personnel as quite good: “There were no dramas whatsoever.”[65] Members from both countries worked well together, respected each other’s differences, and enjoyed the experience. Remembering time they had to socialize, O’Brien said, “We used to mix and mingle with the Americans, and there was no big dramas there. We all got along. I think they sort of realized that Australians have got a bit of a happy-go-lucky attitude … they did enjoy our presence … because we were laid back. They were on edge, and it was like, well, get on with life.” Rather than causing U.S. service members to judge or think less of the Australians, their more playful attitude may have facilitated easier interactions between members of two different cultures. As O’Brien noted, “They realized that even though we are a laid back sort of people … we do get the job done. So it was never a big issue. I think if anything it made us more approachable.”

From O’Brien’s testimony it seems likely that the easy interactions between U.S. and Australian sailors also helped facilitate the U.S. sailors’ ability to deal with O’Brien’s sexual orientation. Using his characteristic phrase, O’Brien said that with regard to his service as an openly gay man in the Australian Navy alongside U.S. forces, “It was never any dramas there.” O’Brien was comfortably out with his fellow sailors on the HMAS Melbourne, and he says that U.S. personnel who boarded his ship “knew exactly who I was … because everybody did on the ship, so it wasn’t a secret and it wasn’t hidden or anything.” His Australian colleagues asked about his male partner in front of U.S. service members and made other references to his sexuality—all without causing any negative responses among Americans who spent time on the Australian ship.

O’Brien clearly knew that even if problems had emerged between him and a U.S. service member, his position was not threatened. If conflicts had developed, he said, “We basically draw the line and say, ‘We’re here to do a job.’ Everything else gets left behind.” If a problem had persisted, then he would have outlined possible steps, including replacing himself for that specific task, or replacing the U.S. service member. He notes that “It’s an individual thing, and if I can deal with it, then it’s fine. If the other person can’t, then they’re the one that needs to fix the problem.” Even though he expressed willingness to work with U.S. personnel uncomfortable serving with an openly gay man, no U.S. service members complained or expressed any concern about working with O’Brien; everyone was able to focus on getting the job done. During the interview, he repeatedly emphasized that focusing on common goals helped the sailors negotiate cultural differences: “We’re in different navies, but we’re here to do the same job. So it’s not an issue, and it shouldn’t be an issue.”

In addition to serving with heterosexual American sailors, O’Brien worked closely with a U.S. sailor who revealed that he was gay to a small group of Australians. O’Brien recalled, “We came across one of the U.S. guys we had on board, who was actually gay and did come out to small group of us.” O’Brien commented that the gay U.S. sailor

felt comfortable in doing so [coming out], and he realized that we were so laid back and didn’t really care, and it wasn’t an issue for us. That he was comfortable in discussing that with us, whereas with his own people, with the American fellows, he would not have mentioned it at all for fear of repercussions.

O’Brien’s presence in the operations did not threaten unit cohesion or the mission’s success, and O’Brien believed that he contributed to the successful collaboration among Americans and Australians. His commanders concurred, for shortly thereafter, they promoted him from Leading Seaman to Petty Officer. As he observed, “I went from a ship to an admiral’s office, so I was doing something right.”

Lieutenant Rolf Kurth, Royal Navy

Lieutenant Rolf Kurth joined the Royal Navy in 1990 and served until 1997 when he was discharged for homosexuality.[66] After nearly four years in civilian life, Kurth was invited to rejoin the navy after the British government lifted its gay ban to comply with a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.[67] Kurth re-enlisted in 2001, and in January 2003 he passed the Principle Warfare Officers` course, graduating in the top of his class. After completing the course, he joined the Royal Navy’s largest amphibious ship. This ship, which for security purposes will be referred to as SHIP A, was deployed in the Gulf throughout the recent war against Iraq. During the latter stages of the conflict, Kurth’s ship took over the command function of a high-profile Royal Navy ship, which will be referred to as SHIP B.

While numerous U.S. sailors served onboard SHIP A, Kurth worked closely with a team of six Americans. Kurth’s team, which consisted of two officers, one chief petty officer and three petty officers, joined the ship to help manage relations with American forces. Kurth explained, “In the beginning, SHIP B, was in charge. SHIP B left the Gulf and left SHIP A in charge. When they did, this team transferred from SHIP B to SHIP A. They were a team of liaison people who helped us integrate with the American forces.” Regarding his relationship with the American team, Kurth commented, “I was their direct link to the ship on day-to-day work matters, but not administratively … [I]n actual operations, what we were doing, they would always come directly to me if they needed anything. Because we had that sort of relationship, we talked all the time and I felt that I got along very well with them.”

When asked which members of the US team were aware of his sexual orientation, Kurth replied that “it is fairly well known around the entire ship … because I am the only openly gay man on board the ship and at the time there were well over a thousand people onboard—you can imagine a ship at sea, doing the same thing over and over, in an environment that is quite tense but also quite boring, if nothing is happening people talk and if there is a little bit of gossip, it goes around very quickly.” When pressed in a subsequent email to explain how he knew that Americans were aware of his sexual orientation, Kurth wrote,

[M]y sexual orientation was common knowledge and comments are often made in the mess, VERY subtly, that make it very clear that people are aware. For example, when men are sitting around looking at a pretty girl in the newspaper or on TV, sometimes someone will make a comment like “Well, you're not the best person to judge!” or “Like you'd know!”

Kurth spoke in positive terms about his interaction with the US officers in the team: “The working relationship with them was great, and I got along very well with them.” When asked if these officers reacted towards him differently from his British colleagues, he responded: “No, they didn’t behave any differently than British colleagues. They were very friendly.”

Synthesis and conclusions

Viewed collectively, the evidence presented in this study suggests that the presence of openly gay and lesbian personnel in multinational units in which Americans serve has not had a negative impact upon cohesion or military performance. Perhaps more importantly, it is an issue that has generated little attention, as one official with the UN DKO observed: “[I am] just not aware of any instances of sexual orientation becoming an issue in the field.”[68] Experts from NATO, NORAD, the UN, and scholars who have studied these organizations all express similar observations. No one consulted for this study could think of an instance in which an openly gay or lesbian service member undermined a unit’s ability to complete its mission.

Four of the five case studies illustrate this conclusion clearly, but the fifth case study calls for additional commentary. First Lieutenant Joop Neijenhuijzen did experience difficulties in his unit. Unlike other service members discussed in this study, Neijenhuijzen was not fully candid about his sexual orientation with U.S. personnel. And, Neijenhuijzen served in a multinational unit ten years ago, while others served more recently. While Neijenhuijzen’s and his unit managed to accomplish their mission, conditions were more tense than ideally would have been the case. Neijenhuijzen’s example seems to confirm that strong and clear leadership is necessary for preventing problems and managing them should they emerge. In the absence of such leadership, units such as Neijenhuijzen’s tend to under-perform.

Scholars who study cultural diversity and multinational units all suggest that improving multinational operations requires addressing many problems that are more pressing than divergent sexual orientation policies. Homosexuality simply does not rank as a problem that presents much difficulty. For instance, Moskos’ suggests that disparity in income, health insurance, English-language competency, accountability, and civilian-military relations are the most important issues.[69] For the UN, tensions between the militaries of developing and developed nations warrant much more attention, as does the integration of women in peacekeeping operations. And as has been made evident, NATO still struggles to initiate standardization programs for defense materials. Addressing the issue of homosexuality is simply not a priority.[70] And for both NATO and the UN, more general concerns about command and control issues far outweigh the issue of homosexuality.

Finally, scholars may debate the extent to which findings from this study may or may not be relevant for assessing the plausibility of the unit cohesion rationale, the notion that the presence of openly gay service members disrupts unit cohesion. On the one hand, the international setting itself may help explain why homosexual personnel do not disrupt multinational units. A number of experts discussed the diplomatic nature of personnel in multinational environments. As Thomas-Durrel Young observes, “When you’re working in [a multinational military] environment … as you go up the chain [it] becomes excessively polite.”[71] In places like NATO headquarters, derogative comments about someone’s sexual orientation become less and less likely; it would be improper for anyone, regardless of their personal opinions, to cause problems because of it.[72] Many personnel who serve in multinational operations do so on a voluntary basis, and scholars have suggested that such personnel may display greater tolerance toward diversity. On the other hand, one underlying premise of the unit cohesion rationale is that American service members do not like gays and lesbians and cannot form bonds of trust with them that are necessary for promoting and sustaining military effectiveness. Evidence presented in this study, however, indicates that American personnel serving in multinational units have worked quite closely and effectively with openly gay service members from foreign countries, and that integrated service has not compromised the effectiveness of military units.

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You can download a PDF version of this publication here.
You can also read the British Army's statement regarding this policy shift.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Like the U.S. military, the British Services is an all-volunteer force comprised of army, air force and navy contingents. Until January, 2000, when Britain lifted its gay ban following a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, gay and lesbian soldiers were prohibited from serving in the British Armed Forces.

The first ten months of the new policy have been an unqualified success. The military’s own classified, internal assessment at six months found that the new policy has “been hailed as a solid achievement” (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2). There have been no indications of negative effects on recruiting levels. No mass resignations have occurred. There have been no major reported cases of gay-bashing or harassment of sexual minorities. There have been no major reported cases of harassment or inappropriate behavior by gay or lesbian soldiers. There has been no perceived effect on morale, unit cohesion or operational effectiveness. The policy change has been characterized by a “marked lack of reaction” (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2).

The conclusions of the Ministry of Defense report have been confirmed by our conversations with more than twenty-five representatives from the military, academia, and non-governmental organizations. None of those interviewed know of any major problems associated with the policy change. No one has heard of any difficulties related to recruitment or training completion rates; recruitment levels are characterized as “quite buoyant.”

None of those interviewed for this report have heard of cases of serious homophobic harassment. Open gay service personnel interviewed for this report and by other sources describe collegial treatment by their co-workers and other service members.

Experts in all fields acknowledged that more work remains to be done, and new obstacles could still emerge. Homophobic attitudes persist throughout the Services. It is possible that some problems will develop as more gay and lesbian service personnel acknowledge their sexual orientation to colleagues, or if the Armed Forces relaxes its vigilance against harassment and inappropriate behavior of all kinds. Issues of equality such as pension, accommodation and partnership rights have yet to be addressed. Still, concerns of dire consequences have been replaced by a general recognition that the transition has proceeded smoothly.

II. INTRODUCTION

Until January 12, 2000, the British Services maintained an official policy of discharging all known gay and lesbian soldiers.[1] It was felt that close living quarters and the stresses of military life precluded the inclusion of homosexual servicemembers; military commanders argued that “homosexual behavior can cause offence, polarize relationships, induce ill-discipline, and as a consequence damage morale and unit effectiveness” (Ministry of Defense, 1994, p.1). At the beginning of this year, the British Armed Forces ended its policy of excluding gay and lesbian soldiers. The change came as a result of a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights and after years of resistance by the Armed Forces to lifting the ban. Once the decision was announced, however, the Services quickly established a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Instead, the social conduct rules were rewritten to prohibit sexual behavior, by both heterosexuals and homosexuals, that adversely affects operational effectiveness. Such misconduct includes, but is not limited to, sexual harassment, sexual contact with subordinates, and overt displays of affection between servicemembers. The new inclusive policy remains politically charged; even with the European Court decision, leaders of the Conservative Party have declared that they would reevaluate the policy if returned to majority status.

This report draws together military documents; press coverage; prior research on homosexual military issues; and interviews with military officials, academics, think tank and non-profit organization representatives, and sexual minorities presently serving in the military to provide an appraisal of the initial effects of the policy change. All available information indicates that the removal of the ban has been a success in its first nine months. The military undertook its own internal review of the new policy six months after enactment and declared that the transition has been characterized by a “marked lack of reaction” (Ministry of Defense, 2000c, p. 2). The policy change has had no perceptible impact on unit cohesion, morale, or operational effectiveness. There is no indication of any discernible effects on recruiting, training completion or resignation rates. There have been no major problems of gay-bashing, harassment or sexual misconduct associated with the new policy. While the long-term consequences of the policy change remain to be seen, fears of upheaval within the military have largely been replaced with an awareness that the transition has proceeded smoothly.

III. METHODOLOGY

Information collected for this report was systematically gathered from publicly available primary and secondary sources relevant to an understanding of military outcomes associated with homosexual service in the British Armed Forces. Sources and methods included: identification, retrieval, and analysis of prior research bearing on homosexual service in the British military conducted by governmental, academic, and policy-focused organizations; content analysis of Lexis/Nexis search retrievals for all news articles and wire service dispatches relating to homosexual service in the British Armed Forces (n=101); interviews with present and former military officials (n=10); interviews with journalists and major academic, non-governmental, and policy observers familiar with gay-military issues in Britain or British military concerns generally (n=14); and interviews with present and former sexual minority participants in the British Services who were located through snowball sampling (n=5[2]).

This report relies on a multi-method approach to compare and synthesize evidence provided by a variety of sources in order to draw conclusions. Whenever possible, independent observations from multiple sources are compared to draw out common findings that are consistent among observers in different sectors (e.g., military, academic, non-governmental). During the interview process, we also sought to ensure the broadest universe of sources by repeatedly asking expert observers from different sectors for recommendations of additional sources of information.

IV. POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

From 1864 to 1885, male homosexuality was illegal in Britain unless conducted in private and by consent. In 1885, the new offense of “gross indecency” criminalized all sexual activity between men, and male homosexuality remained wholly illegal until the passage of the 1967 Sexual Offenses Act[3]. Female homosexuality was never similarly banned, purportedly because Queen Victoria refused to believe that lesbianism existed. In 1967, Parliament partially decriminalized gay sexual activity by legalizing private consensual sex between two men over the age of 21. Male homosexual sex with anyone under 21, in public, or between more than two men remained a criminal offense. The 1967 Sexual Offences Act also included an exemption for the Armed Forces, so that male servicemembers could still be convicted for consensual homosexual sex of any kind (Rayside, 1998; Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker, 1994).

Although British attitudes towards homosexuality have become more tolerant over the last twenty-five years[4] (Scott, 1998), polling data reveal continued widespread discomfort with sexual minorities. A 1994 study found that a majority of British respondents felt sex between members of the same sex is always wrong[5] (cited in Hayes, 1997). The British public also continues to be conservative about issues such as gay and lesbian public school teachers and adoption by homosexuals (Hayes, 1997). The data does, however, show greater tolerance of sexual minorities in other areas. Polling on the age of sexual consent revealed that approximately 75% favored equality in principle, although less than 20% specifically supported changing the age of consent to sixteen (Rayside, 1998). With respect to the issue of homosexual service in the military, a 1999 Stonewall poll found that approximately 70% of Britons opposed the ban on homosexual soldiers, with a majority in every class and party in favor of inclusion of gays and lesbians in the military (Norton-Taylor, 1999)[6].

Homosexuality has been the subject of fierce skirmishes between the Conservative and Labor parties, and between religious leaders and gay rights advocates, for more than a decade. The passage in 1987 of Section 28, a law that bans local authorities from promoting the acceptability of homosexuality in schools, became a catalytic force for supporters of expanded gay and lesbian rights (Rayside, 1998)[7]. After considerable pressure by the gay-rights groups Stonewall and Outrage!, the age of consent for homosexual sex was decreased from 21 to 18 in 1994; this new minimum was, however, still higher than the age of 16 for heterosexual consent (See Majendie, 1995). The Labor Party, which presently holds power, has long supported the inclusion of sexual minorities in the military and expanded rights for homosexuals (Rayside, 1998). The Labor government has been working on a code that will instruct employers to grant homosexual partners the same rights to health care, travel benefits and relocation allowances as heterosexual married couples (Sylvester, 2000; Sylvester, 2000a). The government has also been trying unsuccessfully for more than a year to repeal Section 28 (See Jones, 2000; Jones, 2000a; and Britton, 2000).

Until the Human Rights Act[8] went into effect in October 2000, Britons were not protected by a set of enumerated fundamental human rights similar to that provided by the U.S. Bill of Rights. British citizens looking for judicial redress for governmental human rights violations had to pass what is known as the “Wednesbury test”, which mandated that courts could only overrule a governmental action if it “outrageously defies logic or accepted moral standards” so that “no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it” (cited in The Lawyer On-Line, 1995). In practice, the Wednesbury test proved to be an extremely difficult hurdle to overcome. Since Britain was a signatory of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, British citizens could also take human rights complaints before the European Court of Human Rights[9]. They could only do so, however, after exhausting all British channels, including the High Court, the Court of Appeals, and the House of Lords[10][11]. While the European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly include sexual orientation, it has been interpreted expansively to encompass the rights of sexual minorities[12].

V. A HISTORY OF BRITAIN’S MILITARY POLICY CONCERNING SEXUAL MINORITIES

Like the U.S. military, the British Services is an all-volunteer force comprised of army, air force and navy contingents[13]. Military conduct is governed by the Queen’s Regulations, which are reviewed by Parliament every five years (RAND, 1993). The British military includes approximately 211,000 soldiers; 7.9% of the officers and 5.4% of the enlisted soldiers are women. During the 1980s and early 1990s, women became more fully integrated into the British military. Women are employed in all corps except armor and infantry, although they are not permitted beyond the second echelon of brigade in combat. Women are allowed to serve at sea in most of the surface specialties, although they cannot work on small vessels such as submarines (Dandeker, 2000).

Like most of its NATO allies, the British military has faced conflicting pressures since the end of the Cold War. Troop strength has been reduced by 30%, and the percentage of GDP devoted to defense decreased from 5.2% in 1984-85 to approximately 2.8% in 1997-98[14] (Dandeker, 2000). At the same time, the scope of peacekeeping missions has expanded considerably, and the Armed Forces has had to prepare itself for a wider variety of operations due to changing defense roles. The British Services has also faced recruiting shortages since 1992 (Tweedle, 2000)[15]. The military has responded to these constraints in part by developing a recruitment initiative, increasing the use of reserves and by civilianizing and outsourcing some jobs previously performed by soldiers (Dandeker, 2000; Kirkbride, 1996).

Until January 2000, gay and lesbian soldiers were prohibited from serving in the British Armed Forces. Prior to 1967, British civil and military law were congruous with respect to male homosexuality – sodomy was illegal, and both civilians and soldiers could be imprisoned for homosexual activity. The 1967 Sexual Offences Act decriminalized gay male sex for civilians, but it included an exemption that allowed the British military to continue to prosecute servicemembers engaging in gay sex (Rayside, 1998; Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker, 1994). Gay soldiers could also be administratively discharged from the Services. While civil law did not cover same-sex female sex, however, the military was able to discharge lesbians under the offense of general misconduct[16]. Offenses for homosexuality were usually charged as “disgraceful conduct of an indecent kind”, “conduct prejudicial to good order or discipline”, or more rarely “scandalous conduct by officers” (Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker, 1994).

In the wake of considerable Parliamentary debate on the subject during discussions about the 1991 Armed Forces Bill, the government acknowledged that the military exemption from the 1967 Sexual Offenses Act was no longer justifiable. In June 1992, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced an administrative order to immediately halt criminal prosecution for sexual activities that were legal for civilians under the 1967 act. The British restricted court-martials for homosexuality to those male servicemembers who were found to have had sex in public or with anyone under the age of 21. The legislative reconciliation of military and civilian law occurred later with the passage of the 1994 Criminal Justice Act. The military persisted in maintaining, however, that both male and female homosexuality were incompatible with military service. Gay and lesbian soldiers continued to face discharge if their sexual orientation was discovered (Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker, 1994).

Figures for the number of gay and lesbian service members discharged while the ban was in place vary among sources. Estimates range between 60 and 100 each year between 1988 and 1995[17]. Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker report that 296 service members were administratively discharged between 1988 and 1992, while an additional 39 soldiers were dismissed following conviction for an offense involving homosexuality during the same period (Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker, 1994, p. 193)[18][19]. When factoring in servicemembers who left without being discharged, Evans surmises that as many as 150 soldiers departed the military each year due to the policy on sexual orientation (Evans, 2000). Because the British Services did not keep statistics about the cost of the policy, no definitive figures exist about the fiscal impact of the ban on sexual minorities. Using GAO figures for the U.S. and extrapolating them to the British case, Edmund Hall estimated that the restrictive policy cost the British military L40 to 50 million between 1990 and 1995 (Hall, 1995)[20].

Prior to 1994, the Royal Navy was the only branch of the Armed Forces that maintained specific guidelines related to homosexuality[21]; the other Services dealt with homosexuality through general regulations. The Navy’s guidelines provided the following instructions for medical officers when dealing with suspected gay or lesbian personnel:

…homosexuals are often a source of sexually transmitted diseases … Tears and stains, particularly of the underpants, trousers and shirt, should be examined and, if available, an ultra-violet light should be used to screen the clothing, bearing in mind that semen is not the only substance which fluoresces under UV light. (cited in Hall, 1995, p. 75)

The guidelines also suggested that investigators seek to determine “whether the man may have played the passive role” and recommended that the agent “look for feminine gestures, nature of clothing and use of cosmetics” (Hall, 1995, p. 76).

In 1994, the Ministry of Defense issued Service-wide regulations concerning homosexual soldiers. The new regulations maintained the policy of barring homosexual service, but they standardized policy and provided more detailed protocol. Any recruit who admitted to being gay would not be allowed to enlist, and any servicemember who was discovered to be homosexual would be discharged from the military. Homosexual sex between adults of consensual age would not be considered a criminal offense, but the military could prosecute a gay or lesbian soldier for otherwise consensual sex if “the act was to the prejudice of good order and Service discipline” [22] (Ministry of Defense, 1994, Annex 2). All recruits were to be informed that homosexuals were not allowed to serve in the British Armed Forces. The 1994 policy made it clear that homosexual orientation as well as homosexual behavior would be a bar to enlistment and service:

Even if a potential recruit admits to being homosexual, but states that he/she does not at present nor in the future intend to engage in homosexual activity, he/she will not be enlisted. (Ministry of Defense, 1994, p. 2)

The 1994 policy also included instructions for medical officers[23] in dealing with homosexual service personnel. The guidelines informed medical officers that “homosexuality is not in itself a medical condition” and “intimate examinations are not indicated purely on the grounds of homosexuality” (Ministry of Defense, 1994, Annex A). The medical officer was to be consulted to confirm the orientation of a professed homosexual, to advise commanders in dealing with cases of homosexuality, and to insure the emotional stability of the soldier in question. If a gay or lesbian soldier was referred to the medical officer after his or her sexual orientation was already known, the health practitioner’s job was to “assess the individual’s physical and mental wellbeing, including the need for onward referral to specialist services if required” (Ministry of Defense, 1994, Annex A). The Ministry of Defense recognized that revelation of one’s homosexual orientation could be psychologically devastating in the context of the military’s ban on sexual minorities:

The Medical Officer should remember that ‘coming out’, [sic] can be highly stressful, particularly because of the prospect of the loss of a career, and attention should be paid to assessment of the individual’s mental state since some individuals are vulnerable to thoughts of self harm at this time. (Ministry of Defense, 1994, Annex A)

The military’s need for information about gay and lesbian soldiers did, however, outweigh any medical confidentiality rules. If a soldier’s sexual orientation was already known and the purpose of an interview was therefore not to establish sexual identity, the medical officer might still be required to discuss the “health and psychological development” of the soldier with a commanding officer (Ministry of Defense, 1994, Annex A). While the medical officer was advised to obtain the consent of the servicemember, disclosure would be expected even if consent was not procured. If a servicemember was acknowledging his or her orientation for the first time, the individual was to be informed that:

…notwithstanding medical confidentiality, the Medical Officer has a duty to report to the Commanding Officer any information relating to a serious offence or matters which might adversely affect the health, security or discipline of the unit. If the Medical Officer is satisfied that the individual is experiencing homosexual feeling then it would be most unusual not to discuss the matter with the Commanding Officer (again if possible having obtained the individual’s consent). (Ministry of Defense, 1994, Annex A)

Commanding officers could handle cases of suspected homosexuality with their own staff or through official investigatory channels (Ministry of Defense, 1994, Annex A). Military investigations were conducted by each service’s police forces: the Royal Military Police (RMP) and Special Investigating Branch for the Army, the RAF police and Security Services (P&SS) for the Air Force, and the Royal Navy’s Regulating Branch and Special Investigating Branch (SIB). Investigations could include undercover surveillance, lengthy questioning, medical examinations, and searches through personal materials to uncover information about other homosexual soldiers (Hall, 1995).

Former servicemember Joan Heggie experienced investigations for suspected homosexuals as both a military policewoman and a target of investigation. She describes common tactics used during her tenure with the British Army in the late 1970s and early 1980s:

The MPs conducted raids in the middle of the night to women’s barracks to “catch people in the act”. The military police would gain access to the garrison with the permission of the commanding officer. Nine out of ten times the commanders would give permission, because they wanted to show that they were not accepting of lesbianism. The MPs would bring dogs and say they were looking for drugs, even though drugs were not a major problem in the early 80s. They would look under beds, in wardrobes and even out windows to make sure that no one was hiding there. I’ve been told that some MPs who really had a thing about homosexuality, particularly with women, would keep information on people on an index card and build up a record. If they came across information that corroborated what they had heard earlier, even if it was years later, they would target that person for investigation[24]. (Personal Communication, October 3 and 16, 2000)

Heggie added that, in such a restrictive environment, “Every day I woke up thinking ‘Today might be the day that I get kicked out’” (Personal Communication, October 3 and 16, 2000). Other former service personnel have told of the military using information from blackmailers, staking out local gay bars and pubs, asking detailed and embarrassing questions about sexual practices in interrogations, and even recommending shock aversion treatment (Nunn, Personal Communication, October 17, 2000; O’Kelly, 1995; Mills, 1995; Hall, 1995).

Ministry of Defense officials in told journalist Edmund Hall in 1995 that they did not believe the police routinely carried out surveillance of gay and lesbian establishments. They did, however, acknowledge that individual surveillance probably occurred. One Ministry of Defense official declared:

Policemen are very difficult to control. … If you tell me that this kind of surveillance is taking place then it’s beyond the call of duty. Policemen have got to have their own agenda. (Hall, 1995, pp.78-79)

General Sir Charles Guthrie, Chief of the Defense Staff, admitted at the time of the removal of the ban that military police investigations of suspected gays and lesbians sometimes “went too far” and expressed regret at the way some interrogations had been carried out (cited in Evans, 2000). The European Court of Human Rights also condemned the investigations of the plaintiffs as “exceptionally intrusive” in their ruling against the Ministry of Defense (Evans, 2000).

The British Armed Services’ exclusion of homosexuals from service, even after gay sex was decriminalized by Parliament in 1967, stemmed from the conviction that the unique conditions and objectives of the military precluded behavior that was acceptable in civilian life. Defense Minister Nicholas Soames commented in 1996 that:

The view of the service chiefs and of Ministers is not based on any moral judgment but on the impracticality of homosexual behavior, which is clearly not compatible with service life. (The Lawyer Online, 1996)

Military commanders argued that the sacred duties of the Armed Forces - to protect the nation from harm and to advance Britain’s interests even at the expense of loss of life - necessitated considerable caution when advocating changes in military organization or the composition of personnel. The inclusion of gay and lesbian soldiers was viewed as social engineering that could damage the integrity of military units.

The unique conditions specified by military officials included cramped living conditions, same-sex facilities and the dependence on one’s comrades in life-threatening situations. Given extended excursions at sea and on foreign missions, military personnel often live under conditions of minimal privacy. First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Jock Slater declared in 1995 that:

Everyone who joins the Navy is committed to going to sea and therefore there is no question of ‘it is acceptable ashore but not at sea’. I then look at the conditions at sea, where relatively they are cramped, they are crowded; it can be tough, it can be stressful. (Weale, 1995, p. 1)

Military leaders argued that the intimacy of living together in same-sex barracks, showering together, and sharing toilet and washing facilities made homosexual service impractical (see The Lawyer Online, 1995). They further contended that heterosexual servicemembers would feel uncomfortable showering or sleeping next to a homosexual soldier.

British commanders also asserted that the friction that could arise between gay and lesbian soldiers and their heterosexual colleagues would undermine morale and unit cohesion and even threaten the success of its operations. Soldiers need to depend on their comrades in life-threatening situations. Commanders argued that the introduction of distrust or ill-will among individuals within a unit due to differences in sexual orientation could have disastrous consequences on the effectiveness of that unit. Defense Minister Archie Hamilton argued during a 1991 debate in Parliament:

[B]oth homosexual activity and orientation are incompatible with service in the armed forces. The main reason centers on the need to maintain discipline and morale. The services are hierarchical, close knit [sic] overwhelmingly single sex and young communities. Units can work to full effectiveness only on the basis of mutual trust and the expectation of equal treatment among each rank. The formation within these units of sexually motivated relationships are potentially very disruptive of discipline and morale, particularly when they cross rank boundaries. (cited in Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker, 1994)

The 1994 regulations regarding homosexuality explicitly included concerns about operational effectiveness as well:

Homosexuality … is considered incompatible with service in the Armed Forces. This is not only because of the close physical conditions in which personnel often have to live and work, but also because homosexual behavior can cause offence, polarize relationships, induce ill-discipline, and as a consequence damage morale and unit effectiveness. (Ministry of Defense, 1994, p.1)[25]

Much was also made of the need of the military to protect its youthful servicemembers from the danger of homosexual sexual predators. One third of the British Armed Forces recruits in the mid 1990s were under the age of eighteen. Military officials argued that removal of the ban would result in “sexual exploitation by older, more senior, personnel” (cited in Harnden, 1996). Not only did the service chiefs feel they had a duty to protect the minors in their care, but they also worried that the potential for sexual abuse could also jeopardize recruitment among young men and women[26]. Air Chief Marshal Sir John Willis warned in 1995 that “the confidence both of young people to join the Armed Forces, and their parents to permit them to join the Armed Forces, would be seriously damaged” (The Lawyer Online, 1995).

vi. court cases concerning the armed forces’ Ban on

sexual minorities and the military’s response

In 1994, four servicemembers discharged for homosexuality began a legal challenge in British courts against the military’s ban on gay and lesbian soldiers. Lawyers for the servicemembers invoked the Wednesbury doctrine and the European Convention on Human Rights to argue that the privacy rights of the soldiers had been violated. The former service personnel included: Lt. Cdr. Duncan Lustig-Prean, a former naval supply officer; Sgt. Graeme Grady, a former RAF intelligence officer; Jeanette Smith, a former RAF nurse; and John Beckett, a former naval weapons engineer on a nuclear submarine. Their case was backed by Stonewall, a British gay and lesbian rights group.

The four plaintiffs had excellent military records and many years of service between them (see Lyall, 1999). Lieutenant Commander Lustig-Prean maintained an ‘exemplary’ service record of fifteen years (Hicklin, 1995). He was about to be appointed a military advisor to John Major when he was discharged after reporting a blackmail attempt. Sergeant Grady, the married father of two children, was the chief clerk at the British defense intelligence liaison office in Washington, D.C. and had high security clearance. He was released after he was seen attending a counseling group for gay married men (Agence France Presse, 1999; Guardian, 1999). Smith, an RAF nurse for five years who had been recommended for promotion four times, was dismissed after an anonymous caller informed her superiors of her relationship with a civilian woman (Booth, 1999; Guardian, 1999a). During her interrogation, Smith was asked if she had ever had sex with her partner’s adolescent daughter, whether she used sexual appliances during sex, and who was the dominant sexual partner in her relationship (Agence France Presse, 1999). Beckett was a potential officer candidate. He was released from service after disclosing his relationship with a civilian man to his chaplain, who encouraged him to tell his commanding officer. It was his only gay relationship. Beckett alleges that the Royal Naval psychiatrist suggested electric shock aversion therapy (Mills, 1995).

In June 1995, the High Court ruled against the discharged service members on the grounds that the British courts did not have the authority to invoke the European Convention on Human Rights. Justices of the High Court signaled, however, that the policy was unlikely to withstand judgement by the European Court. Lord Justice Simon Brown declared at the time that “the tide of history is against the Ministry”, and “so far as this country’s international obligations are concerned the days of this policy are numbered” (cited in The Lawyer On-Line, 1995). Britain’s Court of Appeals upheld the High Court’s decision in November 1995 (Majendie, 1995)[27].

In response to the High Court’s warning that the ban would likely be overturned by the European Court, the Ministry of Defense assembled the Homosexual Policy Assessment Team (HPAT) in 1995 to appraise the existing policy and determine if changes were needed (Butcher, 1995). The HPAT report[28], which was released in 1996, included survey data from servicemembers and analyses of the military policies toward sexual minorities in Australia, Canada, Israel, the Netherlands and the U.S. A month before the release of the report, an insider leaked to journalists that the HPAT committee would propose a compromise policy that would permit individuals with a homosexual orientation to serve while continuing to prohibit homosexual contact between servicemembers. A source close to the committee commented, “We are looking to take some of the heat out of the issue. We need to make some changes while respecting the strong feeling in the Services” (Gilligan, 1995, p.1). But the source also acknowledged that the proposals were provisional and could be changed (Gilligan, 1995). By the time the report was released in February, the committee did in fact recommend the continued prohibition of homosexual service.

The HPAT report argued that lifting the ban on homosexual soldiers would be an “affront to Service people” and would harm fighting efficiency. The report maintained that while “evolving social attitudes towards homosexuality” might induce further review, “it may equally be that the permanent features of the military environment are such that it will never be possible to integrate homosexuals” (cited in Harnden, 1996). The report evoked the unique demands of military life to justify restrictions not necessary in civilian life, declaring: “No other employer sends its employees out in disciplined teams to kill and be killed”. Ending the ban would likely lead to “heterosexual resentment and hostility” and would be viewed by military personnel as “coercive interference in their way of life” (cited in Harnden, 1996).

The HPAT report also included an attitudinal survey of 13,500 servicemembers. 80% of those surveyed felt that the ban should continue indefinitely, while only 5% felt the ban should be lifted immediately. Only 3% believed that the Armed Forces would be a more comfortable environment if gays were accepted; 84% disagreed (Copley, 1996; Bowcott, 1996). Opposition to a more relaxed policy was strongest in the Army and weakest in the Air Force (Harnden, 1996), and women were less resistant than men to removal of the ban (Shrimsley, 1996). Greater hostility toward male homosexuality than to lesbianism was also reported (Bowcott, 1996). More than two-thirds of the men felt that admitting gay and lesbian soldiers would damage recruiting, and a similar amount said they would not willingly serve under those circumstances (Shrimsley, 1996). Some complaints about bias in the survey and the methodology were, however, registered at the time (Bowcott, 1996; Bowcott, Stewart and Zinn, 1996).

In addition, the committee received 639 letters about the policy; 587 of those received, or 92%, opposed changing the regulations (Bowcott, 1996). The letters included comments like those expressed by a warrant officer in the Royal Marines who said, “Men don’t like taking showers with men who like taking showers with men”, and those from a senior aircraftsman who warned that, “Homosexuals would definitely get beaten up” (cited in the Daily Telegraph, 1996). A lieutenant in the Royal Marines argued that:

We do not want a citizen army with the same weaknesses as Continental forces. The role of British Forces is to mount successful operation as directed, not to be a medium of social change. (cited in the Electronic Telegraph, 1996)

However, not all of the comments were negative. For example, one lieutenant in the Army wrote, “When I go to war, I would rather have alongside me a guy [sic] who shoots straight, than a straight who shoots crooked” (cited in the Daily Telegraph, 1996).

The committee’s recommendation for the continuation of the ban came even though “…committee members who visited foreign armed forces, most of which permit homosexuality, were told that the admission of gays had made little practical difference to operational efficiency” (Gilligan, 1995). This view was reinforced by the comments of a Canadian officer who said that British researchers told him that, “We believe we could change our policy, based on your experience, and what we heard in terms of candid comments from former commanders” (Belkin and McNichol, 2000). The British team also told the CF official, however, that they did not believe a more inclusive policy would be politically feasible in Britain at that time[29].

A legal advisor for the Ministry of Defense also warned military officials that the British Forces were likely to lose their case with the European Court of Human Rights, and that they would have a better case if they “mov[ed] to a compromise solution, eg. [sic] no open homosexuality” (cited in The Lawyer Online, 1996a). But the armed forces minister and the three service chiefs of staff were said to strongly support a continuation of the exclusion of homosexuals (Bowcott, Stewart and Zinn, 1996; Copley, 1996). Instead, defense ministers ordered a relaxation of the ban, which Armed Forces Minister Soames described as the “softly softly” approach (Gilligan and Wastell, 1996). Military police were instructed not to actively search for gay and lesbian soldiers; they were only to act if a problem was drawn to their attention. The defense ministers also made it clear that overzealous investigation, surveillance and harassment would no longer be tolerated (Gilligan and Wastell, 1996)[30].

Despite the recommendations of the HPAT report and the relaxed approach, it appears that over the next three years ministers and service chiefs behind the scenes were adjusting to the possibility that they would lose the case of the former servicemembers in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Sylvester and Thomson, 1998; Carrell, 1999) [31]. The Defense Minister announced in 1998 that the ban “in principle” should be lifted, and Rank Outsiders reported the same year that they were consulted on a draft code of conduct for all military personnel, heterosexual and homosexual (Gilligan, 1998). In a related case, the European Court ruled in July 1999 that discrimination against transsexuals fell under the definition of “sex discrimination” in the European Convention. The ruling undermined part of the Armed Forces’ defense in the European Court case, which, in accordance with the British Sex Discrimination Act, argued that neither transsexuals nor homosexuals suffered from sex discrimination as long as transsexuals or homosexuals of both sexes were treated identically. On August 2, 1999, it was reported that transsexuals would henceforth be permitted to serve in the Armed Forces (Davies and Jones, 1999). The decision was criticized by the Conservative shadow defense secretary, Iain Duncan-Smith, who accused the Government of having a “politically correct agenda” and seeking to “end by stealth” the ban on homosexual service (Jones, 1999). The Ministry of Defense continued to discharge homosexual service personnel, however, and the last gay servicemember was dismissed from the Armed Forces on September 24, 1999 (Norton-Taylor, 1999).

On September 27^th, the European Court of Human Rights ruled unanimously that the ban on homosexual military service violated the privacy rights of the plaintiffs. The seventy cases being investigated by the Armed Forces were immediately put on hold (Norton-Taylor, 1999a; Cullen, 1999)[32]. Civil servants suggested that a new code of conduct could be put in place earlier than 2001, presumably because considerable work had already been done on it. The Conservative Party signaled that it might try to overturn the policy change if it were returned to power (Shrimsley, 2000).

A week after taking office, the new Secretary of State for Defense Geoffrey Hoon set aside “at least £4m” to cover pending compensation claims by homosexual ex-servicemembers (Syal and Gilligan, 1999). The more important question, however, was what model to choose for the new army regulations. There was considerable opposition from both gay groups and services chiefs to basing the regulations on the American model, which was seen as “a disaster”; services chiefs saw the Dutch and Israeli options as “too liberal” (Sparrow, 1999). Stonewall recommended the Australian regulations, which bans heterosexual and homosexual public displays of affection, as a possible model (Waugh, 1999). In mid-December, Hoon announced that the new code would be published the following month, and that it would govern “sex not sexuality” - a reference to the Australian rules.

With respect to the model that was chosen, Michael Codner of the Royal United Services Institute explained:

I think both sides of the debate saw “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ as something which hadn’t worked, which was unworkable and hypocritical. The internal advice given to service chiefs by the civilian civil service was in favor of another model.

…But the Australian model was pushed strongly by Australian service chiefs. Their defense attaches were also very proactive in pushing the success of the Australian option. And I think the British service chiefs saw some logic to it. The two forces have a similar structure and ethos. (Personal Communication, September 26, 2000)

On January 12^th, the Secretary of State for Defense announced the lifting of the ban to the Commons. He declared that the European Court judgement made the ban “not legally sustainable” and proclaimed that a new code of conduct governing personal relationships, based on that of the Australian armed forces, would be introduced. No legislation was required to effect this change, which went into effect immediately. Discharged homosexuals were also invited to reapply for their jobs (Waugh, 2000). Shadow Defense Minister Iain Duncan-Smith voiced “regret”, and he said that if the Conservatives won the next election they would review the decision and allow military chiefs to decide (Waugh, 2000). On that day a sailor became the first homosexual servicemember to come out openly to colleagues (Fleet, 2000).

Since the January 2000 decision, the enactment of the Human Rights Act in Britain has resulted in the replication of the European Court decision by a domestic court. A former RAF officer won an employment tribunal appeal against the Ministry of Defense in September, after it was ruled that the officer suffered sex discrimination in his dismissal for homosexuality (Robertson, 2000). The original plaintiffs in the European Court case were also awarded more than L400,000 as compensation for loss of future earnings, the emotional and psychological impact of the investigations, and court costs (Dyer, 2000; BBC News, 2000). A number of other suits are presently pending.

VII. BRITAIN’S PRESENT POLICY CONCERNING SEXUAL MINORITIES

In their development of a new policy, the Ministry of Defense emphasized the need for: 1) compliance with the ECHR ruling, 2) regulations that were non-discriminatory; 3) the preservation of operational effectiveness, 4) accordance with the general requirements of the military, and 5) protection of individual rights under the Human Rights Act (Ministry of Defense, 2000). Homosexuality is no longer a bar to military service. Gay and lesbian soldiers are not, however, eligible for married accommodations, spousal pension or other partnership rights. In addition, a code of social conduct establishes rules of behavior that apply equally to heterosexuals and homosexuals. Soldiers, regardless of sexual orientation or sex, are prohibited from engaging in social behavior that undermines, or may potentially undermine, the trust and cohesion, and therefore the operational effectiveness, of the Services. Enumerated inappropriate behavior includes: unwelcome physical or verbal sexual attention, overfamiliarity with the spouses of other service personnel, displays of affection which might cause offense to others, taking sexual advantage of subordinates, and behavior which damages the marriage or personal relationship of other service personnel. The code of conduct further covers other types of “social misbehavior” that have not been enumerated. Discretion is left up to the commanding officer to determine if behavior constitutes a threat to the cohesion of the unit or the military command chain. Abuse of authority, trust or rank, or taking advantage of a person’s separation, are deemed particularly serious types of misconduct (Ministry of Defense, 2000a)[33].

The new guidelines for social conduct are general and involve considerable discretion. The code therefore provides a “service test” for commanding officers to use in their assessment of the need to “intervene in the personal lives of personnel” (Ministry of Defense, 2000a, p. 1). Commanding officers must consider each case in light of the following question:

Have the actions or behavior of an individual adversely impacted or are they likely to impact on the efficiency or operational effectiveness of the Service? (Ministry of Defense, 2000a, p. 1)

In the event of an affirmative answer, commanders are instructed to take prompt and decisive action to minimize damage to the effectiveness of the unit. If the misconduct is sufficiently serious, commanders may institute immediate administrative or punitive action. Such action may include a formal warning, official censure, the posting of the parties involved, or other disciplinary action. If the behavior is sufficiently serious, or if the servicemember has a history of social misconduct, termination of service may occur (Ministry of Defense, 2000a).

The Ministry of Defense also issued guidelines and speaking notes for commanding officers to help them explain and enforce the new policy. The speaking notes emphasize that the lifting of the ban brings the Armed Forces into greater concordance with the general society. A person’s sexual orientation is to be considered a private matter, and every servicemember has a right to personal privacy. The speaking notes exhort service personnel to “[r]espect that right, and do not try to make their private business your concern” (Ministry of Defense, 2000c, p.2) Commanders were further advised to stress the continuity of the policy:

This change is not a major issue, and you should not make it into one. There have always been homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces. We do not expect that this change will result in a significant increase in the number of homosexuals coming into the Service. (Ministry of Defense, 2000c, p.2)

Continuity is emphasized with respect to the new code of social conduct as well. The speaking notes explain that the code “largely reflects existing policies” and “does not mean a tightening up on heterosexual relationships” (Ministry of Defense, 2000c, p. 2)

The notes for commanding officers state that their actions should be guided by the following principles:

a. Sexual orientation is regarded as a private matter for the individual.

b. Knowledge of an individual’s sexual orientation is not a basis for discrimination.

c. Incidents which involve the possible commission of civil or military offences, or which come to a Commanding Officer’s attention through a formal complaint, should be investigated and dealt with in accordance with Service disciplinary or administrative procedures.

d. The Service Test … should be applied when there is any doubt about the impact on operational effectiveness of any particular incident.

e. The Armed Forces value the unique contribution which every individual makes to operational effectiveness, regardless of their sexual orientation.

f. The Armed Forces … will only intervene in the private lives of individuals where it is necessary in the interests of preserving operational effectiveness.

g. The new policy makes no moral judgements about an individual’s sexual orientation.

h. There is no place in the Armed Forces for harassment, bullying or victimization.

i. Commanders have a duty of care towards all those under their command. (Ministry of Defense, 2000d, p. 1)

The guidelines also include a list of questions and answers that commanding officers might encounter under the new policy. The list provides responses to such situations as: what to do regarding someone who wants to ‘out’ themselves[34]; whether homosexual personnel will be able to bring their partners to ‘semi-official’ functions[35]; how they should handle a situation in which a person is unwillingly ‘outed’[36]; whether an individual has a legal right to refuse to share accommodations with a homosexual[37]; and how to deal with an extra-marital relationship between heterosexual servicemembers[38]. With respect to a question about protecting young soldiers from predatory homosexuals, the guidelines declare that “It would be wrong to assume that homosexuals are predatory” and remind commanding officers that they must be “particularly alert to ensure young people are protected, regardless of their sex” (Ministry of Defense, 2000d, p. 5). Commanding officers are advised to remember that an open display of sexual behavior of any kind can cause offense, and to respond quickly to defuse situations before they spread (Ministry of Defense, 2000d).

When the new policy was announced by Secretary of State for Defense Geoff Hoon on January 12, 2000, he highlighted the fact that the chiefs of staff were completely involved in the creation of the new policy and endorsed the changes. Secretary Hoon stated that the code would apply to all members of the Forces, regardless of “Service, rank, gender or sexual orientation” (Ministry of Defense, 2000b, p. 2). He further stressed that the code complemented existing policies, including “zero tolerance for harassment, discrimination and bullying” (Ministry of Defense, 2000b, p. 2). As for the use of the service test, Secretary Hoon declared that:

Commanders will have to apply this Service Test through the exercise of their good judgement, discretion and common sense – the essence of command and the effective management of people. (Ministry of Defense, 2000b, p. 2)

Shifting gears from the public statements in support of the ban before the European Court ruling, Chief of the Defense Staff General Sir Charles Guthrie went on record at the time of the announcement of the new code of conduct to say that lifting the ban was likely to lead to some difficult situations for commanding officers, who would be required to decide if conduct was damaging to a unit’s operational effectiveness. He added, however, that “As CDS (Chief of the Defense Staff), I don’t believe that the operational efficiency of the Services will be affected, although I’m not saying we won’t have some difficult incidents”. He acknowledged that some people would still be against the ban “because they are homophobic or on religious grounds”, and that his assessment of the new policy differed from that of former service chiefs and ministers. But he added that “times have changed”, and he doubted that the change in policy would have any effect on recruiting (Evans, 2000). General Guthrie characterized the new code of conduct as “sensible and pragmatic” and said that it would be up to commanding officers to reassure their subordinates. “We think we can make it work”. (Evans, 2000)

Discussions on the code of social conduct and the importance of equal treatment for heterosexuals and homosexuals have since been integrated into training at the Tri-Service Equal Opportunities Training Center, the training site for the Services’ Equal Opportunity Advisors (Ministry of Defense, 2000c). In February, the Royal Air Force became the first service to include tolerance toward homosexuality in its officer training courses. The training course discusses the issue during the “beliefs and values” session, which is conducted by chaplains and staff. Officer candidates are informed that homosexuality is compatible with service and does not damage team morale. They are also taught that overt displays of affection, whether heterosexual or homosexual, threaten team discipline (Butcher, 2000). The other Services have since followed suit.

In October, 2000 it was reported that a naval lieutenant-commander had won

the right to some of the partnership benefits previously reserved for heterosexual personnel. The companion of Lieutenant-Commander Craig Jones will be flying out with other naval spouses to visit the HMS Northumberland in the Mediterranean. Spousal flights are subsidized by interest-free loans from the Navy. Jones’ partner has also been invited to a black-tie dinner and other mess dinners on shore and aboard the ship (Gilligan, 2000).

VIII. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF THE CHANGE IN POLICY

Six months after the lifting of the ban and the enactment of the new social code of conduct, the Ministry of Defense conducted its own assessment of the policy change. Commanders from each of the Services were asked to comment on a variety of issues related to the policy change and on developments arising from it. The assessment was for internal review only, and the resulting report was not released to the public. The Ministry of Defense report therefore constitutes the best evidence to date on the effect of the military’s new policy. It conducted a comprehensive managerial review with access to all relevant data. Further, since it was not intended for a civilian audience, the report was not written with an eye toward shifting the public opinion or influencing policy debates. The Ministry of Defense provided the researchers of this report with a summation of the contents of the internal assessment. This marks the first time that the findings of the report have been released to the public.

The appraisal by the Ministry of Defense depicts the policy change as an unqualified success. No problems associated with the new policy were reported. It found that both the lifting of the ban on homosexual soldiers and the new social code of conduct have been effectively instituted. It also states that there have been no significant difficulties in the transition to the new policy, that servicemembers have come to widely accept the policy change, and that the implementation has gone surprisingly well. Given the success, the internal review found that no further changes in regulations or enforcement were needed:

… [T]he change in policy has generally been hailed as a solid achievement. It has been introduced smoothly with fewer problems than might have been expected and no changes either to the policy, the Code of Social Conduct, or the content of our training courses are planned at the present time. (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2)

The Ministry of Defense determined that the policy change has not affected recruitment levels. The three Services “reported that the revised policy on homosexuality had had no discernible impact, either positive or negative, on recruitment” (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2). The evaluation did, however, find that the more inclusive policy had positively affected their access to recruiting fairs. College recruiting fairs that used to forbid participation by the military have reversed themselves in the wake of the lifting of the ban:

Interestingly, some areas that had previously closed to the Forces, such as Student Union “Fresher’s Fairs”, are now allowing access to the Services because of what is seen to be a more enlightened approach. (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p.2)

Because sexual orientation is now seen to be a private matter, the British Armed Forces will not set any quotas for the recruitment of sexual minorities and will not monitor recruitment levels of sexual minorities. No records will be kept if recruits volunteer the information that they are homosexual.

The report acknowledges that the policy change was not popular with some military personnel before its enactment, as some servicemembers originally expressed apprehension about the lifting of the ban:

Within the Services, the change in policy was accepted as inevitable, although there were some expressions of ‘political correctness’ having gone too far. The majority of initial misgivings were in regard to the practical aspects of implementation and its consequences, often centered on shared accommodation. (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p.2)

Such misgivings appear, however, to have been short-lived. After the new policy had been in place for only six months, the Ministry of Defense was able to report that service personnel had adjusted well to the lifting of the ban:

Over the longer term the feeling has been generated that there is widespread acceptance of the new policy. … Generally people have demonstrated a mature and pragmatic approach which has allowed the policy to succeed. (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2)

Service personnel have gotten along well and adjusted quickly to the policy change; the actual inclusion of homosexual servicemembers has resulted in surprisingly little reaction. The report also found that harassment of gay and lesbian soldiers had not been a problem since the new social conduct code had been instituted. There were “no reported difficulties of note concerning homophobic behavior amongst Service Personnel” (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2).

The evaluation by the Ministry of Defense suggests that the success of the new policy was in large part due to the non-discriminatory nature of the Code of Social Conduct. The Code’s emphasis on behavior allows the military to address problematic behavior without resorting to discriminatory policies or restricting whole classes of people:

The Code of Social Conduct has been very well received and has been found to be a useful guide for commanding officers in dealing with all issues surrounding personal relationship and behavior, going wider than just homosexual issues. (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p.2)

Because the focus has been placed on behavior instead of sexual orientation, sexual orientation has not become a source of antagonism as some had feared. Gay service personnel know that they have the code of conduct to back them up in the event of harassment or bullying. And all servicemembers know that they have recourse to complain if they witness inappropriate comments or actions. The report remarks on the noteworthy lack of focus by service personnel about the issue of sexual orientation:

[Homosexuality] has not been an issue of great debate, in part because of the underlying principle, embodied in the Code of Social Conduct, that sexual orientation is now regarded as a private matter. In fact there has been a marked lack of reaction. Discussion has rather been concerned with freedom of individual choice and exercising personal responsibility across the board, rather than a focus just on sexual orientation. (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p.2)

In arguments for the continuation of the ban, military officials suggested that friction between heterosexual and homosexual servicemembers could result in distrust and offense among colleagues and even threaten operational effectiveness. In contrast, the Ministry of Defense’s own internal assessment of the policy after six months suggests that heterosexual and homosexual soldiers alike have responded well to the change in policy. In spite of the concerns raised in the years and months prior to the lifting of the ban, no major problems have so far resulted from the policy change. At the request of the House of Commons Defense Committee, the Ministry of Defense will conduct another review of the policy in two years. But the report indicates that at this stage military officials believe the new policy has been successfully implemented.

Since the ban has been lifted, several newspaper articles have recorded military reactions to the policy change[39]. British newspapers have reported the assessment of Rear-Admiral Burnell-Nugent and two resignations over the policy. In addition, researchers for this report interviewed eight Armed Forces officials and two retired Armed Forces officers. The officials include: the director of personnel policy for the Ministry of Defense, a commander with Naval Personnel and Service Conditions who was involved in the writing of the new policy, a lieutenant colonel with Army Public Relations, a major with the Army Training and Recruiting Agency, a squadron leader with the Air Force Engineer Liaison Recruiting Team, an official with the Personnel Management Agency of the Air Force, an official with the Ministry of Defense Press Office, and a Whitehall source with knowledge of the policy’s implementation. The retired officers were not apprised of the effect of the transition and were interviewed for background information.

Nine months after the ban was lifted, the assistant chief of the Navy staff, Rear-Admiral James Burnell-Nugent declared publicly that the change in policy had caused fewer problems than the inclusion ten years ago of women at sea. The Rear-Admiral stated that the removal of the ban had caused less difficulty than many of his colleagues had expected. He further stated that the ruling had raised some issues about accommodations aboard ships but that it had otherwise not caused serious problems. “I think it has caused less of a ruffle than the issue of women at sea did 10 years ago. That is not to say it is not without impact” (Paterson, 2000). The Rear-Admiral also commented that, “Although some did not welcome the change of policy, it has not caused any great degree of difficulty” (Paterson, 2000). Rear-Admiral Burnell-Nugent added:

There are issues to do with sharing accommodation and so on, which we shall deal with using normal management mechanisms. I am not saying everybody is happy with it, but on the whole it has not caused a great upset. (Paterson, 2000)

A straw poll of cadets immediately following the change in policy “revealed an already relaxed attitude to the issue” (Butcher, 2000a). One cadet responded, “It might just be that we belong to a different generation but I do not see it as a problem” (Butcher, 2000a). This attitude was shared by most of her fellow cadets. All those polled agreed that it was possible for homosexuals to serve in the RAF if their professional work was not influenced by their sexuality. One male cadet did say, however, that the presence of a gay or lesbian in a soldier in a unit could damage the team’s morale. “I personally do not have a problem with homosexuals but I can see it being a problem if everyone is cooped up together” (Butcher, 2000a)[40].

Two officers publicly resigned in the wake of the lifting of the ban. Brigadier Pat Lawless, the Deputy Commander of the Joint Helicopter Command, announced in January 2000 that he was resigning because the ban was lifted without adequate consideration for the military rationale for preserving it. Brigadier Lawless, who reported that he was “very sad to leave”, stated that he “couldn’t reconcile my strongly held moral and military convictions as a soldier and a citizen with the Government’s decision to lift the ban on homosexuals” (Wright, 2000). A friend of Lawless stated that “[Cdr. Lawless] was not taking this decision because he personally has a problem with homosexuals. He saw it as a decision foisted on the Armed Forces for no good military reason” (Butcher, 2000).

Commander Colin Douglas, a senior naval commander who led an air squadron in Bosnia and was director of flying at the Fleet Air Arm’s Culdrose air station, also resigned in January because he felt that policy decisions were being made for political reasons instead of military ones. Cdr. Douglas said that the decision on homosexual inclusion was “the final straw”. He added, “There is plenty of sound military sense against lifting the ban, but the decision was taken for political and legal reasons” (Butcher, 2000). There have been no other public announcements of resignations due to the lifting of the ban.

An article on desertion and recruitment issues in June 2000 commented that the opening of the military to gays and lesbians and of combat positions to women would hopefully increase recruitment levels. Problems associated with desertion included bullying, harassment during initiation rites, and an inability of the military to successfully deal with soldiers far away from home when family problems such as terminal illness and marital strain develop (Burke, 2000)[41]. Problems in recruiting levels were first made public in 1996. Articles discussing recruitment problems cited the number of foreign operations and the number of humanitarian missions, as well as the family turbulence that results from long absences or overseas postings (Schoefield, 2000). The lifting of the ban was not mentioned as a source of problems.

Two months after the Ministry of Defense’s internal appraisal, the responses of military officials interviewed for this report confirm its findings. The transition to the new policy has gone surprisingly well, and there have been no major problems to date. A Whitehall source who had access to the original, unabridged report emphasizes the definitiveness of its conclusions:

The assessment showed that there has been no impact at all. The report looked at all aspects, operational effectiveness, unit cohesion, and there has been no impact. At the end of the day, operational effectiveness is the critical matter, and there has been no effect at all. There haven’t been any disciplinary problems. There have only been one or two minor incidents, and they have been handled individually. The whole thing has gone a lot better than people had expected. (Personal Communication, October 9 and 11, 2000)

None of the officials that we spoke to knew of any evidence or had heard of any that suggested any significant difficulties that had arisen as a result of the policy change. No one had heard of any problems with resignations[42]. None of the officials interviewed knew of any evidence to suggest that recruitment rates or training completion had been affected. There have been no major problems with harassment or gay-bashing. Military officials interviewed for this report affirm that the lifting of the ban has largely been a non-issue.

This is not to imply that all servicemembers approved of the new policy before it was implemented. Many soldiers maintain anti-gay attitudes and worried about how the lifting of the ban would affect them. While complaints about the sharing of facilities with homosexual in particular were vociferous before the policy change, such protests were surprisingly short-lived. Commander Cooper, who worked on the new social code of conduct, explains:

The prime concern, and really the only one raised by people in the run-up to the publication of this policy, which came into effect in January of this year, was sharing accommodations. … straight chaps and straight girls might not necessarily like having to share living, changing and washing facilities with people of another sexual orientation. … We’ve taken the view that we will not separate out homosexuals and give them separate living accommodations. Now I would characterize the reaction to that as being very short-term complaints, very loud but short-lived. And as far as I know, the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom has only lost three people who have resigned over this issue. (Personal Communication, October 13, 2000)

Military officials interviewed for this report were also not aware of any indications that the new policy had negatively affected recruit training completion rates or that there had been any training problems related to the lifting of the ban (Hodges, Personal Communication, October 10, 2000; Cooper, Personal Communication, October 13, 2000; Peebles, Personal Communication, October 17, 2000). Service personnel have responded well to the new code of social conduct and the equitable premise of all servicemembers’ responsibility to act appropriately. As was suggested by the Ministry of Defense’s internal report, more discussion appears to have been raised about exercising personal responsibility generally than about the specific issue of homosexuality. A Whitehall source explains:

In the commanding officers’ course, they go over the code of social conduct. Homosexuality doesn’t even come up anymore – it’s no longer an issue. In the Equal Opportunities training, a whole raft of issues are discussed, and race and gender are bigger issues for us. There is one morning in the training where homosexuality gets discussed along with many other issues. One person in six months has argued vociferously against it, and that’s it. Everyone else’s attitude is to let people alone. No one wants to flaunt their sexuality, so let people have it. (Personal Communication, October 9 and 11, 2000)

Incidents of harassment or sexual misconduct related to sexual orientation by either heterosexual or homosexual soldiers have also not been a problem since the new policy was implemented in January. None of the military officials interviewed related a single case of gay-bashing or assault related to sexual orientation. Lieutenant Colonel Hodges confirmed with a colleague at the Central Discipline Office there have been no incidents related to sexual orientation reported to that office since the ban on homosexual soldiers was lifted. He added: “The change in policy has been a complete non-event” (Personal Communication, October 9 and November 2, 2000).

Although precise data is not available, there are no indications that the policy change has affected recruitment levels (Bagley, Personal Communication, October 13, 2000; Fuller, Personal Communication, October 17, 2000; Payne, Personal Communication, October 9, 2000). The Armed Forces does not ask about sexual orientation when recruiting, so the military does not possess any statistics specifically concerning either increases in the number of homosexual recruits or decisions not to enlist because of the policy change. Further, so many factors affect recruiting that it is difficult to isolate the effects of one. But there have been no signs, from the experiences of recruiters or assessments within the Ministry of Defense, that recruiting numbers have decreased substantially as a result of the lifting of the ban. A Ministry of Defense official states, “Certainly recruitment hasn’t dropped dramatically – recruitment is quite buoyant at present” (Barnard, Personal Communication, October 13, 2000). After several years of recruiting shortages, the last two years have witnessed the fulfillment of recruiting targets (Hodges, Personal Communication, October 9 and November 2, 2000). Paul Barnard adds, “Nothing drastic has happened in terms of recruiting or anything else” (Personal Communication, October 13, 2000).

Military leaders emphasize that behavior rather than sexual orientation is what ultimately matters to the men and women in the Armed Services. As long as people do their jobs and contribute effectively to the teamwork of their units, individual differences in opinion or in their personal lives are not considered relevant. The new policy’s focus on behavior rather than on personal attributes has allowed heterosexual and homosexual soldiers alike to maintain their focus on the jobs at hand. It is the emphasis on effective teamwork that Lieutenant Colonel Hodges believes is ultimately behind the success of the policy change:

There has been absolutely no reaction to the change in policy regarding homosexuals within the military. It’s just been accepted. In the military, it’s important to fit in and be a member of the team. As regards homosexuals, if someone were acting ‘camp’, they would not fit into the team. But if they are discrete [sic], it doesn’t matter. Our great strength as an Army is that we treat everyone [as] an individual who contributes to the team. We’ve won three recent wars – Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor because we place a lot of importance on personal responsibility, down to the lowest level. Everyone has strengths and known weaknesses, and everyone is given responsibility. Your sexuality doesn’t matter as long as you act as a member of the team. (Personal Communication, October 9 and November 2, 2000)

For those heterosexual soldiers who feared the new policy would bring major changes in interpersonal relationships, the continuity has been a relief. Since the lifting of the ban, heterosexual servicemembers have discovered that the Services after the policy change looks basically like the Services under the old policy. Paul Barnard explains:

And the media likes scare stories – about showers and what have you. A lot of people were worried that they would have to share body heat in close quarters or see two men being affectionate, and they would feel uncomfortable. But it has proved at first look that it’s not an issue. (Personal Communication, October 13, 2000)

Now that the court case has been resolved, people have been able to effectively move past the controversy. There have been no major surprises, no radical or inappropriate behavior. Heterosexual and homosexual soldiers alike continue to focus on the primary task at hand: doing the job that they signed up for. Paul Barnard adds: “It’s gone better than a lot of people thought it would. It’s almost gone unnoticed.” (Personal Communication, October 13 and November 6, 2000)

Military officials also suggest that servicemembers were better prepared to adapt to the lifting of the ban than many military commanders expected. Both the on-the-ground reality of homosexual service and more accepting attitudes in general about homosexuality among the young were raised as partial explanations for the relatively tranquil transition. Homosexual service personnel have been a part of the Armed Forces since long before the policy change occurred – a fact that was not denied by military officials even during the legal battle. Barnard argues that for many heterosexual servicemembers, the admission by a colleague of his or her sexual orientation in the wake of the new policy has not come as a surprise:

A lot of gay people have gone about like before and not said anything. But in most cases with those that have said that they’re gay, it was probably known already. Close associates who worked with them probably already knew, but they kept quiet about it, because they didn’t want to get the person in trouble. So often it hasn’t been a surprise. It just has not been an issue. (Personal Communication, October 13, 2000)

Commander Cooper in turn emphasizes the more liberal attitudes of younger service men and women:

We have a ground-breaking social policy here. … But in broad terms, I don’t think we’re shy about the fact that there has been an atmosphere of resigned acceptance, particularly amongst the younger people in the Navy. … There is a more relaxed attitude among younger people towards those of a different sexual orientation, and by and large it has been, therefore, a non-issue; it really has. (Personal Communication, October 13, 2000)

In interviewing military officials for this report, the theme of a lack of response was repeated. Officials emphasized that the policy transition had occurred more smoothly than expected, that any criticism to the lifting of the ban quickly died away, and that the anticipated problems have not developed. People on all sides of the issue have behaved responsibly and respectfully. And while problems may still develop at a later date, many Service officials are genuinely surprised by how agreeable the transition has been. A number of interviewed officials commented on the disjuncture between the predicted difficulties and the reality of the change. The Ministry of Defense Director of Personnel Policy states:

And [the] code of conduct seems to have been accepted and applied generally around the Armed Forces, and we’ve had very few real problems that have emerged, and people seem to have, slightly surprisingly, settled down and accepted the current arrangements. And we don’t really have the problems that we thought we’d have. (Fuller, Personal Communication, October 17, 2000)

Peebles concurs:

As far as I am aware, the rank and file airmen and airwomen have accepted the revised policy. The anticipated tide of criticism from some quarters within the Service was completely unfounded. (Personal Communication, October 17, 2000)

And Commander Cooper adds:

We now have chaps at sea that people now know are homosexuals – there are very few – we’re talking about a handful of people who have come out, and there wasn’t a [problem] coming out at all. And our youngsters have just taken it in stride. So it’s a major non-issue, which has come as a considerable surprise. (Personal Communication, October 13, 2000)

Given the fact that the new policy has been in place for less than a year, insufficient time has passed for any quantitative or in-depth external study of the policy change. Nonetheless, researchers for this report felt that it was important to canvass relevant observers outside of the military to further assess the impact of the lifting of the ban on homosexual soldiers. Academics, journalists and non-profit organization representatives[43] who have been following the controversy concerning sexual minorities in the military, or who are knowledgeable about British military personnel issues more generally, provide an independent check to the information provided by the Armed Forces. The outside experts may be aware of issues that have not been brought to the attention of the upper echelon of military commanders, they can provide a different perspective on events, and they may be more critical of the policies or the culture of the British Services than commanders.

Researchers for this report spoke with six respected academics and journalists who have been commentators on the military policy concerning homosexuality since before the ban was lifted. The interviewees included: Dr. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, a professor of military sociology at the University of Hull; Dr. Christopher Dandeker, a professor of military sociology and head of the Department of War Studies at King’s College; Dr. Hew Strachan, professor of military history at the University of Glasgow; and Edmund Hall, former journalist for the Sunday Times, Independent and the Evening Standard, and the author of the most widely-read book on the subject, We Can’t Even March Straight. Professor Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker specialize in military personnel issues and have written specifically about homosexuality in the Armed Forces. Researchers also interviewed Joan Heggie, a doctoral candidate at the University of York who is presently working on a dissertation on lesbian service personnel in Britain, and Tim Butcher, a reporter for the Daily Telegraph who has covered the topic for that paper since 1995. The researchers asked these and other contacts if they knew of any other prominent scholars or commentators who should be reached for this report; we could uncover no other principal sources on this subject.

The academics and journalists contacted for this report agree that it is still too soon to determine what the long-term consequences of the policy would be. The information available so far does, however, suggest reason for cautious optimism. None of the respondents knew of any major problems that have occurred in the wake of the policy change. And the (admittedly scant) information that they have heard about indicates a relatively smooth transition. Professor Dandeker states:

It’s too early to say, but the reports I have heard say … that so far there are few problems and indeed, perhaps less than the ones arising from gender integration. (Personal Communication, September 20, 2000)

Professor Harries-Jenkins also agrees that insufficient time had passed to definitively assess the outcome of the new policy, but he does add that “press statements (‘an informed source’) suggest a slight decrease in the incidence of harassment” (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000). Joan Heggie argues that the relative lack of news about the transition is itself a sign that no major problems had occurred. Since many military and political officials had been highly antagonistic to the removal of the ban, any sign of significant problems would have created a public furor. Heggie declares:

But there has been no feedback the new policy is not working. Certainly the fears of massive resignations or sexual harassment have not come true. (Personal Communication, October 2 and 16, 2000)

Professor Dandeker, Heggie and Hall all suggest that the relatively smooth transition may have been due in part to the fact that most gay and lesbian soldiers presently serving in the military have remained quiet about their sexual orientation and their private lives. Professor Dandeker and Heggie argue that such low visibility most likely stems from continued bias against homosexuality by most heterosexual soldiers. Professor Dandeker explains:

Most expect gay personnel to continue to be extremely discreet until attitudes within the services change further, and that this is an acceptable price to pay for achieving a lifting of the ban on personnel serving simply because of their homosexual orientation. (Personal Communication, September 20, 2000)

Heggie adds:

Even though the situation is better, soldiers don’t want to set themselves up for a fall. Even though the rules have changed, not everyone feels comfortable. (Personal Communication, October 2 and 16, 2000)

Hall, however, argues that gay and lesbian service personnel were unlikely to be particularly conspicuous even in the most accepting environment:

When the ban was lifted, I think that many people who had been serving quietly in the armed forces breathed a sigh of relief. Gay people who go into the armed forces tend to be conservative in their politics, and reserved about their private lives. After the ban was lifted, you didn’t find these people indulging in ostentatious out behavior. (Personal Communication, September 25, 2000)

Professors Harries-Jenkins and Dandeker, both noted experts on the British military in general, also concur that the issue of homosexual service in the military was minor given the priorities of the military at present. Like many other Western militaries in the wake of the Cold War, the British military has had to confront the effects of a shift in priorities and the extension of peacekeeping missions with shrinking resources. Professor Harries-Jenkins states that homosexuality “is a minor issue in the light of major problems for recruitment and retention caused by overstretch, role uncertainty, turbulence and rates of remuneration” (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000). Professor Dandeker also cites overstretch, recruitment and retention as primary problems presently facing the British military, and he adds that the size of the defense budget is an additional source of concern (Personal Communication, September 20, 2000).

Echoing Rear-Admiral Burnell-Nugent, Professors Dandeker and Harries-Jenkins suggest that the integration of women into the Armed Services is perhaps a more vexing personnel problem than that of including homosexuals. Professor Harries-Jenkins declares:

At present, the major [personnel] issue is the political policy that women should be recruited to direct combat on the ground posts in armor, infantry and special forces units. Whilst it is possible to substitute males in terms of race and sexual preference, there is a strong body of opinion in the military which questions the ability of women to serve in such posts. The lifting of the ban on gays may or may not have effects upon good order and discipline but these can be covered by regulations. (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000)

Both Professors did, however, append caveats to this assessment. Professor Dandeker contends that it “remains to be seen” whether the integration of women and sexual minorities will “interact and lead to difficulties” (Personal Communication, September 20, 2000). Professor Harries-Jenkins adds that the legislative approval of gay marriages or the “active promotion of the rights of homosexuals” would “alarm service chiefs” (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000).

Finally, Dandeker, Heggie and Butcher all caution that while the rules may have changed, fundamental attitudes have not. Many military personnel remain opposed to the change in policy, including a number of commanders. And a large number of those who are resigned to the new regulations continue to view homosexuality in an unfavorable light. Given the discretion placed with commanding officers in interpreting what constitutes social misconduct, such anti-gay feelings could result in harsh restriction of homosexuals. Professor Dandeker explains:

It should be pointed out that the ‘lifting of the ban’ is not quite right. Integration of open homosexuals is problematic and remains so under the new policy. … Much will depend on how commanding officers use discretion and how much gay personnel wish to be discreet about their orientation as well as scrupulously careful about their behavior both on and off duty. (Personal Communication, September 20, 2000)

Heggie also warns that “the rules of conduct are so loose that they allow discrimination by individual commanders” (Personal Communication, October 2 and 16, 2000). How the implementation of the code of social conduct proceeds in the coming months will have a considerable effect on the ultimate success of the new policy. Because gay-bashing is punishable by administrative discharge, however, Butcher expects that “the quality of life for the average homosexual servicemember [will] go up considerably” (Personal Communication, August 8, 2000).

Researchers for this report also talked with representatives from relevant major non-governmental organizations to determine their assessments of how the policy change was proceeding. We contacted the Christian Institute, the major NGO opposing the new policy; TORCHe, the gay rights group of the Conservative Party; the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI), an independent military think-tank; Stonewall and Outrage!, the two primary gay-rights groups in Britain; and Rank Outsiders, an organization that promotes the rights of gay and lesbian servicemembers. Rank Outsiders has been monitoring the inclusion of gay and lesbian service personnel closely since the policy change was announced in January.

Colin Hart, the executive director for the Christian Institute, does not feel that sufficient information was yet publicly available to assess the impact of the removal of the prohibition against homosexual servicemembers:

Well, it’s far too early to say what the results of lifting the ban have been. Clearly some senior officers are so concerned that they have resigned. We have not yet been able to investigate the implementation of the policy. (Personal Communication, September 21, 2000)

Debbie Gupta, the Director of Policy and Public Affairs at Stonewall, also feels that her

organization is not in a position to know the military effects of the policy change on morale, unit cohesion, or harassment levels. She points to the statements of Rear-Admiral Burnell-Nugent as providing the best public evidence of the impact of the policy change (Personal Communication, October 18, 2000).

None of the other organizations, including the non-partisan RUSI, know of any major problems with morale, unit cohesion or operational effectiveness that have developed in the wake of the policy change. Steven Johnston, the Chair of Rank Outsiders, posed the question of operational effectiveness and morale to Air Marshal Pledger at a RUSI presentation on September 28 concerning personnel matters:

I asked the very same question [concerning operational effectiveness and morale], and his direct reply was that there had been no change in either operational effectiveness or problems with moral[e]. In fact, I have three members of my Association who have been accepted back to full service (all in the Navy) where they have rejoined with the service knowing about their sexual orientation. These three individuals are of the three rank structures: Lt. [Commander], Chief Petty Officer and rating. This I believe is sufficient evidence to back up that statement. (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000)

Peter Tatchell, the Chairman of Outrage!, echoes Joan Heggie’s comments about the lack of news about difficulties during the transition. Although Outrage! does not have the military connections that either RUSI or Rank Outsiders maintains, Tatchell suggests that the level of concern before the removal of the ban means that major post-change problems would have been brought to light:

But clearly, there has been none of the damage that the army chiefs were predicting to morale or operational effectiveness. … [G]iven the dire warnings the service chiefs were making before the ban was lifted about how it would cripple morale, the consequences they predicted were so severe that we should be seeing something by now. But they have not come to pass. (Personal Communication, August 21, 2000)

RUSI, Rank Outsiders and Outrage! also have no knowledge of any increases in harassment related to sexual orientation. Rank Outsiders has been monitoring this issue and has been in close contact with the military on these matters. It is best positioned to assess the issue of anti-gay harassment, because they both support gay and lesbian service personnel and have access to the military’s own analysis. Rank Outsiders might hear about cases of harassment of homosexual servicemembers that were not reported within the chain of command. Johnston, the Chair of Rank Outsiders, states that he knows of no significant harassment problems within the British military. He only knows of two minor instances of harassment, both of which were successfully resolved:

As an Association we have not heard of any major problems of harassment or assaults [sic] within the AF. I have been privy to two incidents in which we were able to advise and the problems were resolved quite quickly. … Both incidents were of a ‘name calling’ situation with only one that included any physical efforts, that being belongings overturned and adverse comments painted onto a private motor vehicle. The local commanders were very sympathetic … The end result was that the individual, by his own request, had moved units and is now an instructor at his unit Training Center! (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000)

Johnston further reports that the military has expressed a desire to work effectively with Rank Outsiders should any future problems arise. Johnston explains:

I have been to the Ministry of Defense a number of times in which [harassment] has been the subject of many discussions. It appears that there have not been any cases that they are aware of and were very positive as [to] this situation. I have been told, however, that if any do come to light that I am aware of and require assistance, they will investigate at the highest levels (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000).

Michael Codner, the Assistant Director for Military Sciences at RUSI, believes that assurances of this kind by military commanders are not simply empty gestures. He is convinced that the Armed Forces are strongly committed to making the new policy work. Codner argues that not only has the top brass invested in the policy change, but also that the new thinking about homosexual inclusion is part of a larger shift that has affected the military. Codner explains:

The intention is to be far more than cosmetic. If you look at the thinking of senior personnel, they have invested a great deal of credibility and authority into this policy shift. They want to see it fully implemented.

There has been a kind of generational shift. [For] the people who are moving into the rank of 1-star and 2-star general, who are around 50-53 … for them this is just not so much of a major issue. (Personal Communication, September 26, 2000)

The Chairs of Rank Outsiders and OutRage! both suggest that the eradication of the ban on homosexual service in the military is just the first step in a longer process toward full equality in the military for sexual minorities. The attainment of equal access to domestic partner benefits, joint accommodations and pension benefits will signal a real acknowledgement of the contributions and sacrifices that homosexual personnel have made, as well as their full acceptance into the fabric of military life. Johnston explains:

As to the future, there is still much to be done. The ban being overturned is a major step for the future, but equal rights with their heterosexual colleagues is a different matter. Full employment rights will include: pension rights, accommodation rights and partnership rights … These, when obtained, will show the commitment by the [Armed Forces] hierarchy to full equality to every member of the [Armed Forces] …

As for the transition to the new policy, well it has all been very much a ‘matter of fact’ and life goes on as it always has. In summary, there has simply been no change but a positive step forward that at last each and every person can be themselves and give their very best to the roles that they undertake! (Personal Communication, October 16, 2000)

Since the ban on homosexual servicemembers has been lifted, the British media has reported the first instance of a gay soldier coming out to his crewmates. Most recently, it has also reported the acceptance of the boyfriend of the first openly gay officer in the Royal Navy as a “naval wife”, with rights to benefits such as subsidized flights to see his partner in port and invitations to formal Navy dinners (Gilligan, 2000). Researchers for this report also spoke with four sexual minorities presently serving in the British Armed Forces about their experiences before and after the policy change. The four men include: a chief petty officer in the Royal Navy, a lieutenant commander in the Royal Navy, a corporal in the Royal Air Force, and a junior technician in the Royal Air Force. The chief petty officer and the lieutenant commander were both discharged under the former policy and have recently been reinstated. The corporal has been in the military for ten years and was recently promoted. He has been out to his colleagues since the ban was lifted. The junior technician has served continuously for the past five years and has not disclosed his sexual orientation to any of his colleagues. Because these interviewees do not constitute a representative sample of presently-serving homosexual soldiers, their experiences cannot be said to provide a complete picture of life for sexual minorities under the new policy. But their perspectives as servicemembers most affected by the policy change allow for a more detailed portrait of the present conditions on-the-ground than the comments by MOD staff members and other non-military observers.

At the end of January 2000, the first purported servicemember to publicly acknowledge his homosexuality in the wake of the lifting of the ban told his shipmates that he was gay. The sailor, who asked reporters not to disclose his name, announced his sexual orientation several hours after the lifting of the ban. The 280-member crew was ‘reminded’ of the rules against bullying and harassment, and that any allegation would be “thoroughly investigated” (Fleet, 2000). The man told members of the ship’s mess while docked near Portsmouth, Hants, his hometown. He reported that his announcement was well-received. “They were all fine about it. I was surprised. I had no problem with them about it at all”.

The sailor, who had been with the Navy for eight years but had only realized his sexual orientation four years ago, said that he was relieved to have been able to disclose his sexual orientation with his crewmates:

I was just fed up with lying to people, especially when I went home at the weekends. People have asked me where I have been, and I have had to make up somewhere because I had been to a gay club. I was living separate lives. I had my Navy life and I had my life at home. Coming out in the Navy has been a big weight off my shoulders. It has been a big relief. (Fleet, 2000).

The sailor added that he did not expect any problems in the wake of his announcement. He declared, “I do not expect any problems in the future or for it to affect my work” (Fleet, 2000).

On October 29, the Sunday Times reported that the partner of the first openly gay naval officer had won the right to some partner benefits, including joining naval spouses flying out to see their husbands and wives. Lieutenant Commander Craig Jones said that his partner Adam has been “made to feel welcome” by the navy and has been “fully integrated” into naval family life (Gilligan, 2000). Jones’ partner has attended formal dinners on ship and ashore:

Our first mess dinner, in Portsmouth, was a worry, but we had a great time. It was a difficult issue for Adam and me, but people generally, and particularly my colleague’s wives, looked after us very well. (Gilligan, 2000)

All of the out servicemembers interviewed for this report also state that they have had no major problems with their colleagues because of their sexual orientation. Corporal Andrew Blythe has had no difficulties with his colleagues at Bentley Priory, all of whom know that he is gay. Chief Petty Officer Rob Nunn and Lieutenant Commander Michael Griffiths, who have been recently reinstated in the Navy after earlier discharges due to sexual orientation, report that colleagues have responded well to their reinstatements. The circumstances of their departures and returns have meant that the sexual orientation of each officer is widely known by co-workers. This has not, however, resulted in problems for either officer. Lieutenant Commander Griffiths explains:

I am now out to anyone who wishes to know. Just about everyone who knew me before 1995 knows [my sexual orientation,] and I have already met about a dozen people who know since rejoining. They have been absolutely fine, welcoming me back to the Royal Navy and it obviously isn't causing them any difficulty. I have come out to one person who knew me [prior to discharge] but didn't know [my sexual orientation]. He was astonished, remarked that I kept it very quiet before and has been fine since. (Personal Communication, October 22, 2000)

Chief Petty Officer Nunn, who has served in the navy for a total of 21 years, may be returning to submarine duty and is in line for a promotion. He also reports a positive response from co-workers:

Now, the people in the mess have asked me all sorts of questions, and I’ve answered their questions. They think I’m very brave doing what I’ve done, and we’ve now got to the stage where the mess president a couple of nights ago asked if my partner was coming to the Christmas ball. (Personal Communication, October 17, 2000)

Chief Petty Officer Nunn believes that the best approach has been to allow for an open dialogue with colleagues about the subject of his sexual orientation and his reinstatement. This has enabled him to counter stereotypes, improve the knowledge of his colleagues, and put people at ease. Chief Petty Officer Nunn has not been subject to harassment either before his dismissal or after his return; he has, however, encountered several people since his reinstatement who have been unsure how to respond to him. He describes the experience:

Well, it’s the not being able to ask me a question. It’s the old – ‘I don’t know quite what to say’. In fact, one guy that I talked to who couldn’t sort of talk to me, I said, ‘Right, I’m going to ask the questions that you want to ask, and answer them.’ So I did. (Personal Communication, October 17, 2000)

Chief Petty Officer Nunn adds that his open approach has been successful. Once colleagues are able to ask the questions that they have about homosexuality and about the service of gay and lesbian soldiers, any remaining discomfort seems to disappear. With respect to the colleague who was once afraid to voice his queries, Chief Petty Officer Nunn reports that he is “nice as pie now” (Personal Communication, October 17, 2000).

All four respondents feel positively about the policy change. While Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and the junior technician believe that it is too early to know if the policy will be implemented fairly for both heterosexual and homosexual soldiers, Corporal Blyth and Chief Petty Officer Nunn both feel that the army is committed to providing equal standards for heterosexual and homosexual soldiers alike. Corporal Blyth says that, “In fact I now feel more protected under the military code than my partner does at work ([h]e’s a civilian)” (Personal Communication, October 27, 2000).

Chief Petty Officer Nunn believes that he has already seen evidence of the military’s commitment to enforcing across-the-board both a code of social conduct and a zero-tolerance policy for harassment. He explains:

To a person, everybody I’ve talked to, commander downwards, has said – if you’ve got problems, come and see me. … I can deal with most of it. But you know, I know full well that if I went to one of them with it, it would be sorted out. They are more than willing to use the legislation, which is very good news from our point of view. (Personal Communication, October 17, 2000)

He also reports that he has just acted as the Provost Marshal at a Court Martial for a male soldier who had been sexually harassing female trainees. The male soldier was severely disciplined; he was demoted a rank, had to forfeit a medal and lost twelve years of good conduct. Chief Petty Officer Nunn argues that this punishment was a good example of the military’s willingness to apply the social code of conduct to all its servicemembers (Personal Communication, October 17, 2000).

Chief Petty Officer Nunn, Lieutenant Commander Griffiths and the junior technician also report that not much has changed in the day-to-day life in the Armed Forces. The primary alteration has been that homosexual service personnel now have the option to reveal their sexual orientation without fear of discharge. Having this choice enables soldiers to confront comments or harassment by peers without having to worry about losing their jobs. Chief Petty Officer Nunn and Lieutenant Commander Griffiths both agree that service personnel were more receptive to a change in policy than MOD officials initially believed. Lieutenant Commander Griffiths declares:

The policy appears to have been put across as unwelcome but inevitable

and the briefing officers seemed to be embarrassed by the requirement to

tell their men and women of the change. Fortunately, the men and women seem to be much better able to cope with the change than senior officers were prepared to give them credit for and many of the men and women know friends or family outside of the Service who are gay. (Personal Communication, October 22, 2000)

For Chief Petty Officer Nunn, his assessment of the open-mindedness of the soldiers stems from both the reception he has received upon his return and the comments of his crewmates when he was discharged. When his co-workers originally heard that he was being dismissed, they expressed support for him:

In fact, all of them were coming up to me and saying ‘if there’s anything I can do, give us a shout’, all this sort of stuff. And … my commanding officer when he said goodbye to me, said that ‘we can’t afford to lose people like you, but my hands are tied’. And the attitude as far as I can see – certainly it’s been proved since I got back - is that ‘what the hell’s the problem here?’. You do your job, and that’s all they want from you.

(Personal Communication, October 17, 2000)[44]

At the same time, however, the servicemembers agree that negative stereotypes about homosexuals continue to be widespread among British soldiers. Because the Armed Forces is such an insular climate, many gay and lesbian soldiers still feel fearful of revealing their sexual orientation in a setting where anti-homosexual feelings remain pervasive. For the RAF junior technician, the homophobia of his colleagues has made him wary of telling anyone about the people that he dates or other aspects of his private life:

And [the restrictive military environment is] difficult, and that prevents people from coming out, the fact that it’s such an insular environment, where everybody knows everyone else… and no matter if you get moved, someone else will find out, and that’s the big problem for people at the moment, is that we know it’s quite homophobic, and we know that there’s not an easy way of getting away from it. And that’s the worry we face at the moment – is the general perception of gay people. (Personal Communication, October 22, 2000)

But, he adds, ‘Gay people are just like any other people’ (Personal Communication, October 22, 2000). For Lieutenant Griffiths, changing heterosexual servicemembers’s attitudes about gay and lesbian people will take time:

Overall, the [Royal Navy] seems to be treating the change in policy as a bit of a joke (I believe as an inherent defense mechanism) but this is likely to change as the numbers of openly gay people grow. I do not foresee a problem and the joke will stop once people get used to serving with lesbian and gay people. (Personal Communication, October 22, 200)

For Corporal Blyth, such a change in attitudes has already begun:

Yes, there is less micky talking etc. We used to be a minority that was fair game to be the butt of someone’s [sic] joke, but that is all changing. People are now aware that they used to serve with [closeted] gays and the ones I work with now know that they are serving with a gay man, [who] is proud of the fact he’s gay. (Personal Communication, October 27, 2000)

IX. CONCLUSION

The British Services fought for a number of years to maintain its policy of excluding openly gay and lesbian soldiers. Even after the outcome of the European Court of Human Rights case appeared inevitable, the Armed Forces resisted calls to eliminate the ban. While the Ministry of Defense asked commanders to soften their enforcement of the ban in the months before the decision was handed down, it both refused to alter its basic policy and continued to dismiss soldiers for homosexuality. The last gay soldier was discharged from the military just three days before the ruling that overturned the ban on homosexual service. Service officials argued that the inclusion of open homosexuals would engender distrust, splinter working relationships, damage morale, and even harm operational effectiveness. Efforts to overturn the ban were deemed by some military officials to be inappropriate political meddling in military operations and harmful social engineering.

Once the decision was handed down by the European Court, however, the military acted quickly to put in place a policy that would both accord with the ruling and address effectiveness concerns. The Armed Forces enacted a new policy within three months of the decision by the European Court. It established a nondiscriminatory mandate that focuses on behavior rather than on personal characteristics. It emphasized the importance of equal application of the new social code of conduct and instructed commanders to intervene in soldiers’ personal lives only when operational effectiveness might be compromised. It invited discharged soldiers to reapply and accepted back several former service personnel. The Services also reemphasized the policy of zero tolerance for harassment, bullying and victimization.

While the long-term effects of the elimination of the ban remain to be seen, the first ten months of the new social code of conduct and the more inclusive policy have been a clear and unqualified success. The Services’ own internal assessment at six months found that the new policy has “been hailed as a solid achievement” (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2). There have been no indications of negative effects on recruiting levels. The social code of conduct has been effectively incorporated into the military’s training courses. No mass resignations have occurred. There have been no major reported cases of gay-bashing or harassment of sexual minorities. There have been no major reported cases of harassment or inappropriate behavior by gay or lesbian soldiers. There has been no perceived effect on morale, unit cohesion or operational effectiveness. The new policy has been well received by soldiers, and the policy change has been characterized by a “marked lack of reaction” (Ministry of Defense, 2000e, p. 2).

The conclusions of the Ministry of Defense report have been confirmed by our conversations with more than twenty-five representatives from the military, academia, and non-governmental organizations. None of those interviewed know of any major problems associated with the policy change. No one has heard of any difficulties related to recruitment or training completion rates; recruitment levels are characterized as “quite buoyant” (Barnard, Personal Communication, October 13, 2000). There has not been a problem of mass resignations associated with the removal of the ban. None of those interviewed have heard of cases of serious homophobic harassment. Rank Outsiders, the only organization devoted exclusively to homosexual servicemembers, knows of only two cases of minor problems. The issues were quickly addressed by military personnel and effectively resolved. Out service personnel interviewed for this report and by other sources describe collegial treatment by their co-workers and other servicemembers.

Experts in all fields acknowledged that more work remains to be done, and new obstacles could still emerge. Homophobic attitudes persist throughout the Services, and many soldiers therefore feel the need to remain silent about their personal lives. It is possible that some problems will develop as more gay and lesbian service personnel acknowledge their sexual orientation to colleagues, or if the Armed Forces relaxes its vigilance against harassment and inappropriate behavior of all kinds. Issues of equality such as pension, accommodation and partnership rights have yet to be addressed. Still, the distance that has been traveled over the past year is impressive. Concerns of dire consequences have been replaced by a general recognition that the transition has proceeded smoothly.

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You can download a PDF version of this report here.

Original research and analysis conducted for this report were furnished by ELM Research Associates, an independent, non-partisan research consultancy. The authors thank Nathan Paxton, Ph.D. student in Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley for invaluable research assistance.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In November 1992, the Australian Defence Forces lifted its ban on open gay and lesbian soldiers. Using all available data from military, academic, non-governmental, and other sources, this report assesses the extent to which the lifting of the gay ban has affected the well-being and performance of the Australian military.

Based on the results of prior studies, eighteen in-depth interviews with informed military and non-military observers, and other data, this study finds that the full lifting of the ban on gay service has not led to any identifiable negative effects on troop morale, combat effectiveness, recruitment and retention, or other measures of military performance. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that policy changes associated with the lifting of the ban may have contributed to improvements in productivity and working environments for service members. Key findings include:

· Senior officials, commanders, and military scholars within the ADF consistently appraise the lifting of the ban as a successful policy change that has contributed to greater equity and effective working relationships within the ranks.

· Prior to the lifting of the ban, ADF service chief argued that allowing homosexuals to serve openly would jeopardize recruitment, troop cohesion, and combat effectiveness while also spreading AIDS and encouraging predatory behavior

· Senior officials, commanders and scholars report that there has been no overall pattern of disruption to the military. However, some individual units have reported disruptions that were resolved successfully through normal management procedures.

· While the lifting of the ban was not immediately followed by large numbers of personnel declaring their sexual-orientation, by the late 1990s significant numbers of officers and enlisted personnel had successfully and largely uneventfully come out to their peers.

· Recruitment and retention rates have not suffered as a result of the policy change. As Commodore R. W. Gates of the Royal Australian Navy states in the report, “There was no great peak...where people walked out, and there was no great dip in recruiting. It really was a non-event.”

· Self-identified gay soldiers, officers, and commanders describe good working relationships in an environment that emphasizes capable and competent job performance under uniform rules of conduct for all personnel. Gay soldiers and commanders have successfully served in recent active deployments in East Timor.

· Complaints regarding sexual orientation issues comprise less than 5% of the total complaints received by the ADF of incidents of sexual harassment, bullying, and other forms of sexual misconduct.

· Of 1,400 calls received by an anonymous “Advice Line” maintained by the ADF to help personnel and commanders manage potential misconduct issues since this service was initiated in August 1998, 17 (1.21 percent) have related to sexual orientation issues.

· Current debates in Australia related to the policy change are now focused on extending equal benefits to the partners of gay servicemembers, rather than on the policy itself. To the degree that harassment issues continue to exist in the Australian Forces, most observers believe that problems faced by women soldiers are more serious than those faced by gay personnel.

II. INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1992, the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) maintained both formal and informal rules to discourage known or suspected homosexuals from serving (Smith 2000, Agostino 2000). As a result of a number of external and internal pressures, in 1992 the Defence Forces issued a new directive that lifted the remaining ban on homosexual service by specifying uniform rules of appropriate and inappropriate sexual conduct that applied equally to both heterosexual and homosexual interactions. The change in policy met with strong opposition from the ADF service chiefs as well as from several service member organizations who argued that allowing homosexuals to serve openly would jeopardize recruitment, troop cohesion, and combat effectiveness while also spreading AIDS and encouraging predatory behavior (see e.g., Associated Press, 24 November 1993). In the months that followed the policy change, however, the issue largely and quickly faded from the public stage.

This report integrates prior studies of gay-military issues in Australia, press coverage, Australian Forces data, and interviews with eighteen ADF officials, academic observers, non-governmental actors, interest groups, and enlisted personnel to assess how and to what extent the performance and well-being of the Australian Defence Forces have been affected by the 1992 lifting of the ban on open gay service. Almost eight years after the ban was lifted, all available evidence indicates that the policy change has not led to deleterious consequences for recruitment or retention, effective unit functioning, or combat effectiveness. While very little quantifiable data appear to exist that bear directly on performance effects of the policy change, the experiences and observations of senior ADF officials, commanders of active-duty deployments, recruitment officers, and self-identified homosexual servicemembers all strongly suggest that the policy change has been implemented smoothly and successfully, albeit imperfectly. Their opinions are corroborated by the research and evidence provided by informed scholars, journalists, and representatives of a number of interest and pressure groups. At the present time, public debates in Australia over gay-military issues have moved on to second-order concerns—to issues concerning spousal benefits and adequate enforcement of existing anti-discrimination policies in the workplace. For the ADF, the participation of homosexuals in the military is now very much a “non-issue.”

Part III begins the analysis by outlining the evidence collected and the methods used to appraise it. Part IV briefly reviews the historical context of the 1992 decision to lift the ban, describes the policy change, and addresses its implementation. Part V provides a systematic review of evidence from prior assessments, the Australian Defence Forces, and the independent Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, before moving on to observations made by informed academics and representatives of relevant interest groups. Part V concludes by documenting the experiences of seven current and former self-declared homosexuals in the ADF. Finally, Part VI synthesizes the available evidence and concludes the analysis.

III. METHODOLOGY

Information collected for this report was systematically gathered from publicly available primary and secondary sources relevant to an understanding of military outcomes associated with homosexual service in the Australian Defence Forces. Sources and methods included: identification, retrieval, and analysis of all prior research bearing on homosexual service in the Australian Defence Forces conducted by governmental, academic, and policy-focused organizations in North America; content analysis of Nexis/Lexis search retrievals for all North American, European, and Asia-Pacific news articles and wire service dispatches relating to homosexual service in the Australian Defence Forces before and after the ban was lifted (n=63); interviews undertaken with Australian Defence Forces units and their senior representatives (n=3 individuals); snowball identification and interviewing of major academic, non-governmental, and policy experts on gay-military issues in Australia since the ban was lifted (n=9); and interviews with sexual minority participants in the Australian Defence Forces who were located through the cooperation of leading non-governmental and military human rights organizations (n=7). Australian Defence Forces representatives were chosen by asking academic, non-governmental, and policy experts for suggested contacts who were knowledgeable about the military's policy on homosexuality, and then using snowball identification techniques to identify other interview subjects.

To draw its conclusions, this report relies on a multi-method approach to compare and synthesize evidence provided by a variety of sources. Whenever possible, we compare independent observations from multiple sources to elucidate findings that are consistent among observers in different sectors (e.g., military, academic, non-governmental). During the interview process, we also sought to ensure that the universe of sources drawn upon for the study was complete by repeatedly asking observers from different sectors for recommendations of additional sources of information. While it is possible that additional confidential information on outcomes not documented in this report may be maintained by the ADF, senior officials contacted for this study were not aware of any additional data. The final compilation of sources that informs this report thus reflects an exhaustive inventory of relevant data and opinions.

IV. CONTEXT OF THE 1992 LIFTING OF REMAINING BAN

A. Australian Society and Military Policy Regarding Homosexuals Prior to 1992

Like the Armed Forces in many other Anglophone countries, the Australian military maintained both formal and informal rules proscribing the participation of known homosexuals in the armed forces from 1986 to 1992. Prior to 1986, the ADF did not maintain a formal policy regarding the participation of homosexuals. According to a report by United States General Accounting Office (1993), recruits were not formally questioned about their sexual orientation before 1986. However, informal efforts frequently were made to identify and document activities of personnel suspected of homosexual conduct, usually followed by the removal of such personnel from duty (Agostino 2000). Existing state and federal laws proscribing sodomy and homosexual relations usually were invoked to enforce these actions (Croome 1992, 9; Livingstone 2000).

While most historical perspectives on the treatment of homosexual personnel have identified a number of instances of investigation and prosecution (referred to by some critics as “witch hunts”) between World War II and the mid-1980s, substantial evidence nonetheless exists that homosexuality was at times tolerated if not informally accepted in some units (Smith 2000). Anecdotal evidence provided by most experts interviewed for this report also indicates that many ADF personnel were aware that practicing homosexuals served in the ranks.

In the 1980s, as Australia incorporated international human rights accords into its national laws, federal and state governments actively dismantled existing laws against homosexuality and began to ratify new human rights bills that included protection against arbitrary discrimination. As a result, the ADF could no longer justify anti-homosexual practices on the basis of territorial laws and was required to issue its own policy. It did so in September 1986, and the ban on homosexual service became an explicit and formal part of ADF instructions (Croome 1992; Smith 1995).

Even so, according to Hugh Smith, Associate Professor of Politics at the Australian Defence Force Academy, the policy of banning gays was exercised with some degree of tolerance and senior military officials often used discretion to decide whether or not to implement the gay ban (Smith 2000). At the same time, however, other persons familiar with the situation between 1986 and 1992 assert that the military routinely engaged in “witch hunts” to root out members suspected of homosexuality. According to Dr. Katerina Agostino of the Macquarie University Department of Sociology, “The military invested lots of time and money in finding and rooting people out. Military police were used” (Agostino, 2000)”

B. Context of the Policy Change

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of economic, social and cultural factors served to undermine the perceived legitimacy and rationale of the ADF ban on homosexual service. To begin, military leaders encountered criticisms of ADF policies concerning equality of opportunity and racial and ethnic diversity. In 1992, the government examined charges that the ADF was not recruiting a sufficient portion of its soldiers from non-European populations and the result was a major study of the ethnic makeup of the forces (Smith 1995, 535). Debates over the status and treatment of women in the ADF also influenced the perceived legitimacy of the ban on gay service. Though women had been able to participate in the Australian military for many years, either directly or through auxiliary branches like the Women’s Royal Australian Army Corps, they were not allowed to take combat roles until the late 1980s. Smith points out that the three service branches began to face difficulties in retaining qualified personnel: “The ADF thus had a clear incentive to open more positions to women, thereby expanding the pool of potential recruits” (Smith 1995, 540). Related to these problems, considerations of sexual harassment and problems of sexual behavior in the ADF began to come to light. In late 1992, three women who had served on board HMAS Swan alleged that they had been sexually harassed quite severely at the hands of their male shipmates. Similar to the Tailhook sexual harassment incident in the United States, the case provoked widespread outrage and a call for the military to examine gender issues in the forces (Agostino 2000, Smith 1995, Smith 2000).

In the years shortly before government and ADF officials considered lifting the ban on homosexuals, Australia adopted several human rights measures into its laws and codes including the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Article 26 of the ICCPR posits the fundamental equality of all human beings and Article 2 addresses each individual’s right to equal treatment before the law (Sidoti 2000). Although sexual orientation is not included explicitly in the ICCPR’s list of prohibited justifications for discrimination, Australian Human Rights Commissioner Chris Sidoti says that the ICCPR’s list was meant to be inclusive rather than exclusive. Therefore, Sidoti continues, although not explicitly mentioned, sexual orientation is covered by the spirit of the ICCPR and it cannot serve as the basis of discrimination. Opponents of the ADF ban argued that the military was in violation of these human rights provisions in Australian law.

As civil rights considerations came to play an increasingly important role in the Australian political landscape, the ADF encountered a number of social and international trends that changed its understanding of its own mission and its relationship with civilian society. In particular, the end of the Cold War forced the ADF to reevaluate its role as a fighting force and many Australians came to see military service as a temporary occupation rather than a long-term career.[1] Professor Hugh Smith has argued that during the Cold War, many Australians regarded the military as a calling and a lifetime vocation (1995). According to the old mindset, a career in the armed forces meant that military life always took precedence over other priorities. Smith says that according to the new “occupational” mindset of many Australians, however, a military career is “just another job.” Except in extraordinary circumstances like combat, soldiers now expect regular working hours, free weekends, pension and benefits, and other freedoms and privileges associated with the civilian word. In the late 1980s and early 1990’s, much of Australian society moved toward an occupational outlook on most careers including military service, and just as the rest of Australian society was moving toward greater tolerance and support for individual rights and freedoms, the military found itself needing to adjust (Smith 1995, 536-39).

As the center-left/left party in Australian politics, the Labour government that controlled Parliament in the late 1980s and early 1990s faced some disagreement within its own ranks over social issues such as the lifting of the ban on gays and lesbians in the military. As Croome (2000) points out, some members of Labour’s caucus supported “traditional family values” and opposed lifting the ban. Others were traditional progressives, committed to an expansion of what they argued were equal rights for all Australians.

In a 1990 test of the military ban on homosexuals, a servicewoman made a formal complaint to the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission and contended that her discharge had been partially based upon the fact that she was a lesbian. The HREOC asked the ADF to explain the reasoning behind its ban on homosexual service, and some observers believe that the complaint was a serious challenge to ADF policy and that it may have prompted the ADF to review its rationale for discrimination (UK Ministry of Defence 1996, H1-1; Smith 1995, 544; Croome 1992, 10). In February 1992, the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel informed Parliament that the federal government would review the ADF’s ban (Croome 1992, 10). In June 1992, however, the Defense Minister told Parliament that following the recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff, the Government would not lift the ban. Gay activists condemned the declaration as hypocritical and prejudiced. (Agence France Presse, 18 June 1992)

In reaction, the Government formed a special party committee to study the matter, to accept submissions from interested groups, and to make policy recommendations for the government. In September 1992, this committee recommended that the ban be dropped “immediately.” The Caucus Committee also recommended that the ADF undertake a survey of members’ attitudes and engage in an education campaign as part of the lifting of the ban. Committee members who favored lifting the ban contended that the military was not significantly different from other organizations and thus should not be exempt from anti-discriminatory policy changes being made elsewhere.[2] Those who opposed the removal of the personnel restrictions contended that such a change would hinder the military’s operational effectiveness, combat performance, and morale. At the time, an ADF spokesperson said that the military would find the removal of the ban “disturb[ing]” and would likely react with disgust (Agence France Presse, 18 September 1992).

C. The Lifting of the Ban and Immediate Reactions

In late November 1992, the Cabinet accepted the Caucus Committee recommendation and the Government voted to drop the ban on the service of gays and lesbians in the Australian military. Although the Defense Minister and the service chiefs opposed the removal of the ban, the Attorney General, the Health Minister, and the Prime Minister all supported its removal. The Attorney General argued that Australia’s policy violated international human rights agreements not to discriminate against people based upon sexual orientation and the Health Minister said that by pushing military members to keep their relationships “underground”, the ban contradicted efforts to fight AIDS. Prime Minister Paul Keating then made the decision to accept the policy change and to order its immediate implementation in the entire ADF. (Agence France Presse, 23 November 1992; United Press International, 23 November 1992; Reuters, 24 November 1992.)

In place of the previous military regulation banning gays and lesbians from service, the government issued a more general instruction on “sexual misconduct policy.” Among other provisions, the new instruction referred to unacceptable conduct without making a distinction between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Rather than define what was unacceptable based upon sexual orientation, in other words, the new instruction prohibited any sexual behavior that negatively impacted group cohesion or command relationships, took advantage of subordinates, or discredited the ADF (Smith, 1995, 545). Thus, for example, “homosexual advances” were not illegitimate; threatening sexual behavior was. And the policy provided commanders with some latitude to judge whether a certain behavior was acceptable or not in a certain context. According to a report prepared by the British Defence Ministry, the Australian policy “recognises that sexual relations are a part of adult life and are predominately a private matter for each individual. Nevertheless, the ADF is concerned with the sexual behavior of its members where it is inconsistent with the inherent requirements of the ADF, or where it is unlawful. …The term ‘Unacceptable Sexual Behaviour’ is not defined and thus left to a wide variety of command interpretation. This lack of prescriptive definition of unacceptable behavior is in line with the Australian Sex Discrimination Act’s emphasis on what is reasonable in the circumstances and the recipient’s response to such behaviour” (UK Defence Ministry 1996, H1-3).

Reaction to the Australian change was swift and severe. The Returned and Services League, Australia’s largest veterans group, condemned the policy change and argued that allowing open homosexuals to serve would shatter unit cohesion and lead to a deterioration of trust among soldiers, thus undermining the forces’ fighting effectiveness (Associated Press, 24 November 1992). Other opponents raised the specter of AIDS and said that the battlefield practice of direct blood-to-blood transfers would lead to an increased incidence of HIV infection. Even within the military, however, opinion seemed to be somewhat mixed (Associated Press, 9 December 1992). As of January 1993, however, no members of the ADF declared themselves to be gay to military authorities (Associated Press, 27 January 1993). Early reports generated in the immediate aftermath of the policy change indicated that the ADF did not experience any decline in recruiting or combat performance and media attention to the issue largely disappeared approximately six months after new policy’s implementation (New York Times, 30 April 1993).

After the lifting of the ban, the ADF introduced a variety of new programs and training courses to enforce and support the provisions of the Defence Instruction on Discrimination, Harassment, Sexual Offences, Fraternisation and other Unacceptable Behavior in the Australian Defence Forces (2000). In 1997, responsibilities for monitoring, education, and enforcement of the Instructions were consolidated into the new Defence Equity Organization (DEO) that reports directly to the Defence Personnel Executive (the head of personnel for the ADF). Currently, the DEO is planning to provide additional support for the integration of gay and lesbian soldiers by creating a new training course (Grey 2000).

V. EFFECTS OF FULL INCLUSION ON PERFORMANCE IN THE ADF: APPRAISING THE EVIDENCE

A. Prior Assessments: United States General Accounting Office (1993) And United Kingdom Ministry Of Defence (1996)

GAO (1993) Study

In June 1993, seven months after the Australian ban on homosexual service was lifted, the General Accounting Office of the United States conducted interviews with ADF officials to document early outcomes associated with the change (GAO 1993). The short overview of the policy change concludes with a summary statement based on comments from an “Australian official,” who stated that:

“...[A]lthough it is too early to assess the results of the revised policy, no reported changes have occurred in the number of persons declaring his or her sexual preference or the number of recruits being inducted. Effects on unit cohesiveness have not yet been fully determined. However, early indications are that the new policy has had little or no adverse impact” (19).

These claims are substantiated by additional evidence collected for this study, described below.

United Kingdom (1996) Assessment

In February 1996, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence completed a report documenting the findings of its “Homosexuality Policy Assessment Team” that investigated homosexual personnel policies of a number of foreign militaries. The team sent to Australia met with representatives of the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Australian Army, and Royal Australian Navy, as well as with Dr. Hugh Smith of the ADF Academy (also interviewed for this report) and service psychologists at ADF headquarters in Canberra. Their findings describe the context of the policy change, the manner in which it was implemented, and observed outcomes in practice.

Regarding implementation of the policy, the British team reported that service staffs believed that the change had not resulted in any notable problems for military functioning. According to the report,

Service policy staffs all stated that following an initial outcry, homosexuality had become a non-issue...The difficulties of integrating open homosexuals were described as ‘just another legitimate management problem’ (UK Ministry of Defence 1996, H1-4).

The opinions of personnel drawn from the services, however, varied in their assessments of potential difficulties arising from the policy change. According to the report, male members of a random volunteer group from the Royal Australian Air Force were “very largely against the new policy and believe that, in a combat situation, the presence of open homosexuals would have a degrading effect on [o]perational effectiveness” (H1-4). However, personnel drawn from an Army Logistics unit, as well as a Royal Australian Navy group based in Sydney, emphasized equality and non-discrimination regardless of personal opinions on homosexuality per se (H1-4). The report concludes that HIV was “not regarded as a significant issue” in light of routine testing of personnel.

The British report noted that thirty-three homosexual soldiers, contacted through the president of the major gay servicemembers group, had been willing to identify themselves to members of the team. Senior members of the group included a RAN Commander and a former Army Lieutenant Colonel. The authors believed that another fifteen personnel were members of the group but were not willing to reveal their identities. The report speculates that the reasons for this “continuing reticence” were related to “fear of comrades [sic] rejection and informal sanctions, and anxiety about the effect on their careers” (H1-5). According to the report, gay service members were satisfied with the policy change but were still eager to push for additional acceptance and rights such as equal entitlements for same-sex partners.

B. Evidence from the Australian Defence Forces

Defence Equity Organization

The Defence Equity Organization (DEO) serves as the primary ADF unit responsible for development, implementation, training, and support for all policies regarding equity, diversity, and sexual misconduct in the military. Its self-described mission “is to inform, educate, encourage and ensure that equitable policies, processes and practices form an integral part of doing business in Defence as the basis for a fairer and better work environment” (DEO 2000). Formed in August 1997 during a widespread re-organization of the ADF, the DEO consolidated responsibilities that had been assigned separately to each service branch as well as a human rights policy area within Defence Headquarters (now defunct). In addition to supporting the implementation of ministry policies, DEO handles complaints regarding all matters of sexual misconduct including harassment, bullying and assault, provides an anonymous advice line for service members and commanders, and directs the training and outreach activities of “Equity Advisors” throughout the forces. The director of the Defence Equity Organization, Ms. Bronwen Grey, occupied the analogous Directorship in Defence Headquarters until 1997.

According to Director Grey, all available formal and informal evidence regarding outcomes associated with the 1992 policy change suggests that, in spite of early fears of deleterious consequences, the lifting of the gay ban has had no adverse effects on the capability or functioning of the Defence Forces:

I have to say, from that point on [the 1992 change], nothing happened. I mean people were expecting the sky to fall, and it didn’t. Now, a number of gay people probably didn’t come out at that point, but we’ve had an X.O. of a ship come out and say to the ship’s company, “I’m gay,” and, quite frankly, no one cared (Grey 2000).

The Director bases her conclusion on her experiences at Defence Equity as well as her tenure as Director of Personnel Policy at Headquarters (HQADF) before the 1997 re-organization. While quantifiable data associated with sexual conduct or performance outcomes prior to 1997 are not available, Director Grey says that

[T]here was no increase in complaints about gay people or by gay people. There was no known increase in fights, on a ship, or in Army units or something...The recruitment figures didn’t alter.… At that time, it didn’t figure in recruitment. Commanders were really on the watch at the time because they were told that had to really make sure that this worked.… [They] were watching out for problems. They didn’t identify any. Now that doesn’t mean there weren’t any, but they didn’t identify any (Grey 2000).

When pushed by the interviewer to identify any problems that may have arisen after the ban was lifted, the Director did note that some gay people probably did not feel comfortable revealing their sexual orientation immediately after the change. Nonetheless, she says that a number of individuals have unambiguously come out to peers and commanding officers and that their revelations had no negative consequences for their careers or personal relationships. When asked to clearly specify any other concrete observations of what she termed a virtual “non event,” the Director added,

All I can say is, from the organizational point of view, while we were waiting for problems...we were ready. Nothing happened. There were no increased complaints or recruiting [problems] at all.… I mean nothing happened. And it’s very hard to document nothing (Grey 2000).

While the ADF could not provide the authors of this study with quantifiable data on sexual misconduct that occurred during the first several years after the lifting of the ban, in 1997 Defence Equity began collecting aggregate data from its anonymous telephone “advice line” that concerned sexual misconduct and harassment. Table 1 summarizes the aggregate results and the specific instances related to homosexual conduct:

Table 1: Total and Sexual Orientation-Specific Instances Received Since Inception: Formal Complaints and Advice Line Calls Regarding Sexual Conduct

SOURCE	Total number	Number involving homo- sexuality	Percent involving homo-sexuality
Formal Complaints Received (March 1997-August 2000)	494	12	2.43%
Advice Line Phone Calls (September 1998-August 31, 2000)	1642	25	1.52%

According to Director Grey, these figures, while not providing a full portrait of possible problems relating to the service of open homosexuals, nonetheless suggest that “harassment regarding sexual orientation really isn’t significant in the ADF.” Reiterating the philosophy behind the ADF’s new position on sexual behavior enshrined in the 1992 lifting of the ban, she notes that the sexual behavior policy monitored and enforced by DEO is intended for all personnel, whether homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual: “It doesn’t matter what the sexual orientation is. The reason we have [these policies] is because unfit behavior diminishes capability. We’re focused on work output and the impact on capability.” Thus, the military’s efforts to collect information and enforce sexual conduct policies do not reflect a particular concern over possible problems relating to homosexual service, but rather a focus on maintaining an appropriate environment for maximum capability and work output. Commenting on the philosophy and approach behind the ADF’s position on this issue, the Director adds:

[O]ur focus is on the work people do, and the way they do the work, and that applies to heterosexuals, bisexuals, and homosexuals. We don’t ask people if they’re homosexual because we don’t care. It doesn’t play a part in promotion, it doesn’t play a part in training, it doesn’t play a part in postings. It simply isn’t an issue. Now that doesn’t mean that we don’t have some complaints, but basically it is a non-issue (Grey 2000).

Evidence form Other ADF Commanders and Personnel

For this study, senior military officials familiar with recruiting, training, deployment, and performance were contacted for their perspectives on the impact of the 1992 decision to lift the gay ban. In this section, we review evidence from in-depth interviews with two senior ADF officials: a one-star Naval Officer with extensive command experience who now serves as Director General of Career Management Policy; and the Senior Marketing Officer of the Defence Course Recruiting Organisation, who oversees a variety of recruitment-related outreach activities across the ADF.

At the request of the authors of this study, the ADF arranged for an interview with a senior warfare officer with substantial command experience and widespread familiarity with deployments for his perspectives on the performance outcomes associated with the 1992 lifting of the ban. At the time of the interview, Commodore R.W. Gates had been in the Royal Australian Navy for twenty-nine years, having commanded a number of frigates and served in policy positions in the personnel division at Defence Headquarters in Canberra. Recently, he was promoted to Commodore (one-star Naval Officer) in the Joint Personnel area in Career Management Policy. In his interview with the study authors, Commodore Gates offered extensive and frank observations based on his experiences.

Consistent with other evidence collected for this study, Commodore Gates described the early 1990s as a time when a pro-active liberal government as well as complaints surrounding the HMAS Swan incident led to widespread concerns about equity and harassment in the ADF. And, like other observers, the Commodore described mixed opinions and strong emotions within the Forces at the prospect of allowing homosexuals to serve openly: while nobody would deny that homosexuals existed in the ADF, whether they should “declare” their orientation was another matter. When the policy did change, serious protests all-but-disappeared, and formerly closeted personnel stepped forward successfully and largely uneventfully. In his recounting of the experiences of several personnel who have come out without major problems, the Commodore offered the following example:

I must admit, after it happened, it’s been an absolute non-event. We’ve had some major cases of people declaring. Probably the most that I recall...would be one of our executive officers of a destroyer, the second-in-command. He declared. And, I’ll be frank, it created a bit of a stir. We’re talking about a mid-rank lieutenant commander in an absolute critical position on board a major warship – one heartbeat from command.… That person under the new policy was certainly not removed from the ship, and in fact completed his full posting (Gates 2000).

According to the Commodore, in this case the lieutenant commander approached the ship’s captain to explain his decision and reasons for declaring that he was gay. The lieutenant commander explained that he wanted to uphold honesty and integrity and could not continue to “live a lie.” Upon hearing the news, both the captain and troops were generally supportive, continued to respect his position as second-in-command, and moved on with their missions. Since then, the lieutenant commander’s career has continued successfully—he was promoted and is now serving in the RAN as a full commander.

The Commodore attributes the largely successful transition to a broader effort on the part of top officials in the Navy and the ADF to develop aggressive new training protocols to minimize harassment and maximize equality of opportunity. Like other experts interviewed for this study, he points to both external societal pressures as well as internal missteps within the ADF as motives for the change. In the Navy, efforts began shortly after the HMAS Swan incident with a program called “Good Working Relationships,” followed by the new defence instruction on sexual misconduct in 1992 which was promulgated via promotion courses offered throughout the chain of command.

When asked specifically if the policy change seemed to have any affect on recruiting or retention, the Commodore replied,

In my opinion, it had no effect. It got a little bit of press back in ‘92, it was a normal flutter. And then something else came along, and the press moved on to something else. There was no great peak in “wasting trade” as we call it where people walked out, and there was no great dip in recruiting. It really was a non-event. I want to stress there was a lot of work in making sure it was a non-event (Gates 2000).

While he had no recollection of any specific person refusing to join or leaving the service because of the change, the Commodore noted the possibility that one or two cases might exist where a heterosexual soldier was personally offended and chose to leave. Given that the ADF included 70,000 people at the time, he considers such numbers as “very, very minor.”

The observations made by Commodore Gates are consistent with the views of the recruitment director interviewed for this study as well as other recruitment officers. Squadron Leader Chris Renshaw, Senior Marketing Officer for Defence Force Recruiting, has not observed any deleterious effects of the policy change on recruiting or retention. Renshaw says that recruiting and retention rates have decreased but that the lifting of the gay ban had nothing to do with the trends. Rather, he says that government-mandated reductions in the size of the ADF as well as competing opportunities in the civilian sector explain the change. [3] Renshaw says that the policy change has allowed personnel to spend less time monitoring rumors and innuendo and to devote more time to the execution of their missions.[4]

C. Evidence from the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and Government Officials

The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission is a statutory body that enjoys a relatively autonomous status in Australian politics that is analogous to courts. The Commission’s members are appointed by the government and it receives its budget through the normal budgetary process but it is not accountable to the federal government, the bureaucracy, or political parties. In this section, we review evidence from just-retired Human Rights Commissioner Chris Sidoti, who made gay and lesbian equality one of the priorities of his five-year tenure at the Human Rights Commission. Although Sidoti had little authority to force organizations to change their practices, he was responsible for investigating complaints and suggesting legislative reforms to minimize and eliminate discrimination in Australia. He told us that HREOC has devoted considerable effort to monitoring sexual orientation issues in the military.

Sidoti agrees with most of the observations of military and academic experts we contacted. He indicates that there have been virtually no significant effects of the policy change on the military. In his five years as Human Rights Commissioner, Sidoti estimates that his office investigated half a dozen complaints of discrimination based upon sexual orientation. He also indicates that harassment of homosexuals also seems largely non-existent, at least at the official level.

Sidoti notes that cases of harassment and discrimination involving gays and lesbians have tended to occur when heterosexual service members have abused homosexual service members. He is aware of only one or two such cases but he cautions that the problem may be more widespread than is officially known. And, he emphasizes that although soldiers are told that gays and lesbians are welcome, one would not want to be gay and in the military. He explains that although there has been no major public scandal regarding harassment of gays, this does not mean that such behavior does not occur: “Whether it is widespread or not, I don’t know. In some sense, it may not be as widespread as harassment of women, because gays have always been [around] and the military knows it” (Sidoti 2000).

Sidoti believes that the lifting of the ban may have had positive implications for military effectiveness. Not only does the policy shift “improve the career prospects of gays,” but “It’s bad for morale to have your guys snooping on other of your guys” (Sidoti 2000). He concludes that the 1992 policy change is indicative of and contributes to broader social change. “The military is the last bastion of traditional male values. These developments contribute to broader social acceptance for all” (Sidoti 2000). However, Sidoti notes that there are areas of military personnel policy in which progress has not been made such as the recognition of partners and the extension of benefits.

D. Opinions and Observations of Academic, NGO, and Other Informed Observers

Academic Observers

For a number of reasons, few scholars have examined outcomes associated with the 1992 policy change in detail.[5] Professor Hugh Smith, of the School of Politics of the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, remains the leading academic authority on matters relating to the policy change and military performance.[6] In addition to interviewing Professor Smith, we also sought to contact other scholars at major Australian universities who maintain a professional interest in gender, the military, and sexuality. As a result, we identified and interviewed two additional academics who have conducted related research.

Based on his research and observations over the last eight years, Professor Smith believes that the lifting of the ban has not led to any significant effects on military performance, combat effectiveness, or unit cohesion. Like other respondents, he characterizes the outcome of the policy change as a virtual “non-issue,” with little remaining salience in government, media, or military circles. The lack of quantitative empirical data regarding the policy change constitutes, in his opinion, a form of evidence. In Professor Smith’s words, “This is not a subject that has troubled the Defence Force to the extent that they have felt that studies have needed to be done on it. The lack of evidence is evidence” (Smith 2000). He explains that when government ordered the military to lift the ban, some officers said: “Over my dead body, if this happens I’ll resign.” However, Smith says that there were no departures and that the change was accepted in “true military tradition”(Smith 2000).

When pushed by the interviewer to identify any possible negative outcomes associated with the lifting of the ban, Professor Smith acknowledged that there “may have been one or two resignations,” but that close government scrutiny of ADF policy implementation did not find any real effect on performance. While there have been occasional reports of coming-out incidents that may have made peers “a bit nervous,” Professor Smith does not believe that there have been any notable incidents of gay bashing or harassment (Smith 1995). To the degree that problems of sexual misconduct and harassment continue in the ADF, Professor Smith believes that they are mostly related to the treatment of women in the ranks and incidents of hazing (referred to as “bastardization”) in the Academy.

Professor Smith’s views about the harassment of women are consistent with the findings of Dr. Katerina Agostino of the sociology department at Macquarie University in Sydney. Dr. Agostino, who has consulted with the ADF on sexual fraternization policy, argues that women who work in charged military environments such as ships often face cultural and institutional obstacles when their male peers equate heterosexual masculinity with effective military performance. Her research suggests that gay and lesbian personnel, like heterosexual women, may encounter difficulties when attempting to integrate fully into traditional military culture. However, her research also shows that women and gays can and do adopt a variety of strategies to negotiate these difficulties and integrate themselves into a changing environment that is, very slowly, becoming more egalitarian and less entrenched in masculinist beliefs (Agostino 1997, Agostino 1998a, Agostino 1998b, Agostino 2000). Nonetheless, instances of discrimination and harassment still occur, especially when individuals do not conform to traditional masculine stereotypes. In her interview with the authors of this study, Dr. Agostino was able to identify an example:

There is a senior naval officer that I know who’s very good at what he does, but he’s been unable to get promotion. It’s quite clear from his reports that he is very good at what he does. He dyed his hair blond, but you can see his natural color at the roots. He dresses “gay” when off-duty…. He feels strongly that his opportunities have been curtailed since he’s openly outed himself.… He was called up before his commanding officer, because the C.O. had heard through the rumor mill that his hair had been dyed pink. The C.O. saw it wasn’t true. [The friend who is an officer] wasn’t censured but he was certainly told off about it and told that he was being openly gay. He was also told there’s nothing wrong with being gay, you just can’t look so gay.

Like Professor Agostino, Dr. Jindy Pettman of the Australian National University observes that women and, quite possibly, gays, still face informal obstacles as they attempt to integrate into a traditionally masculine heterosexual military culture. Based on her research and observations, Dr. Pettman notes that the largest conflicts and challenges to the ADF in the early 1990s concerned gender equality; questions of sexual orientation were secondary. When the possibility of lifting the gay ban was raised, military officials who were opposed to integrating women raised similar objections to the inclusion of gays and said that homosexuals would jeopardize unit cohesion, threaten the privacy of soldiers, and lead to performance problems. However, she says that after women were permitted to serve in most deployment environments and after the ban on gay and lesbian soldiers was lifted, the flurry of concern immediately died off and both issues fell from public attention. Dr. Pettman believes that this relatively uneventful adaptation, while not indicating the disappearance of all forms of discrimination, suggests that military culture is slowly becoming more inclusive (Pettman 2000).

Observations and Evidence Provided By Interest Groups, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Other Observers

For this study, all major interest groups, veterans associations, journalists, and non-governmental organizations that have been involved in public or policy discussions relating to outcomes of lifting of the ban and its consequences were contacted for their observations and any documented evidence they might possess. Interviews and supplemental documentation were obtained from five sources: the national president of the Returned and Services League of Australia, a major veterans group analogous to the American Legion; a well-known activist and co-convenor of the Australian Council for Lesbian and Gay Rights; a journalist who has written three major stories on gay/military issues in the last year; and a New Zealand-based consultant who is a specialist in gay/military integration issues and who has provided consulting services to the Australian Defence Forces. Additional resources were obtained from the International Lesbian and Gay Association and the Tasmanian Gay and Lesbian Rights Group.

Two of the individuals interviewed and their respective organizations have held divergent opinions regarding the lifting of the ban. The Returned and Services League (RSL) was an early and active opponent of proposals to lift the ban, arguing that doing so would jeopardize morale, unit cohesion, performance, and decency in the Armed Forces and would hasten the spread of AIDS. Major General Peter Philips (ret’d), the current RSL president interviewed for this study, still opposes the participation of open homosexuals. Mr. Rodney Croome, on the other hand, was a vociferous gay rights activist who lobbied for the removal of the ban. Interestingly, however, Major General Philips’ comments on outcomes associated with the lifting of the ban are more optimistic than those of Mr. Croome.

In a telephone interview with one of the study authors, RSL President Major General Philips reiterated the group’s position and rationale behind opposing the removal of the ban. As summarized in the RSL’s “Standing Policy of the RSL in Australia,” the organization opposes open homosexual participation for four major reasons: (1) the presence of homosexuals will lower morale and military performance; (2) personnel will be at greater risk for contracting HIV; (3) homosexuals engage in predatory behavior; and (4) the military does not need to engage in social experimentation. However, when asked which of these or other problems relating to the lifting of the ban he or the organization believe have come to pass, he responded that, “It’s [homosexuals serving openly] not been a significant public issue. The Defence Forces have not had a lot of difficulty in this area” (Philips 2000). When asked specifically by the interviewer whether he knows of any evidence that suggests that allowing homosexuals to serve might affect military performance, combat effectiveness, or unit cohesion, he replied,

We haven’t fought in any wars since Vietnam, but we have been involved in some UN peacekeeping operations, most recently in East Timor…. If the issue had arisen, it would have in East Timor. I haven’t heard of any gay issues in that (Philips 2000).

Major General Philips acknowledges that some gay personnel have come out to peers but disagreed with assertions made by some groups that there were significant numbers in combat units.

While he cannot identify any concrete data on the matter, Mr. Croome also believes that the lifting of the ban has not contributed to any negative performance consequences for the ADF as a whole. Generally, the change helped reduce the climate of fear and allowed some gay service members to come out to trusted colleagues. However, based on reports he has received, Mr. Croome also asserts that the change has been uneven: instances of discrimination and harassment have been reported, and entitlements for same-sex couples have yet to be granted. Regarding harassment issues, Croome states,

Of those that are about harassment, some have to do with people who are out, and some are from people who are not out but are being gossiped about or suspected of being gay. The harassment is just like any other sort of workplace harassment, but there are no policies to deal with it (Croome 2000).

In recent years, Mr. Croome has been one of the most active critics of the implementation of the new sexual conduct policy, arguing that the ADF’s enforcement of the equal treatment laws is imperfect and incomplete.

Mr. Eugene Moore, Director of Full Spectrum Ltd., a New Zealand consulting firm that addresses sexual orientation issues in the workplace, has been working with the ADF Defence Equity Organization during the past year to provide training and educational briefings to staff and service chiefs on how to best manage concerns relating to sexual orientation. Like other observers, Mr. Moore notes the lack of concrete data on outcomes of the policy change. In his view, the absence of data suggests in part that the ADF did not aggressively follow through with implementation and enforcement in the first several years after the ban was lifted. Moore says that gay service members’ unwillingness to reveal their sexual orientation during the first few years after the ban was lifted may have contributed to perceptions that the policy change was a “non event.” Regarding military performance issues more directly, Moore does not believe that any significant problems have occurred even as more service personnel have come out to peers in recent years.

The experiences of a journalist who covered the issue of gays in the military during the past year provide more direct evidence regarding the welfare of combat units with actively serving self-identified gay personnel. Mr. David Mills has interviewed service members for several stories dealing with same-sex partner benefits and combat service in East Timor. For his investigation of East Timor, Mr. Mills spoke with gay soldiers who had served actively. He was aware of seven or eight active duty soldiers serving in East Timor who self-identify as gay, and he recalls speaking to an enlisted Army soldier who worked as a firefighter:

I spoke with a guy who is serving in the Army, a six-month stint in East Timor, speaking about his experiences. He was an interesting guy who said there is a lot less homophobia in the Armed Forces than you might think, although he was pretty selective about who he was open about his sexuality with.… He said he didn’t have any problem with that [coming out] whatsoever, although there was an element of surprise when he told people” (Mills 2000).

D. Experiences in the Field: Out Personnel, Their Commanders and Peers

Drawn from the opinions and observations of ADF officials and other observers, the evidence presented above strongly suggests that military performance —including recruitment and retention, harassment and sexual misconduct, and unit cooperation —have not suffered as a result of the 1992 decision to allow homosexuals to serve openly. However, the experiences of self-disclosed homosexual personnel themselves may offer the most direct and revealing evidence over how the policy change has impacted unit performance. Using a snowball sampling technique based on initial contacts provided through a gay servicemembers’ organization, seven current and former out ADF members were contacted and interviewed for this study. They include six actively serving members of the three main service branches – Army, Navy, and Air Force — at the ranks of Squadron Leader, Captain, and Flight Sergeant. An additional former enlisted ADF member who self-identifies as gay and who maintains active contact with currently-serving homosexual personnel was also interviewed. Their experiences, while representative of varying ranks, times, and service branches, can nonetheless be characterized by a number of shared qualities.

1. Self-identified gays and lesbians currently serve as enlisted personnel and officers in a range of positions in all of the major service branches of the ADF.

The snowball sample of respondents described here is small and possibly unrepresentative of the larger population of out gay servicemembers in the ADF. Nonetheless, the diversity of backgrounds and positions of the respondents, coupled with their frequent references to out peers in other units or services, suggest that out gay servicemembers are found at all levels and in all branches of the ADF.

Furthermore, most of our respondents have actively served in both troop deployments and managerial/administrative positions during their careers. One respondent, Squadron Leader Michael Seah, and colleagues of several others, actively served in what is widely considered to be Australia’s most “combat-like” and successful deployment in recent years — The United Nations’s peacekeeping operation in East Timor. As Medical Corps Sergeant Scott McLennan, who served in a peacekeeping exercise in Bougainville, New Guinea, comments,

Looking at the current operation in East Timor, I’ve got a number of gay and lesbian friends in an operational situation. I have served in Bougainville, and there is no problem. We all get work professionally, and it’s our jobs that come first. You don’t look at it from a gay or lesbian point of view, you don’t look at it from a straight point of view. You’re there to do a job, and you work together to ensure that the job gets done (McLennan 2000).

2. Currently serving self-identified gay and lesbian service members have experienced largely uneventful coming-out processes and describe professional, friendly, and cooperative relationships with their peers and commanders.

All of the self-identified gay and lesbian active personnel we spoke with describe their experiences of coming out as largely positive and uneventful. While some describe initial uneven reactions among their colleagues and commanders—ranging from warm acceptance to puzzlement to unease—over time all of our respondents experienced a transition to full acceptance. As one respondent who served in East Timor put it:

From the discrimination point of view, I haven’t faced any overt discrimination. Most people I’ve come across…have been very supportive, certainly haven’t treated me any differently. I’ve found it quite refreshing (Seah 2000).

A lesbian Squadron Leader in the Air Force assessed her situation similarly:

People, when they do find you’re gay,...some might be a little bit weary, but...it very soon disappears, because what you’re judged on is your professionalism and your ability. Who according to your sexual orientation you find attractive is not an issue (Renshaw 2000).

All of the respondents explain acceptance by their peers as a reflection of a shared respect for professional competence and capability: in the end, one’s peers and colleagues come to recognize that one’s sexual orientation has nothing to do with the ability to do one’s job.

I’ve had nothing but support. It’s an initial thing, but then they work with it, and they see you in an operational point of view, and they see your skill level, and they have no issue. If they cannot fault you professionally, they will not look for faults with you personally (McLennan 2000).

The fact that these people were there had no effect whatsoever on the effectiveness of the units, unit cohesion or morale. People are accepted for who they are and, as long as they can do the job, who cares. That’s pretty much the view of most, I would say, in defence, here in Australia. As long as you are capable of doing your job, they don’t care what you’re doing in your spare time (Stuht 2000).

Once a gay soldier is out to his or her peers, his or her sexuality usually becomes largely irrelevant to professional identity. Perhaps the single most common way respondents describe their sexuality on the job is as a “non-issue.” As Army Captain Renshaw paraphrases it, “No one gives a damn, no one worries about it. Totally a non-issue…Here people just don’t care” (Renshaw 2000).

To the degree that evidence of their sexual orientation becomes a point of discussion, respondents described a number of ways in which the new policy has allowed their identity to be normalized as simply one aspect of their lives. A welcoming and open environment allows gay soldiers to spend less time monitoring their comments and more time focusing on their work:

Well, you can be more honest. That’s one of the key things about being in the military — honesty and integrity. Because you haven’t got to worry about if someone’s saying something behind your back, or is someone gossiping or something, because if they gossip, I don’t care. So I’m more focused on my job, I’m more focused on what I’m achieving here, and less worried about the [stories] and what people think. In terms of productivity, I’m far more productive now. Things like when you come into work and people say, what did you do over the weekend. Oh, what was her name... all that stuff disappears. What did you do over the weekend. Everything’s out in the open, no fear, no nothing, no potential of blackmail, no security implications...nothing (Renshaw 2000).

The majority of respondents also report that the newfound honesty they are permitted allows for more frank and sometimes even playful exchanges when uncomfortable situations do arise:

I took my ex-partner to the work Christmas party…I did the courtesy of telling my boss beforehand that I was going to do it. And, he just looked at me with a bit of a pained expression and said, “I expect you to behave.” And I just sort of looked at him and said, “Look, knowing the other people that work on this floor and how they behave with booze, you’re worried about me.” Point taken…. (Renshaw 2000).

I’m quite open about my sexuality. Sometimes the boys decide to give me a bit of a ding-up with a joke or something like that, but that doesn’t bother me. We work really well together, and I’m sure it’s the same for other gay and lesbian soldiers and sailors who are out, and they’re accepted by their peers. O.K. — they’re the object of ridicule sometimes, but everybody is (Stuht 2000).

Other respondents also describe examples in which their orientation becomes integrated as one aspect of who they are, taken no more or less seriously than any other aspect of their lives.

3. While the ADF has succeeded in introducing new directives extending equal treatment to gay and lesbian soldiers, most self-identified personnel are aware of individual incidents of possible discrimination or harassment at the unit level.

While all out personnel we spoke with described their work environments as generally untroubled and productive, most were aware of scattered instances of anti-gay discrimination or harassment suffered by others since the new policy was introduced. Most of these incidents relate to isolated remarks made by individual peers, but there have been occasional references to alleged inappropriate conduct by commanders or officers. Perhaps the most dramatic example is the case of suspected promotion bias offered by Dr. Agostino (see section D, above). A second case is described by RAAF Flight Sergeant Livingstone, who recalls attending a training session where an Army warrant officer defended a homophobic response to a hypothetical scenario by claiming that the Army “did not care” about the changed policy on gay service (Livingstone 2000). Livingstone did not attribute an exact date to the event, but the comments were made in the mid-1990s. Other sources familiar with Army life acknowledge some individual instances of early resistance to the policy change but do not believe they are representative of a systematic pattern.

Generally, respondents report that incidents of discrimination or harassment brought to the attention of commanders are handled appropriately. Several respondents identified incidents in which peers who had made inappropriate remarks were disciplined by superiors promptly and without reservation. Based on the experiences of peers in a variety of units, several personnel we spoke with believed that most of the unevenness in treatment could be ascribed to the differences in particular work environments. As a former ADF service member familiar with the experiences of a number of gay soldiers remarks, “It is totally determined on the work environment of the individual. We’ve got some senior officers who are great—they deal with and address their [gay service members’] problems or whatever, and always work to offer help.” (Edwards 2000).

4. Gay personnel who were in the forces when the ban was lifted, or know of others who were, describe substantial, sustained changes in formal and informal understandings and procedures conducive to better work environments.

All of the respondents who were familiar with life in the ranks for homosexuals before the ban was lifted concur that working environments have improved markedly in the last eight years. While many of these improvements came as a direct consequence of formal implementations of the Defence Instruction issued in 1992 on sexual misconduct, others are seen as reflective of subtle but still important changes in military culture. Respondents concur with other observers interviewed for this study in describing an operating environment that now takes equality of opportunity and treatment quite seriously — for women, for ethnic minorities, and for homosexuals. While pockets of discrimination and unequal treatment still exist, most respondents feel that the ADF has come to embody the same commitment to human rights, equality of opportunity, and diversity (what the ADF calls “Equity”) that now characterize Australian civil society as a whole.

The current situation stands in sharp contrast to the atmosphere of fear, uncertainty, and betrayal that characterized military life for many personnel suspected of being homosexual prior to 1992. Squadron Leader Renshaw and others who joined the ADF before the ban was lifted identify a number of painful personal and professional consequences of being closeted — to oneself and to others — in order to safeguard careers. Seaman Colin Edwards, who was forced to leave the Royal Australian Navy in 1981 after voluntarily disclosing his homosexuality, recalls investigations designed to compel his friends to identify other homosexuals. One colleague, a heterosexual, committed suicide shortly after being investigated for his association with Seaman Edwards (Edwards 2000).

5. Although gay personnel are generally satisfied with the new policy, they feel frustrated and marginalized by the failure of the ADF to extend equal treatment and benefits to same-sex partners.

During their interviews, most out gay personnel spontaneously raised the topic of current debates over extending benefits to same-sex partners. Like other observers we contacted, gay soldiers interviewed for this study were largely untroubled by original concerns over morale, unit cohesion, and retention that surrounded the 1992 decision to lift the ban. Rather, they are focused on pressuring the ADF to fulfill what they believe to be legally binding obligations to extend equal treatment to same-sex domestic partners under Australian law. In fact, when asked to speculate on how the lifting of the ban may have affected the well-being of the Australian Forces, most respondents first focused on their frustrations over same-sex partner issues. Tellingly, these reactions suggest that most out gay soldiers, like the ADF and Australian society more generally, find the question of whether allowing gays to serve has reduced the performance capabilities of the Armed Forces almost impossible to fathom. They have instead moved on to other, more germane concerns.

E. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION

Systematic evidence concerning the lifting of the Australian ban on gays and lesbians in the military is scarce. This report attempts to redress the gap by drawing together and comparing the findings and observations of informed observers from a variety of vantage points in the policy domain. Certainly, any one piece of evidence by itself cannot stand as a comprehensive appraisal of outcomes associated with the change. Nonetheless, taken together, the data presented in this report make a convincing and credible case that, notwithstanding uneven and partial implementation of the policy, the 1992 inclusion of self-described gay and lesbian soldiers into the Australian Defence Forces has not led to any perceptible decline in operational effectiveness, morale, unit cohesion, retention, or attrition. In fact, ADF officials and a number of other observers, including commanders and soldiers, believe that changes associated with the policy have contributed to a working environment that is freer from the burdensome and unproductive consequences of mistrust, misunderstanding, and misjudgment that at times compromised the integrity of units in the past. As part of a broader commitment to equity in the ADF, then, the policy change has been a success.

While the general consensus in the findings above is clear, a close look at the evidence also reveals a number of concerns. Isolated instances of discrimination and harassment still exist, and some service branches may be less proactive in their policies than others. These difficulties may be even more pervasive among the ranks of heterosexual women, who experience higher rates of harassment than gay males. From the perspective of gay and lesbian soldiers and their allies, the failure of the ADF to extend benefits that are accorded to heterosexual spouses to same-sex partners stands as a reminder of a partially-fulfilled mission. At the same time, however, the fact that the debate over gays in the military has shifted away from the question of whether homosexual soldiers undermine military performance also stands as a testament to the success of the inclusive policy.

F. SOURCES

(1992). Australian military maintains ban on homosexuals. Agence France Presse. Canberra. 18 June.

(1992). Armed forces gay ban should end, Australian government told. Agence France Presse. Canberra. 18 September.

(1992). Australia to drop ban on gays in military. Agence France Presse. Canberra. 23 November.

(1992). Veterans and War Hero Angry Over Lifting of Gay Ban. Associated Press. Canberra, Australia.24 November.

(1992). Australia lifts ban on homosexuals in ADF. Xinhua General Overseas News Service. Canberra. 24 November.

(1997). Inquiry into Sexuality Discrimination. Canberra, Australian Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee: 10 pp.

(1999). Assessment Guidelines: Defence Officer Joint Competencies, Australian Defence Force: 12 pp.

(1999). Defence Instructions (General) -- Discrimination, Harassment, Sexual Offences, Fraternisation, and other Unacceptable Behavior in the Australian Defence Force. Canberra. Defence Instruction (General) PERS 35-3.

(2000). FED: RSL chief says gays should not be in the army. AAP (Australian Associated Press). Sydney. 4 March.

(2000). Sydney’s gay parade undimmed by church tirade. Deutsche Presse-Agentur. Sydney. 4 March.

(2000). Croome attacks RSL on homosexual “untruths”. ABIX: Australian Business Intelligence. 16 May.

Agostino, K. (1997). “Masculinity, Sexuality, and Life On Board Her Majesty’s Royal Australian Ships.” Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies 2(1).

Agostino, K. (1998a). “She’s a good hand”: Navy women’s strategies in masculinist workplaces.” Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies 3(1): 1-22.

Agostino, K. (1998b). “The making of warriors: men, identity and military culture.” Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies 3(2): 58-75.

Anderson, T. (1994). Gay Australian soldiers said AIDS risk. United Press International. Sydney. 24 June.

Anonymous. “Fair Go Course -- For Staff of ADF Career Management Agencies.” Australian Defence Force: 47 pp.

Anonymous (1997). “Burton and Quinn Reports Released”: ADF press release. 2 pp.

Anonymous (1999). Chronology of Women in the Australian Military, Australian Defence Force.

Baldwin, J. (1993). Other Armies Accept Gays, But Many Remain in Closet. Associated Press. London. 27 January.

Chapman, A. (1996). “Australian Anti-Discrimination Law and Sexual Orientation: Some Observations on Terminology and Scope.” E Law: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 3(3): 13.

Chulov, M. (2000). Gays Should Not Be in the Army: RSL. The Australian. Sydney.

Clack, P. (1999). AFP Lauded For View On Same-Sex Spouses. The Canberra Times. Canberra. 14 March.

Croome, R. (1992). A Submission to the ALP Caucus Committee on the Australian Defence Force Policy on Homosexuality. Canberra.

Croome, R. (1999). We Should All Look After Our Troops Loved Ones. J. Wilson. Canberra, The Canberra Times. 22 September.

Dandeker, C. (1994). “New times for the military: some sociological remarks on the changing role and structure of the armed forces of the advanced societies.” British Journal of Sociology 45(4): 637-654.

Feldman, E. A. (1998). Testing the Force: HIV and Discrimination in the Australian Military, Yale University Center for Interdisciplinary Research on AIDS.

Fisher, L. (1993). Armed and Gay. Maclean’s. 24 May.

Hawke, A. (1999). Defence Women’s Network: 10.

International Lesbian and Gay Association. (2000). World Legal Survey -- Australia: Federal, International Lesbian and Gay Association.

Lancaster, J. (1992). Many Allies Allow Gays in the Military; Canada, Australia Are Latest to Drop Exclusionary Policy. Washington Post: A1. 30 November.

Marshallsea, T. (2000). UK: Britain to follow Australian Model of gay tolerant army. AAP (Australian Associated Press). London. 12 January.

Munro, C. (1992). Allowing Gays in Armed Forces Stirs Debate in Australia. Kyodo News Service. Sydney.

Reuters, F. (1992). Australia Overturns Its Ban on Gays in the Armed Forces. Los Angeles Times. Sydney, Australia: A12. 24 November.

Schmitt, E. (1993). Gay Soldiers No Problem Elsewhere, Experts Say. The New York Times. Washington, DC: A16. 30 April.

Smith, H. (1992). Homosexuality and the Australian Defence Force: Individual Rights vs Organizational Realities. Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Centre: 30.

Smith, H. (1995). “The Dynamics of Social Change and the Australian Defence Force.” Armed Forces and Society 21(4): 531-551.

Spencer, G. (1992). Lifting of Gay Ban Softens Australia’s Tough Man Image. Associated Press. Sydney, Australia. 9 December.

U.K. Ministry of Defence. (1996). Report of the Homosexuality Policy Assessment Team. London, UK Ministry of Defence.

United States General Accounting Office (1993). Homosexuals in the Military: Policies and Practices of Foreign Countries. Washington D.C., U.S. General Accounting Office: 51.

Wallace, C. P. (1994). Gay Australian Takes Complaint to U.N. Panel -- And Wins; Tasmania: Condemnation of State’s Sodomy laws Stirs Fierce Debate. Island Rebuffs Committee’s Call for Change. Los Angeles Times. Hobart, Australia: A4. 10 September.

Ward, S. (1995). Australia rebuffs UK rule on gay troops: “Now we have another persecution. Of course they don’t kill gay people in this country. They just ruin their lives.” Two men hounded out the services. The Independent (London). London: 1. 11 March.

Zinn, C. (1996). Armed Forces’ Gay Float Under Fire From Old Soldiers. The Guardian (London). Sydney: 10. 30 January.

Interviews

Academic experts

Agostino, Katerina, lecturer in sociology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. 2000. Interview by authors, 8 August.

Smith, Hugh, associate professor, school of politics, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, Australia. 2000. Interview by authors, 20 August.

Pettman, Jan, Political Science Department, Australian National University. Interview by authors, 12 September.

Senior military officials

Gates, Commodore R.W., Royal Australian Navy. 2000. Interview by authors, 13 September.

Grey, Bronwen, director, Defence Equity Organisation. 2000. Interview by authors, 17 August.

Renshaw, Squadron Leader C. P., Royal Australian Air Force. 2000. Interview by authors, 15 September.

NGO and other expert observers

Croome, Rodney, co-convenor, Australian Council on Gay and Lesbian Rights. 2000. Interview by authors, 17 August.

Livingstone, Flight Sergeant Mark, Royal Australian Air Force. 2000. Interview by authors, 22 August.

Mills, David, reporter, Sydney Star-Observer. 2000. Interview by authors, 12 September.

Moore, Eugene, Full Spectrum, Ltd. 2000. 14 August.

Philips, Major General (ret’d) Peter, President, Returned and Services League. 2000. Interview by authors, 8 August.

Sidoti, Chris, Australian Human Rights Commissioner. 2000. Interview by authors, 18 August.

‘Out’ military personnel

Edwards, Colin, former enlisted personnel, Australian Defence Forces. 2000. Interview by authors, 12 September.

Little, Captain Emma, Royal Australian Army, army psychologist. 2000. Interview by authors, 12 September.

Livingstone, Flight Sergeant Mark, Royal Australian Air Force. 2000. Interview by authors, 22 August.

McClennan, Medical Corps Sergeant Scott. 2000. Interview by authors, 31 August.

Renshaw, Squadron Leader Chris. P., Senior Marketing Director, Defence Force Recruiting Organization. 2000. Interview by authors, 31 August.

Seah, Squadron Leader Michael, Senior Medical Officer, RAAF Base Pearce. 2000. Interview by authors, 13 September.

Stuht, Andrew, enlisted personnel, Royal Australian Navy. 2000. Interview by authors, 25 August.

You can download a PDF version of this report here.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A new study of gays and lesbians in the Canadian military has found that after Canada’s 1992 decision to allow homosexuals to serve openly in its armed forces, no negative consequences occurred. The study, titled “Effects of the 1992 Lifting of Restrictions on Gay and Lesbian Service in the Canadian Forces; Appraising the Evidence”, was sponsored by the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military at the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Key findings are as follows:

· Lifting of restrictions on gay and lesbian service in the Canadian Forces has not led to any change in military performance.

· Self-identified gay, lesbian, and transsexual members of the Canadian Forces contacted for this report who have served since the ban was lifted describe good working relationships with peers in supportive institutional environments where morale and cohesion are maintained.

· The percent of military women who experienced sexual harassment dropped 46% after the ban was lifted. While there were several reasons why sexual harassment declined, one factor was that after the ban was lifted women were free to report assaults without fear that they would be accused of and subsequently discharged for being a lesbian.

· Before Canada lifted its gay ban, a 1985 survey of 6,500 male soldiers found that 62% said that they would refuse to share showers, undress or sleep in the same room as a gay soldier. After the ban was lifted, however, follow-up studies found no increase in disciplinary, performance, recruitment, sexual misconduct, or resignation problems.

· None of the 905 assault cases in the Canadian Forces from November, 1992 (when the ban was lifted) until August, 1995 involved gay bashing or could be attributed to the sexual orientation of one of the parties.

The study was written by Aaron Belkin and Jason McNichol. Belkin is Director of the Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. McNichol is Doctoral Candidate in Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley and Director of ELM Research Associates, a non-partisan research firm located in Berkeley. The research was funded by the Compton Foundation, located in Menlo Park, California.

II. INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1988, gays and lesbians were prohibited from serving in the Canadian Forces (CF).[1] Openly gay recruits were prevented from enlisting, and soldiers who were discovered to be homosexual were dismissed. Any personnel who suspected another member of being gay was required to inform his or her commanding officer. This policy was relaxed slightly in 1988 by removing the order to inform, and by declining to dismiss soldiers who were discovered to be gay.[2] Those soldiers who did not quit, however, were denied access to promotions, security clearances, transfers, and re-enlistment. Canada’s Department of National Defence argued that the special mission of the Forces necessitated an exclusionary policy. Military personnel feared that gay and lesbian soldiers would compromise operational effectiveness, as well as damage “cohesion and morale, discipline, leadership, recruiting, medical fitness, and the rights to privacy of other members” (NDRI 1993: 76).

This report draws together prior research on gay military issues, press coverage, Canadian Forces data, and interviews with senior officers, academic observers, policy experts, and enlisted personnel to provide a multi-method appraisal of how the Canadian Forces have been affected by the1992 decision to allow equal and unrestricted participation by sexual minorities. Eight years after the policy was finally overturned, there is no evidence that any of the outcomes feared by proponents of the ban have occurred. The policy change has not resulted in increased levels of sexual misconduct, human rights violation complaints, or rates of sexual harassment. Further, the range of data collected for this study provides strong systematic and interview evidence that the lifting of restrictions on gay and lesbian service in the Canadian Forces has not led to any identifiable change in military performance. To the degree that the current evidence does suggest any trend, it would be toward more effective individual and unit performance as sexual minorities focus more on their work and new conflict resolution programs improve pre-existing tensions over racial, gender-related, and other interpersonal problems in the Forces more generally.

III. METHODOLOGY

Information collected for this report was systematically gathered from publicly available primary and secondary sources relevant to an understanding of military outcomes associated with homosexual service in the Canadian Forces. Sources and methods included: identification, retrieval, and analysis of all prior research bearing on homosexual service in the Canadian Forces conducted by governmental, academic, and policy-focused organizations in North America; content analysis of Nexis/Lexis search retrievals for all North American news articles and wire service dispatches relating to homosexual service in the Canadian Forces before and after the ban was lifted (1987-1999; n=172 articles); interviews undertaken with relevant Canadian Forces units and their senior representatives (n=10 individuals); snowball identification and interviewing of major academic, non-governmental, and policy observers familiar with gay-military issues in Canada since the ban was lifted (n=10 individuals); and interviews with sexual minority participants in the Canadian Forces who were located through the cooperation of leading non-governmental and military human rights organizations (n=9 individuals). Canadian Forces representatives were chosen by asking academic, non-governmental, and policy experts for suggested contacts who were knowledgeable about the military’s policy on homosexuality, and then using snowball identification techniques to identify other interview subjects.

This report relies on a multi-method approach to compare and synthesize evidence provided by a variety of sources in order to draw conclusions. Whenever possible, independent observations from multiple sources are compared to draw out common findings that are consistent among observers in different sectors (e.g., military, academic, non-governmental). During the interview process, we also sought to ensure that the universe of sources drawn upon for the study was complete by repeatedly asking expert observers from different sectors for recommendations of additional sources of information. While it is possible that additional confidential information on outcomes not documented in this report may be maintained by the CF,[3] senior officials contacted for this study were not aware of any additional data. The final compilation of sources that informs this report thus reflects an exhaustive inventory of relevant data and opinions.

IV. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A. Canadian Forces Policy Towards Homosexuals Before 1988

The policy of the Canadian Forces before 1988 was outlined in regulation CFAO 19-20, entitled “Homosexuality-Sexual Abnormality-Investigation, Medical Examination and Disposal.” This administrative order stated that, “Service policy does not allow homosexual members or members with a sexual abnormality to be retained in the Canadian forces” (Vienneau 1989). The Canadian Forces would not permit openly homosexual men and women to enlist, and any soldiers discovered to be gay or lesbian were to be dismissed. The order further required other personnel to inform on fellow service members who they suspected were homosexual. The military handled investigations of suspected service members’ sexual orientation through its Special Investigations Unit .[4]

B. Legal And Political Pressure For Change

The CF policy on homosexual service members came under increasing judicial and political scrutiny after the passage of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) in 1978 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985.[5] While the Canadian Human Rights Act did not explicitly cover sexual orientation, it required employers to justify exclusionary or restrictive policies. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, considered analogous to the U.S. Bill of Rights, also did not include sexual orientation in its enumerated list of prohibited grounds of discrimination. Section 15 of the Charter did, however, enable the restriction of other forms of discrimination if so ruled by the courts (Park 1994).

A review of federal regulations in 1985 by the Justice Department determined that the Canadian Forces were potentially in violation of the equal rights provisions of the Charter in a number of areas, including its discrimination against gays and lesbians (Gade et al. 1996).[6] In response to the Justice Department’s findings, the Department of National Defence conducted a survey of 6,580 soldiers to assess the potential impact of a removal of the ban on homosexual soldiers. The survey found that military personnel, particularly men, were strongly against removing the ban. Service members expressed concern about all aspects of serving with gays and lesbians; 62% of male soldiers stated that they would refuse to share showers, undress or sleep in the same room as a gay soldier, and 45% declared that they would refuse to work with gays. Many also stated that they would refuse to be supervised by a gay or lesbian soldier (Zuliani 1986). The Department of National Defence’s Charter Task Force recommended in its Final Report that the exclusionary policy toward homosexuals be retained, arguing that the unique character and purpose of the Armed Forces necessitated the restriction of gays and lesbians. Given the aversion toward homosexuals in the military, the report concluded that the “the presence of homosexuals in the CF would be detrimental to cohesion and morale, discipline, leadership, recruiting, medical fitness, and the rights to privacy of other members.” It further declared that “the effect of the presence of homosexuals would [lead to] a serious decrease in operational effectiveness” (NDRI 1993: 76).[7]

C. Development Of An Interim Policy

In response to the Final Report, a new Minister of Defence announced his intention in January 1988 to modify the existing policy only slightly. Under the change, the Canadian Forces would not knowingly enroll homosexuals. If servicemen or women were discovered or announced themselves to be gay, they would be asked to leave, but they would not be dismissed. Those who chose to stay would not be eligible for training courses, security clearances, transfers, promotions or reenlistment.[8] The Canadian Forces had already removed the obligation of service members to report on suspicions that another solider may be homosexual (Park 1994).[9]

In spite of the measures taken by the Department of National Defence, pressure to change the policy on homosexuals continued to increase. As court decisions[10] extended the rights of gays and lesbians under both the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights Act, Michelle Douglas[11] and four others filed separate suits against the Canadian Forces that directly challenged its policy toward homosexuals. In August 1990, the Security Intelligence Committee ruled that the military ban against homosexuals violated the Charter and found in Ms. Douglas’ favor (Bindman 1990). The Committee concluded that the military had not established that Ms. Douglas’ sexual orientation made her a security risk; instead, a “simple association” with a suspected lesbian was enough to make her “a potential threat to the security of Canada.” (Toronto Star 1990). The Committee also criticized the military’s “deplorable” conduct in its investigation against Ms. Douglas (Bindman 1991a). [12]

In preparing its appeal in the Douglas case, the Department of National Defence concluded that it could not meet the standard of proof required for a “reasonable limitation” argument under Section 1 of the Charter (NDRI 1993). While the Chief of the Defence Staff General John de Chastelain privately informed members of Parliament that the ban was about to be lifted late in 1991, the federal government delayed in the wake of an adamant refusal by some Conservative MPs to support the policy change (Harper 1991).[13] Finally, facing a case it knew it could not win and lacking the leadership needed to defend its policy, the Department of National Defence agreed to settle the case against Michelle Douglas in October of 1992. In so doing, the military acknowledged that its policy of exclusion violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and it consented to the immediate repeal of that policy (U.P.I. 1992; Bindman et al. 1992).

V. REMOVAL OF THE BAN AGAINST HOMOSEXUAL SOLDIERS

The policy change in October 1992 concerning gay and lesbian soldiers in the Canadian military was less an affirmative order than a dismantling of existing policy. General de Chastelain issued a press report that declared:

The Canadian Forces will comply fully with the Federal Court’s decision. Canadians, regardless of their sexual orientation, will now be able to serve their country without restriction. [14] (cited in NDRI 1993: 77)

In a communiqué entitled “Homosexual Conduct,” the Chief of Defence revoked CFAO 19-20 and all related interim policies. The military would henceforth make no distinction between its heterosexual and homosexual soldiers. He expressed his “full support” of the Federal Court’s decision and stated his expectations of support of the policy change within the chain of command. General de Chastelain also declared that “inappropriate sexual conduct by members of the forces, whether heterosexual or homosexual”, was unacceptable (cited in NDRI 1993: 78; see also Park 1994).

National Defence Headquarters issued a “Questions and Answers” sheet for use within the CF that explained the change in policy. This message included likely concerns and emphasized that homosexual and heterosexual soldiers would be held to the same standards of ' line-height:normal'>Q31: Will such activities as dancing, hand holding, embracing between same/sex members be accepted at mess social functions?

A31: Standards of conduct for homosexual members will be the same as those for heterosexual members. Common sense and good judgement will be applied and required of all members. (cited in NDRI 1993: 78)

No accommodation exceptions for homosexual or heterosexual troops were allowed, since it was decided that gay and heterosexual service-people could share living quarters (Swardson 1993). A “Post-Announcement Action” was issued by the Assistant Deputy Minister of Personnel to provide military leaders with guidance to “communicate the rationale for the change, encourage its acceptance, and respond to the personal concerns of the CF members” (cited in NDRI 1993: 78), and a CF Personnel Newsletter was also disseminated that described the policy change.

Because the courts provided the impetus for change, senior leaders endorsed the change and encouraged the members’ sense of duty. Senior political and military leaders believed that reliance on equal standards for the conduct of gays and heterosexuals was the best chance for success of the policy, since it focused on behavior rather than a transformation of individual values or beliefs. The military made no effort at the time to change individual members’ attitudes about homosexuality. Instead, the CF promoted the policy change through unequivocal answers to specific questions about appropriate behavior (Park 1994).

In December 1992, the CF issued a new regulation (CFAO 19-36) entitled “Sexual Misconduct.” CFAO 19-36 was to be used with an amended version of personal harassment regulations to detail what constituted inappropriate sexual conduct for both homosexual and heterosexual soldiers. Sexual misconduct was defined as “an act which has a sexual purpose or is of a sexual or indecent nature and which … constitutes an offence under the Criminal Code or the Code of Service Discipline” (cited in NDRI 1993: 423). Under the personal harassment regulations (CFAO 19-39), sexual harassment was defined as “… a type of personal harassment that has a sexual purpose or is of a sexual nature including, but not limited to, touching, leering, lascivious remarks, and the display of pornographic material” (cited in NDRI 1993: 431).

The revocation of the ban on openly gay and lesbian soldiers did not, however, settle the issue of the soldiers that had been dismissed or denied promotions because of the former policy. Each case was reviewed separately by the Canadian Forces.

VI. EVOLUTION OF THE POLICY CHANGE SINCE 1993

A. SHARP Anti-Harassment Program

The Canadian Forces did not institute a separate program to handle same-sex sexual harassment or personal harassment based on sexual orientation. The Standards for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP) program was implemented by the Department of National Defence in 1996 to increase general awareness among its civilian and military workforce about harassment and racist conduct, including harassment based on sexual orientation. The program was mandatory for all personnel and included separate courses for employees, those in leadership and managerial positions, and investigators and mediators. The program provided information and exercises designed to effectively prevent, recognize, and handle harassment and racist conduct.

The SHARP phase of harassment awareness has been completed, and the CF has now entered the second phase of its anti-harassment effort. The second phase of the program, which focuses more extensively on skills to handle harassment situations, is being developed by the Directorate of Gender Integration and Employment Equity and is due sometime during the summer of 2000.[15]

The SHARP materials provide a useful window into how issues of same-sex harassment have been incorporated into the CF anti-harassment policy. The SHARP workbook lists sexual orientation in its explanation of prohibited grounds of harassment. It further states that:

…harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation and hazing are not specified in DND’s civilian policy although both these behaviours are clearly prohibited. It is more important to recognize a behaviour as harassment than attempt to categorize it. (SHARP 1996: 9)

In its discussion of systemic harassment, which is defined as “…behaviours which could constitute harassment yet which are considered acceptable behaviour (normalized) in the workplace” (SHARP 1996: 10), the SHARP workbook and companion video use an example related to sexual orientation. It provides snippets of dialogue among four subordinates, including such comments as “He’s the best sergeant I ever had. He can’t be no fag,” and “He could be a fag; he’s got those big ears so a guy could hold him from behind.” The workbook then asks a series of questions related to the dialogue, followed by a declaration of the prohibition against harassment based on sexual orientation:

This video shows not only how systemic harassment is perpetuated, it also depicts examples of harassment based on sexual orientation. Despite how you feel about someone’s sexual orientation, you do not have the right to harass them at work. There is no reason why one’s sexual orientation would affect job performance. However, harassment negatively affects the job performance of a gay, lesbian or bisexual.

Every member of an organization has to feel that he or she is a valued member of the group. If an employee does not feel valued, then that employee will not produce at his or her highest level. Regardless of one’s sexual orientation, everyone deserves an “even playing field.” Skill and ability should be the only criteria upon which people are judged. (SHARP 1996: 11)

The SHARP section on sexual harassment and sexual misconduct uses gender- and orientation-neutral terms in describing specific behavior that would be classified as harassment or misconduct. Examples such as leering, requests for sexual favors, derogatory name calling and sexually suggestive gestures are listed without regard for the gender of either the harasser or the target. Sexual harassment by someone of the same sex, or abusive comments about one’s sexual orientation, fall under the general sexual harassment framework. The sexual harassment exercises include an example of same-sex interaction and anti-gay comments. In the answer section for this example, the workbook highlights the problem of comments which “perpetuat[e] the myth that all homosexual men will make sexual advances toward them” (SHARP 1996: 47). It further emphasizes that sexual harassment is not limited by sexual orientation.

Sexual harassment can be exhibited by anyone, regardless of their sexual orientation. Unfortunately, the men in this video do not recognize that the behavior they fear from the homosexuals is the same behavior that they exhibit toward the females. (SHARP 1996: 47)

B. Extension of Benefits

On June 13, 1996, a Canadian federal human rights tribunal ordered the federal government and federally-regulated companies to provide the same medical, dental and other benefits[16] to gay and lesbian couples as heterosexual common-law couples. The tribunal further ordered the government to review its statutes and regulations within 60 days to identify any provisions that discriminated against same-sex couples. The Treasury Board announced in July that it would not appeal the ruling, although it did seek judicial review of the time period allotted for review of the statutes (May 1996; May and Bindman 1996).[17]

The CF Human Resources Office distributed a memo in December 1996 outlining the policy of granting same-sex partner benefits to Canadian Forces personnel. Same-sex partner benefits were to include: compassionate leave, leave without pay for spousal accompaniment, military foreign service regulations, isolated post regulations, and relocation regulations. Same-sex partners would also be entitled to dental care and health care plans as dependents. Compassionate leave and leave without pay for spousal accompaniment were immediately implemented at this time, since the expansion of these benefits could be achieved through a broader application of existing regulations. Other benefits required formal changes in the Queen’s Regulations and Orders and are still in the process of being implemented.

The December 1996 memorandum stated that same-sex partners would be considered dependents for the purpose of benefits. To be entitled to benefits, a same-sex relationship would be recognized if:

...for a continuous period of at least one year, a member has lived with a person of the same sex in a homosexual or lesbian relationship, publicly represented that person as his/her life partner and continues to live with that person as his/her life partner. (Canforgen 1996: 2)

Canadian Forces members with same-sex partners could obtain benefits by completing a form similar to that used for common-law spouses. These forms, included in a January 1997 memorandum, required service personnel to inform the CF of their request for recognition of the relationship; to provide their names, ranks and addresses; and to “solemnly declare” that: 1) the partners are of the same sex; 2) that they have resided together “in a homosexual or lesbian relationship” for a continuous period of at least one year; 3) that they publicly represent each other as life partners; and 4) that they continue to live together as life partners. The Canadian Forces also provide forms for the notification of a change in relationship status due to death, separation or cessation of co-habitation, and for the reinstatement of a relationship that had been officially terminated (Hurl 1997).

In April 1999, a report by the National Defence revealed that 17 claims for medical, dental and relocation benefits for gay and lesbian partners of soldiers had been filed in 1998. All of the requests were made by women. The first claims were made in 1997, although figures for that year are not available (The Edmonton Sun 1999). The number of requests appears low even given the military’s own estimates that 3.5% of its service personnel were gay and bisexual even before the ban was lifted (Wenek 1995). Michelle Douglas, whose suit against the Canadian Forces precipitated the lifting of the remainder of the ban, suggested that the low figures were likely due to a hesitancy by service members to out themselves by requesting benefits. She declared that “[Gays and lesbians] have operated in a climate that has not been very inviting to them, nor encouraging, nor supportive, for a very long time” (The Edmonton Sun 1999).

In June 1999, the federal government agreed to settle cases before the Canada Pension Plan appeals board to allow same-sex partners to receive survival benefits, including military pensions. Ten days earlier, Canada’s Supreme Court declared that the Ontario Family Law Act was unconstitutional because it limited the term “spouse” to heterosexual partners (The Gazette 1999). More recently, members of the CF Legislative and Regulatory Service have been at work with legislators on the language for Bill C-23. The bill, if passed, would require that same-sex partners be considered common-law partners under the law. This would enable the military to handle all common-law relationships, whether heterosexual or homosexual, with the same paperwork. All remaining benefits relating to 'dependents' in the existing military regulations could also be extended to same-sex partners (LaBelle, personal communication, February 24, 2000).[18]

VII. EVIDENCE OF OUTCOMES FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES

A. Initial Evaluations

The Canadian military itself did not undertake an initial assessment of the implementation of its new policy concerning homosexuals. Because the idea of allowing gays to openly serve in the military became an issue in the United States soon after Canada’s removal of the ban, however, several analyses were conducted by organizations on behalf of the U.S. Congress and military. These included studies by the National Defense Research Institute (RAND) and the GAO, as well as a report by a retired Canadian corporal for the U.S. Army Research Institute. These analyses, as well as journalistic accounts, suggested that the transition was a smooth one. Despite concerns that service members would resign, harassment would increase, and morale would suffer, the reports could find no evidence that any aspect of military life had been negatively affected. While many heterosexual service members were unhappy with the removal of the ban, they responded professionally in the months following the policy change. Few homosexual soldiers, however, took the opportunity to explicitly state their sexual orientation during this time.

1. RAND’s National Defense Research Institute Report[19]

RAND researchers conducted interviews with Canadian military personnel several months after the removal of the ban on gay and lesbian soldiers. They found no evidence that the policy change had had any appreciable effect on any aspect of military life or performance. The officials with whom researchers spoke:

… kn[e]w to date of no instances of people acknowledging or talking about their homosexual relationships, no fights or violent incidents, no resignations (despite previous threats to quit), no problems with recruitment, and no diminution of cohesion, morale, or organizational effectiveness. (NDRI 1993: 79)

Canadian officials offered several reasons for the smooth transition. First, the military leadership had acknowledged the inevitability of the change in policy. Because the process had occurred over time, the military had been able to acculturate itself to the idea of including openly homosexual soldiers. Second, the military adopted a conscious leadership strategy in the implementation phase. Highest priority was give to ensure compliance with the policy change. Military leaders decided that it was not appropriate to try to change the beliefs or attitudes of individual personnel; they did, however, prioritize acceptance of the policy to minimize possible friction. Third, military officials emphasized the fact that the implementation had been accomplished in a low-profile fashion, without numerous public pronouncements or media scrutiny. Finally, officials cited the content of the policy itself as a reason for the smooth change. Officials pointed out that the policy change itself did not formally institute a policy on gay and lesbian conduct; rather, it established new equitable policies that applied to homosexuals and heterosexuals alike (NDRI 1993).

2. The U.S. GAO Report

A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) analysis of the first six months of Canada’s new policy also found no problems associated with the change. In their interviews with members of Parliament, gay advocacy groups, a veterans’ umbrella group, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Department of National Defence, and the Department of Justice, the researchers could find no one who had received any reports of resignations, lower recruitment, morale or cohesiveness problems, or gay-bashing incidents. In addition, the GAO found no reports of open displays of homosexual behavior.

CF officials reported that the greatest advantage of the change in policy was that gay and lesbian soldiers no longer had to fear being discovered and discharged from the armed forces. These officials felt, however, that many gay and lesbian soldiers would not publicly express their orientation because they would see no advantage in doing so. The military leadership’s public support for the removal of the ban and its unified front were cited as significant reasons for the smooth transition (U.S. GAO 1993).

3. U.S. Army Research Institute Research Report

At the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences issued a report in January of 1994 authored by an outside consultant evaluating early outcomes of the lifting of the ban in Canada. The report surveyed all publicly available literature to describe the original impetus to lift the ban as well as the consequences of the 1992 policy change on a broad array of performance outcomes in the Canadian Forces. It its summary of findings, the report states:

The impact of the policy change has been minimal. Negative consequences predicted in the areas of recruitment, employment, attrition, retention, and cohesion and morale have not occurred in the 6-month period since revocation of the exclusionary policy. (Pinch 1994: vii-viii)

The report author also speculated that, to the degree that long-term implications of the removal of the ban may become apparent in the future, problems would more likely have to do with questions of compensation and benefit support for same-sex families than any problems with “cohesion, morale, and effectiveness” (Pinch 1994: 46).

4. U.S. Congressional Testimony

Testimony on allowing gays to serve in the U.S. military before the Senate Armed Services Committee included a session on the policies of other nations. At this session, professors Charles Moskos, David Segal, and Judith Stiehm spoke about research on foreign militaries’ policies concerning gays in the military. Moskos did not discuss the Canadian case. Segal[20] and Stiehm briefly touched on Canada. Both stated that the removal of the ban in Canada had not caused any problems with resignations, recruitment or harassment. Stiehm stated:

Granted in [Canada and Australia], the bans have been lifted for less than one year. But, if mass resignations were to occur, we would have seen them by now. If codes of conduct were being blatantly violated, we would have heard about it. If known gay people had been beaten up, we would know. (Senate Armed Services Committee 1993: 394)

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Calvin Waller, who had commanded troops during Desert Storm, also testified at the Armed Services Committee hearing about the policies of other nations. With respect to Canada, Lt. Gen. Waller pointed out that the policy change occurred after Canada’s engagement in Kuwait had ended. Because Canada had not been involved in armed conflict since the enactment of the new policy, “we really do not know what those results are going to be” (Senate Armed Services Committee 1993: 399).

The record for this hearing also included a report on a comparative survey of foreign military polices on homosexual service. From a review of secondary literature, the report concluded: “The reality is that a majority of the military most likely did not like the fact that the ban was lifted but that its lifting was simply no big deal” (Pond 1993: 82). Pond further elaborated on the elements of the policy change in Canada:

Despite threats and warnings about mass resignations or military unwillingness to put the new policy into effect, nothing of the like happened. Even soldiers unhappy with the change saw it to be disloyal not to effectuate the change and MAKE [emphasis his] it work. (Pond 1993: 84)

5. Journalistic Accounts

Like official reports prepared on the policy change, journalistic accounts and citations of commentaries by soldiers offered no indications of any resignations, problems with morale, violence, or harassment due to the policy change. In the several months following the removal of the ban, Canadian officials publicly declared that the transition was going smoothly. Captain Marc Rouleau, a spokesman for the Canadian Armed Forces, said that “[o]ur indication is that the implementation has gone very well. There have been no indications of any physical abuse” (The Washington Times 1993). Captain Brett Boudreau, a Department of National Defence spokesman, stated, “We have had no resignations to date [at the end of January] as a result of the policy. We also have had nobody standing up and declaring their sexual preference.” He added:

I think people have come to the realization that a change in policy doesn’t mean the floodgates are open and that homosexuals will be coming en masse into the military. … There has been no noticeable impact on our operational effectiveness or anything else. (Ulbrich 1993)

Major Donald Oullette declared that the policy change had had no effect on his base in St. Jean. “Morale on the base is the same. No one’s quit, no one’s complained, no one has been harassed, no one has come out of the closet. There’s been absolutely no difference” (Hustak 1993). In addition, eight months after the ban was lifted, Rear Admiral Richard C. Waller, the commander of the West Coast naval forces in Canada, stated on the record that he had “heard of no harassment cases on one side or another” (Schmitt 1993).

While press coverage following the lifting of the ban portrayed an uneventful transition, several pieces illustrated that not everyone in the military welcomed the change. An anonymous Black Watch (RHR) officer in Montreal was quoted as stating:

There are a lot of guys in uniform who hate homosexuals, and don’t want them around in the service. A lot of men are disgusted with the court ruling, but they have to live with it. They don’t want to speak up. They’re just keeping their heads down. (Hustak 1993)

Lt. Col. Susan Rodgeman, an administrative office for the Petawawa base, thought that about 75% of her fellow officers on the base had concerns about admitting gay soldiers, but the base had not experienced any anti-gay incidents (Swardson 1993).

The clear-cut policy directive from the military leadership did appear to have a strong effect on the behavior of those opposed to the policy change. Master Cpl. Mike Simic, who felt that gays and lesbians could disrupt the critical teamwork necessary in the military, kept his opinions to himself. “My attitude is, grin and bear it. There’s a lot in the military that’s out of your hands. The policy is very clear” (Swardson 1993). Finally, Captain Dave Folkins, of the Royal Montreal Regiment, admitted that the policy change was a sensitive issue with personnel in the months after the removal of the ban. He argued, however, that “[t]he Americans have blown it all out of proportion. They’re making such a big deal for such a small minority” (Hustak 1993).

B. Recent Assessments And Observations: An Emerging Consensus

To date, the Canadian Forces have still not formally evaluated the effects of the full removal of the ban on gay and lesbian service in 1992. Officials that were contacted for this report offered several reasons for the lack of formal analysis. First, senior officers repeatedly stated that, for all the concern, the actual policy change had not been very eventful. Because very little of note actually occurred, there was not much to study. [21] Further, CF officials felt that making any distinction between homosexual and heterosexual soldiers, even for the purposes of data collection, would itself be a violation of the CF policy of treating everyone equally without regard to sexual orientation. A gay soldier reflected on this concern:

… [T]hey were afraid if they did do any tracking, it would be considered potentially discriminatory. Because there’s been other backlashes in other segments of the community as a whole where someone has tracked. ... I think part of it has been that we’re very sensitive about doing this stuff. (Forget, personal communication, February 8, 2000)

Finally, substantial budget cuts precluded any possible study of the integration of gays and lesbians in two ways: 1) the department that studied longitudinal data on the Forces was disbanded; and 2) a multitude of changes in the CF, as described below, have dramatically obscured the sexual orientation issue.

Despite the lack of formal analysis conducted by the CF, however, additional resources do exist that shed light on longer-term consequences of the full lifting of the ban. The following section brings together the quantitative and interview evidence available on the long-term effects of the Canadian Forces’ removal of the ban on gay and lesbian soldiers. Like the initial reports, the data provide no evidence of any ill effect of the policy on the Canadian Forces. There have not been any reported problems with harassment, violence, resignations, or recruitment associated with the policy since its inception.

1. 1995 Briefing Note on Removal of Ban

Although the Canadian military has never undertaken a formal assessment of the policy change toward sexual minorities, a briefing note on the removal of the ban was written by the Section Head for Human Rights Policy (a bureau of the Canadian Department of National Defence) in 1995. Two and one half years after the removal of the ban, the note still could not find any indication that the policy change had had a negative effect on the Canadian Forces. The 1995 note was originally prepared in response to a request for information by U.S. lawyers defending a discharged Navy lieutenant under the U.S. military’s policy on homosexuals. Although the CF official was ultimately prohibited from offering an affidavit for the U.S. case, he took the opportunity to the share data he had gathered with the CF command. He wanted to let them know that, “Despite all the anxiety that existed through the late 80s into the early 90s about the change in policy, here’s what the indicators show – no effect” (Director of Policy Analysis and Development, personal communication, January 20, 2000).

The briefing note examined all available behavioral data related to possible policy effects. A search of the military police staff’s database indicated that none of the 905 assault cases from November 1992 to August 1995 could be identified as involving “gay bashing” or be attributed to the sexual orientation of one of the parties. Of the 544 cases of sexual misconduct between December 1992[22] and August 1995, 22 involved same-sex conduct.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission reported that three of the 213 complaints reported between November 1992 and August 1995 concerned sexual orientation. Of these three, two pertained to differential treatment and release before the policy change. The third complaint dealt with the eligibility of same-sex couples for financial benefits. Those responsible for military grievances at National Defence Headquarters did not have an accurate count of grievances involving sexual orientation, since grievances are not categorized in a way that would allow retrieval of such information. They were, however, fairly confident that no more than a dozen of the approximately 2,000 grievances handled between from the removal of the band until August of 1995 included sexual orientation as a significant factor.

The briefing note also cited a 1993 attitudinal survey on quality of life issues which asked members, among other items, to describe how satisfied they were with the Canadian Forces’ policy on sexual orientation.[23] Out of 3,202 respondents, 43.3% were either satisfied or very satisfied with the policy, 24.4% stated they were neutral, 28.5% were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, and 3.8% had no opinion. The 1995 note compared these findings to a question on employing women in all units and occupations. In response to the question on female involvement, 44.1% stated they were either satisfied or very satisfied, 21.0% were neutral, 32.9% were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, and 2.1% had no opinion. The Human Rights policy officer noted that acceptance of the military’s policy toward gays and lesbians was quite similar overall to attitudes about the inclusion of women. Analysis of the 1993 survey further revealed that female service members were generally more accepting than males of the sexual orientation policy (although no figures were provided), and senior officers were overall the most dissatisfied (37.5%) and junior non-commissioned officers were the least dissatisfied (25.7%) with the policy.

In his conclusion to the 1995 brief, the CF officer declared that “behavioral and conduct data … yield little or no evidence to suggest that allowing homosexuals to serve in the Canadian Forces has been problematic, either in terms of their behavior or their treatment by other members” (Wenek 1995: 3). He qualified his statement, however, by noting that no information was available to estimate the extent to which gay and lesbian service personnel were actually disclosing their sexual orientation.[24] The concluding note went on to add:

It is assumed that homosexual members generally refrain from making their sexual orientation known, in which case behavioural and conduct indicators might not be reliable and the effect of the policy change on such variables as unit cohesion and morale would be extremely difficult if not impossible to measure. (Wenek 1995: 3)

2. 1998 Personal and Sexual Harassment Data[25]

More recent statistic